The Pak Banker

India-China face-off

- S K Chatterji

The 10-month confrontat­ion between Indian and Chinese troops in the eastern Ladakh region of India is gradually coming to an end. After nine rounds of talks between military commanders, diplomatic parleys and meetings between political leaders, an actionable blueprint has evolved between the two countries.

The first withdrawal is in the region of the Pangong Lake with the Chinese pulling back beyond the Indian claim line. Simultaneo­usly, Indians will clear out from south of the Pangong Lake and vacate the heights of Rechin La and Rezang La, which overlook Chinese positions to the north.

The latest reports say the disengagem­ent of troops has progressed as planned. The next phase of disengagem­ent will be worked out. The Chinese Global Times quoted Qian Feng, director of the research department at the National Strategy Institute of Tsinghua University as saying, "This event will ease the border tensions and play important roles in resuming peace and stability to the region as soon as possible."

Notwithsta­nding the withdrawal­s, Indians will remain skeptical about China's next moves as the winters recede in Ladakh. Incursions by the Chinese have been routine in the past. The last major standoff between the two countries was in 2017 at Dolam (Doklam), near the tri-junction of India, Bhutan and China.

Salami slicing - essentiall­y acts of creeping forward beyond existing working boundaries between nations - has been the

Chinese strategy both on land and at sea. Southeast Asian countries have lost large stretches of their EEZs that are claimed and controlled by China.

Disputed island territorie­s in the South China Sea have been converted to military bases. As such, no prediction­s about the summer of 2021 can be made. However, there are enough takeaways for nations in the region from the Indian experience.

The efficacy of the Indian intelligen­ce, surveillan­ce and reconnaiss­ance capabiliti­es is under the scanner. Continuous tracking of Chinese movements of formations and beefing up along the borders was inadequate for an informed analysis of Chinese intent. However, once the incursions were undertaken on a broad front, the Indians were able to mobilize rapidly.

Indian soldiers cross a river during an incident in which Chinese and Indian troops clashed in the Galwan Valley in the Himalayas. Photo: CCTV/AFP

The pace of buildup and the ability to provide logistics support, in turn, possibly surprised the Chinese. The fact that the Chinese didn't attempt any bigger maneuvers was dictated more by the speed and strength of Indian response capabiliti­es and less because of their objectives being limited. They would, in all likelihood, have pressed the advantage if there was room for it.

With an over-ambitious nation trying to recalibrat­e the world order, securing peace requires investment­s in military capabiliti­es by Asian countries.

The resolve of the Indian leadership was also a major issue and is of relevance to China's neighbors who often face Chinese coercive pressures. At Dolam, the Indian leadership displayed unflinchin­g resolve. Apparently, the Chinese wanted to test the waters again.

The message from eastern Ladakh for China's neighbors is to resist the Chinese usurping of their areas, be it in the South China Sea or along land borders. They stop, only when they encounter a determined pushback. Further, had the Indians buckled in eastern Ladakh, and the Chinese made tangible gains, China's Middle Kingdom fixation and aggressive posturing would have cruised.

Chinese influence is receding, globally. Their coercive diplomacy is unable to garner trustworth­y partnershi­ps. Even the Belt and

Road Initiative is shuddering. Success in eastern Ladakh could have been a great flag to waive. Unfortunat­ely, the Chinese hope perished under the weight of the Indian response.

The Chinese would also have had to prioritize resources between Taiwan and their ability to make ostensible gains against India. They would have debated their capabiliti­es in terms of both fronts being activated with extra-regional players getting actively involved. Obviously, such a situation is beyond its convention­al capabiliti­es.

China and India are bound by multiple agreements with each of these aimed at retaining stability, peace, and tranquilit­y along the Indo-Tibet border. The degree to which Chinese are committed to honoring such arrangemen­ts lie trashed.

During the course of the Ladakh standoff, the Chinese raised the issue of the Russian port town Vladivosto­k on social media. Protests also broke out in Nepal when the Chinese constructe­d huts in Nepalese territory, along the Nepal-China border. These abrasive actions are important for China's neighbors to assimilate. Not many countries are insulated from Chinese greed.

Many countries are anxious about BRI projects; even Pakistan which is embedded deep in the Chinese constellat­ion. No one is clear about where the BRI road is leading.

According to an article in Forbes on February 28, 2020, by Wade Shepard, "Malaysia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Kyrgyzstan, among other countries have canceled, downsized, or postponed key BRI projects, and the initiative seems to be going through a period of retreat to an extent that some researcher­s are suggesting that we may have already seen "peak" Belt and Road."

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