Putin's Ukraine bombing campaign

"We are going to scourge the (country) from end to end. We are bombing … city by city and ever more terribly in order to make it impossible for them to go on with the war. That is our object; we shall pursue it relentlessly."

High marks to readers who can identify the source of this slightly modified quote. Given Russian President Vladimir Putin's ruthless attacks on Ukrainian power and water infrastructure to inflict sufficient pain to force Kyiv to quit the war he started, he could have been the author. But he was not.

The originator of those and other equally vicious words was Air Marshal Sir Arthur ("Bomber") Harris, although second prize could have gone to U.S. Air Force General Curtis LeMay.

In February 1942, Harris took over the Royal Air Force's bomber command and promptly instituted a strategy of "saturation bombing" against German civilian targets. That year, the first 1,000-plane bomber raid was launched against Germany. Later in the war, Hamburg and Dresden were subjected to "fire bombing" attacks that killed many tens of thousands of people.

Likewise, LeMay expanded the strategic bombing of Japan that began in late 1944 as the U.S. captured Japanese-held islands from which B-29s could strike the homeland. After Japan's air defenses were neutralized, LeMay removed all machine guns from his B-29s to maximize bomb loads and began firebombing Japanese cities. More Japanese died in these raids that lasted from dusk to dawn over Haruna, Nagoya and Tokyo than were killed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki by nuclear weapons.

Concurrently, U.S. submarines and carrier aircraft cut off all seaborne access to Japan, effectively waging a starvation campaign to force surrender. But Japan stubbornly fought on. Interestingly, at the height of allied bombing in late 1944, Germany was producing record numbers of aircraft, tanks and submarines. It took allied forces to converge in Berlin in April 1945 to end the Third Reich.

Japan's seemingly suicidal resistance left the U.S. with two options. First, it could launch Operation Olympic and invade Japan.

Allied casualties were estimated in excess of 1 million. And based on the Japanese who refused to surrender during the island-hopping campaigns, a significant percentage of the population were believed to be willing to die for the emperor.

The second option was to employ "Fat Man" and "Little Boy," the uranium and plutonium atomic bombs. Given the alternative of an invasion, President Truman and his advisers unanimously approved their use. It took both bombs. Following the attack on Hiroshima, the Japanese War Council held steadfast. After Nagasaki, it was divided. The intervention of the emperor ended the war.

Putin's "terror bombing" of Ukraine has the same aims of Harris and LeMay in ending the war. But unlike World War II, Putin has little chance of defeating Ukraine on the battlefield as the allies did in Germany. Hence, under those circumstances and despite the Kremlin's assurances that nuclear weapons will not be used, at some stage will Putin have no choice except to consider the Truman option?

The historical differences between World War II and Ukraine suggest Putin will not and cannot decide on using nuclear weapons. Hitler's aggression and the horrors of the Blitz generated huge anger on the part of Britons much as Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor outraged

Americans. The Japanese were largely viewed not only as evil but as sub-human. Hence, LeMay's tactics, like Harris's, reflected public hatred of the enemy.

Ukrainians no doubt view Putin as the enemy. And Russia and Russians may detest so-called Ukrainian Neo Nazis, if any actually exist. But that does not apply to the wider societies of both countries.

Further, battlefield nuclear weapons are unlikely to coerce Ukraine to surrender. Lacking options, Putin could decide "winning" means obliterating Ukraine west of the Dnieper River. Perhaps 20-40 relatively large nuclear weapons in the 50-100 KT range would eliminate Ukraine as a threat and as a functioning society. Putin could then withdraw the bulk of his forces.

Would Putin take that risk? The answer is almost certainly no. But if his army collapses and were to be driven out of Ukraine, which is Kyiv's intention, then such dire scenarios cannot be entirely dismissed. There are historical parallels. Putin's current "saturation bombing" campaign is not unique to him.

"The Japanese were largely viewed not only as evil but as sub-human. Hence, LeMay's tactics, like Harris's, reflected public hatred of the enemy. Ukrainians no doubt view Putin as the enemy. And Russia and Russians may detest so-called Ukrainian Neo Nazis, if any actually exist.”