A method to political madness

There is a method to all this madness. The law of our land acknowledges the need for politics and its importance in forging a common future. That is why the legislature is designated as the specific forum in which political wrangling, debates, differences and alternative ideas can be debated and decided.

However, why only parliament? Why didn't the Constitution envision a political role for other national institutions? Why shouldn't the army have a political role as per the Constitution, or the judiciary for that matter?

Why has the Constitution gone to such lengths in trying to insulate the army from politics that it has mandated armed forces personnel to swear an oath that they will not engage in any political activity? Why is judicial activism in political matters frowned upon, or judgements seen as politically motivated seldom cited as good precedent? And why is the civil bureaucracy's apolitical nature extolled, or its dip into political activities decried?

It is simple, really. Politics by some is beneficial, but politics by all is not. If the army indulges in politics, who should we expect to look after our borders? If judicial decisions are based on the political winds of the times, who should one expect to obtain justice from?

If the civil bureaucracy is to act according to the conscience of their political bosses, and not their own, how will the state machinery function for the benefit of all and not just some? Briefly, if everyone indulges in political games, engineering, alliance making, breaking and fixing - whether it be the establishment, bureaucracy, politicians or judiciary - then who's left doing their portion of the work?

The problem is that when any one institution indulges in politics, it not only creates fissures and friction outside it but can also create highly charged and politically divisive opinions within. Some will say that picking political sides is wrong, whereas others may want to justify it in the 'national interest'. However, once this initial barrier of interference or non-interference is breached, the real danger arises.

Once an institution finds political interference acceptable, or at the least tolerable, it is only a matter of time before the institution, or its members, find choosing one political leader over another merely an extension of the national interest narrative. And if an institution starts thinking of political interference as a national duty necessary to save the country, much like the judicially fashioned 'doctrine of necessity', the very notion of the division of powers in the Constitution gets eroded.

For 75 years, we have seen this notion of national interest being used by the establishment to 'nation-build', create, break, mend political parties, or free us of corrupt politicians. It has resulted in devastating polarisation, divisiveness, instability and economic downturns. But in all of this, it is seemingly having another unfortunate effect.

It is contended by some that the same notion of national interest that has been the mainstay of the establishment is now playing out in the judiciary. Whether that is correct or not is yet to be seen. However, the signs are not encouraging.

Especially when you see some judges opine with conviction that parliament should only be allowed to amend corruption-related laws for "compelling reasons", the determination of which they reserve for themselves. Or when you see the Supreme Court read Article 63A of the Constitution in a way that no level of textual acrobatics would have allowed.

Or when certain politicians are declared sadiq and ameen, and others that are not, and certain politicians' trials need supervision, and others not so much.

Eventually, whether we would like to admit it or not, in situations where institutions are exposed to political causes for extended periods of time, they will be rendered susceptible to internal divisions and disunity.

In the establishment, there are already whispers of internal disagreements, with Imran Khan specifically alluding to it, whereas in the judiciary, issues pertaining to bench selection, partisan treatment and sidelining of judges of a particular and different worldview, all give impetus to the impression that there are internal divisions within.

It's intriguing because every institution in Pakistan is either a creation of the Constitution or created in pursuance of its provisions. To that extent, every institution, and its members, would gladly show familiarity with and allegiance to the Constitution and every provision therein which grants them their powers. But when confronted with a provision of the Constitution which they don't particularly like or fancy, may find it difficult recollecting or acknowledging whether, if at all, such restrictions are indeed found in the Constitution.

Even this is a small blessing frankly, as you see, some may not even bother trying to recollect, but may just prefer not to follow it, period. Why indulge in all these semantics when you can simply ignore them, right?

It is this adherence to convenience which has made Pakistan a politically supercharged landmine. In a country where the army chief's appointment is more important than the prime minister's election, where judicial appointments and army promotions are seen by many from the prism of power politics, rightly or wrongly, and where the civil bureaucracy is seen as an extension of the political government of the time, can one seriously say all is well?

Pakistan's institutions, for their own sake as well as the country's, need to take a step back and heed the voice of reason.

The establishment, if it has not already done so, needs to strictly adhere to its constitutional obligations and stay aloof from political