How the Putin phenomenon happened by accident
Vladimir Putin has just won his fifth term as president of Russia (or his first according to the 2020 referendum).
He has been at the helm of the country uninterrupted for 25 years, even while Dmitry Medvedev was nominally head of state, making him one of the longest-serving leaders in Russian history.
Like all those leaders, his lengthy tenure includes periods of reform, rapid development, stagnation and war.
What makes Putin’s political longevity increasingly puzzling is the absence of any distinguishing characteristics, personal or political, that defeated his challengers for the Russian throne.
The answer lies in how although Russia’s leader was determined by chance, the system rebuilt itself around him.
Putin does not possess any qualities that would distinguish him from other Russian politicians, other than the office he holds. He is an uninspiring speaker, his expressions are formulaic, if not outright primitive. He is slow to absorb new information and struggles to remember names and numbers. He struggles to grasp the mood of his audience, and has a mediocre, thuggish sense of humor at best.
Not surprisingly, he never made an impression on anyone until he gained power. Once he did, his apparent charm was the product of the respect commanded by his office, not his personality.
By contrast, Alexei Navalny, the Russian opposition leader murdered on Putin’s orders, made an impression wherever he went whether among seasoned diplomats at an embassy reception or inmates in a prison colony. If Putin were to enter a room unannounced, no one would notice him.
Putin is not the only uninspiring person to have led Russia, look at Nicholas II. But while his supreme power was inherited, Putin’s rise was very different. In 1999, the power obtained through appointment as prime minister had to be earned and defended, not merely inherited.
It is clear what made Putin president. In the absence of a political program that was distinct from his predecessor, he was perceived as a man of the people.
Because that is what he was, an average man. After 10 crisis-ridden years, when the elite invariably occupied the top positions, someone who resembled the views, approaches, and mannerisms of the majority appeared attractive. After a quarter of a century in power, Putin no longer resembles the average Russian. In 2024, his views on most issues align with those of a small minority.
The combination of his advanced age (in a country with a relatively low life expectancy) and mental inflexibility which prevents him from adapting to a changing world, led to Putin’s views becoming distant from those of the majority of Russians.
The sharp increase in censorship and repression of people who stray from the official lines about war and peace, authority, gender relations, etc. is a direct result of this divergence.
Putin can no longer pretend to be an average man, because he is no longer average. Russia’s citizens changed, but he did not, because he has not had to.
The snap forensic analysis after the March 2024 elections showed that the government had to add tens of millions of votes to Putin’s final tally to make his socalled victory look more decisive. Putin had no chance of winning a
"Across his quarter of a century in power, he appointed people to key positions based on personal relationships. Their professional qualities clearly played a secondary role. Of course, the state is made up of many institutions and many people."
competitive election.
He had to arrest, force into exile, and, ultimately, kill his political opponents, along with closing newspapers and prohibiting civil organizations, and making sure his only opponents were puppet candidates to make it happen.
As unimpressive as Putin is as a person, he is equally devoid of individuality as a politician.
Across his quarter of a century in power, he appointed people to key positions based on personal relationships. Their professional qualities clearly played a secondary role. Of course, the state is made up of many institutions and many people.
A significant share of those in power have made their way through a competitive, albeit undemocratic, selection process. Stalin or Khrushchev appointed the overwhelming majority of their closest associates, quick-minded, resilient, morally flexible people capable of working 20 hours a day, this way.
With Putin, for every competent technocrat like Igor Shuvalov or Elvira Nabiullina, there is an Igor Sechin or Vladimir Yakunin, otherwise useless personal friends.