MANAGING CHANGE AFTER EDSA 1 Korea, among other places. But the mess left behind by Marcos required that we “move on” in the genuine sense, and not the cosmetic “move on” that would have us forget the atrocities that had led to EDSA in order perhaps to cl
EDSA 1 was like popping a bottle that had remained tightly sealed during Martial Law but had emerging leaders waiting for their chance to contribute to national prosperity.
Thirty-one years ago, millions thronged to EDSA at the urging of Jaime Cardinal Sin to support Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile, AFP Vice-Chief of Staff, General Fidel Ramos, and officers belonging to the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM). Enrile, Ramos, et al. had bolted from the abusive regime of Ferdinand Marcos and denounced how Marcos had stolen the Feb. 7, 1986, presidential snap election from Corazon Aquino through wholesale fraud and terrorism.
EDSA 1 actually began the moment Marcos carried out Martial Law in the early morning of Sept. 23, 1972, although he had signed Proclamation 1081 declaring the imposition of Martial Rule two days earlier. Thousands of political opponents from political parties, media, clergy, and student, peasant, and labor activists were picked up. The detainees were headed by the charismatic Senator Benigno (Ninoy) Aquino, Jr.
Opposition to Marcos’s rule mounted as political repression, corruption, mass torture, and killings of anti- Marcos personalities, especially the idealistic youth, increased over the years, and as the economy worsened, casting serious doubts on his promise of a new society and better life under his “smiling Martial Law.” His main adversary, Ninoy, who had been locked up in various military and police jails for seven years and seven months and had come home from exile from the United States, was executed with choreographed precision at the tarmac of the old Manila International Airport on Aug. 21, 1983.
In December 1985, under pressure from President Ronald Reagan, who had tolerated Marcos in exchange for the presence of US military bases in the country, Marcos called for a presidential election to “secure a new mandate.” By then, the opposition had gravitated towards Ninoy’s widow, Corazon Aquino, as its leader and eventually its candidate in the Feb. 7 elections.
After the snap elections and after the peaceful revolution that EDSA 1 was, the rehabilitation of the country began.
When Ninoy was granted a rare furlough in 1976 in his house at Times St. in Quezon City, he emphatically told me, “I don’t want to be president after Marcos. I would rather be president after the one after Marcos.” Little did he know that Marcos’ successor would be his widow. This remark of Ninoy, a grizzled political veteran and an expert scenariobuilder, shows how complex and perilous change management would be after Marcos.
In the midst of celebrating peaceful change and soaking up the world’s admiration for our courage, the serious business of managing change had to happen. The Revolution became the model of peaceful change in Eastern Europe, Taiwan, and South
and is therefore the foundation of its governance.
The restoration of both Houses of Congress was a step towards providing substance to the principle of enlightened checks and balances, of sharing the burdens of power and failure and not just the glory of success. The next focal point was therefore the third branch of government, the judiciary, exemplified by the Supreme Court, whose credibility was restored by the appointment of competent judges with integrity and independent minds.
Key to the change process was deregulating the economy and getting rid of government monopolistic practices. During Martial Law, whenever a problem in a sector cropped up, the solution was more government involvement and intervention through Presidential Decrees signed without public consultation.
Perhaps the most important ingredient in the change process was providing opportunities for new leaders to emerge notwithstanding the fact that a number of brilliant, patriotic youth leaders had been murdered during Martial Law.
If the People Power Revolution had not occurred, the same family would be reigning to this day. Would a Fidel Ramos, a Joseph Estrada, a Gloria Arroyo, a Noynoy Aquino, or a Rodrigo Duterte have been allowed to vie for the presidency with one family treating the presidency as an heirloom? Would presidential hopefuls like Manny Villar, Dick Gordon, Mar Roxas, Grace Poe, and Jojo Binay have been allowed to present themselves as successors? Would Alan Cayetano, Leni Robredo, Bayani Fernando, and a couple of other leaders have been allowed to run for the vice-presidency, which is a heartbeat away from the presidency that had already been co-opted by one family?
The People Power Revolution saw the emergence of new leaders and created the environment for their development. EDSA 1 was like popping a bottle that had remained tightly sealed during Martial Law but had emerging leaders waiting for their chance to contribute to national prosperity. n