Implications of the BOI’s Mamasapano report

Much can be gleaned from the Philippine National Police’s Board of Inquiry (BOI) report on the January 25 Mamasapano carnage that took the lives of 67 people, including 44 heroes of the elite Special Action Force.

The BOI report was made available to the public last Friday before it was officially presented to President Aquino, allaying fears earlier expressed by cynics that a whitewash was in the offing.

The entire report was posted online shortly after it was submitted to Interior Secretary Mar Roxas, making it impossible to have its contents diluted or to have some personalities linked to it cleansed of involvement or negligence. This move possibly prevented further public indignation similar to what happened in 2010 when many got disappointed that the Luneta hostage crisis report was released only after it reached Malacañang.

Prepared by the Board of Inquiry composed of Director Benjamin Magalong as its chairman, with Director Catalino Rodriguez and Police Chief Supt. John Sosito as members, the report may have its limitations, which it acknowledges, but it tries to present an extensive narrative and analysis of factors concerning the events relating to the Mamasapano tragedy.

While the BOI was not successful in its attempts to conduct in- depth interviews with key figures like President Aquino as Commander-in- Chief, resigned PNP Director General Alan Purisima, Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff General Gregorio Catapang, or even commanders and combatants of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, it said it “processed and reviewed voluminous documents relating to the Mamasapano incident to produce an exhaustive and thorough analysis of such incident.”

And with such efforts that many may find admirable, the BOI was able to arrive at its findings and conclusions on violations of the chain of command, failure and breakdown of command and control, absence of coordination, ineffective and unreliable communication, defective firepower, defective mission planning, and defective execution of Oplan Exodus in which “troop movement was mismanaged,” among others.

The report’s findings dwelt extensively on the faults, failures, and imperfections on the government side, but many who are critical of the supposed partner of government in the peace process will find very glaring what is lacking or not discussed adequately in the report: the faults and violations of the MILF in Mamasapano.

Other upcoming Mamasapano reports may be more exhaustive ( as of this writing, the Senate has yet to release its findings on its series of committee hearings and executive sessions) and may even condemn the MILF, but for now critics of the rebel group have to be content with the BOI findings that the surrender by the MILF of the firearm of a SAF commando whose brutal killing was shown on video “might indicate that the individuals responsible… are members of the MILF.”

Nevertheless, many may find the BOI report to be quite forthright in its conclusions, foremost of which are: Purisima violated the preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman, and the President allowed Purisima’s participation in the planning and execution of Oplan Exodus despite the suspension order.

And for a grieving nation terribly hurt over the Mamasapano tragedy, some form of healing may come if the BOI recommendations are acted upon. These include the pursuit of “criminal and/ or administrative liabilities of relevant government officials, the MILF, and other individuals” and improved working relationship between the AFP and PNP, both of which “should jointly review related provisions of their respective written manuals and protocols to synchronize, reconcile, and institutionalize inter- operability.”

Positive action on the BOI report is imperative if the Mamasapano deaths are not to be in vain.