Sugar-coated war (2)
THE acquisition of hundreds of thousands of hectares of fertile plains in the Philippines was a windfall for the clutch of Sugar Trust barons, loyal allies of the Republican Party in the United States (US). One of them, Henry Havemeyer, was rumored to have bribed an assortment of senators and government mercenaries using Sugar Trust funds and stock certificates; he offered juicy positions in government and directorships in business corporations to assure the ratification of the “Treaty of Paris” by the US Senate. It passed by only one vote.
For all intents and purposes, the “Treaty of Paris” was a commercial transaction imposed by a nascent imperialist economy on a crumbling Spanish empire for the benefit of a certain class that had bankrolled political power. Lamentably, the “treaty” dealt a mortal blow on the struggling sugar beet growers of America’s prairie states, but Havemeyer and his millionaire ilk could not have cared less; those sugar beet growers were their arch enemies.
That was why the “Philippine question” was such a hot issue in the US 1898 midterm elections; not only did President William McKinley long for a second term, the Republican Party was determined to win the Senate majority. So, the truth behind McKinley’s “Christianize and civilize” rhetoric had to be hidden from the American public; a noxious “annexationist” label might alienate valuable electoral support.
Apparently, McKinley began receiving Spanish emissaries as early as July, 1898, only a month after Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo had declared Philippine independence. Secretly, Spain had accepted McKinley’s three-point proposal – relinquish Cuba, cede Puerto Rico, and negotiate the fate of the Philippines in Paris. It was imperative for the US to grab state power in the colonies while Spain could still claim possession of these.
However, the Philippines was the fly in the ointment; it had a Revolutionary Army, had declared independence, and was forging a republic. The unexpectedly fierce resistance of Filipinos was upsetting McKinley’s electoral timetable, so he unleashed a vociferous black propaganda campaign in pro-Republican media to turn the American public against the Filipinos.
The New York Times ran alarming headlines: “Manila Rebels are Mad. They Would Turn Like Savages upon the Priests and Nuns and Slaughter Them” and “Insurgents Not Our Allies” or “Aguinaldo, the Rebel Leader of the Philippines has Grown Arrogant and is a Hindrance.” On its cover, “Puck” magazine had a series of denigrating caricatures showing Uncle Sam roaring with laughter as he kicked Aguinaldo, the “dictator,” out of the Philippine islands. The American press referred to Filipino fighters as “savages,” “insurgents,” and “rebels,” never as revolutionaries. Only the Anti-Imperialist League took our side. Anti-Filipino propaganda prepared the terrain for the choreographed battle between Spain and the USA that ended with the signing of an armistice in Washington on 12 August 1898.
Leaving nothing to chance, McKinley handpicked the American panel of negotiators for Paris – Republican Senators Cushman Davis of Minnesota, William Frye of Maine, publisher Whitelaw Reed and two token anti-annexationists, former Secretary of State William Day and Democrat Senator George Gray of Delaware.
To McKinley’s chagrin, William Day was such a stickler for International Law. He argued that the Philippines could not be had for reasons of conquest because Manila was not captured by the US before the 12 August armistice and there was nothing in the document that effected a change of sovereignty from Spain to the USA. The only legal basis for a US takeover was “indemnification,” but the Philippines was worth much more than what the US lost in its mock battle with Spain, so that argument was untenable.
Enraged by William Day’s legal scruples, McKinley ordered the negotiators to offer Spain 20 million dollars for the entire Philippine archipelago, or there would be hell to pay. Spain accepted, it was horribly bankrupt.
McKinley sent a telegram to General Elwell Otis naming him supreme authority in the Philippines. Shortly after, the Filipino-American War exploded and in the US, news spread that Filipinos had viciously attacked Americans. Opportunely, the Sugar Trust distributed its ostentatious gratuities so the Treaty of Paris was ratified by a single vote. McKinley did not disappoint those who had contributed generously to the Republican coffers since the 1850’s; he gave them their sugar-coated wars.