Duterte school of foreign policy
(Part II)
By
THE Philippine President has come under criticism for supposedly overspending during his trips, thrice (inflation-adjusted) more than his two predecessors, Benigno Aquino III and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Without a question, there should be more transparency on how taxpayers’ money is being spent on foreign trips, ensuring that only the most qualified and essential officials are on Duterte’s delegation.
Yet, the bigger picture to keep in mind is that Duterte has travelled way more than his predecessors and managed to bag as much $40 billion in pledges of government-togovernment loans and grants as well as business-to-business commercial during his visits to Japan, China, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, and Russia. This is commercial diplomacy on steroids, an astonishing and impressive amount, which deserves more attention and credit.
Of course, it goes without saying that the challenge now is to translate these pledges into tangible investments, which will strengthen our economic fundamentals. China and Japan, in particular, are expected to play a key role in the “Dutertenomics” agenda, which is primarily focused on infrastructure upgrade and expansion.
The fourth element in Duterte administration’s foreign policy is strategic diversification, which, to the President, simply means that our external relations should “not be dependent on the United States.” During his first year in office, Duterte visited China twice (October and May) and became the first Filipino president in recent memory to visit Russia, where he met Vladimir Putin – apparently a ‘favorite hero’ of our President.
So far, there is no concrete plan for Duterte to visit the White House, despite the Trump administration’s invitation last April. If anything, a demurred Duterte said – back then abroad a Chinese warship visiting Davao – that he was “too busy” to visit Washington, usually the first major destination of Filipino presidents.
Just to put things into perspective, Arroyo visited 18 times during her tenure, followed by Ramos and Aquino, who each visited our sole treaty ally as many as seven times in six years. Duterte’s message is clear: The Philippines’ relations with America is no longer special and sacred, but more transactional and “normal.”
Under Duterte’s “independent” foreign policy, we have achieved a “strategic sweet spot,” whereby we continue to have robust relations with Western allies while also enjoying fruitful and cordial relations with major regional powers, particularly China. The AFP has ensured that we maintain the bulk of our security cooperation with Washington, despite Duterte’s rhetoric.
No wonder then, we currently find ourselves at the receiving end of major defense aid from both Washington and Beijing in the Battle of Marawi. Yet, this doesn’t mean that our foreign policy in the past year has been a straightforward slam-dunk.
Duterte’s fiery rhetoric, especially against key Western officials, has had some negative impact on bilateral relations with our key partners, regardless of how comfortable Trump is with his Filipino counterpart. Push comes to shove, will the American people be willing to sacrifice blood and treasure to help a country, whose leader cussed at their first AfricanAmerican president?
Of course, this assumes that the Trump administration will activate our Mutual Defense Treaty in an event of emergency. The other concern is that China may feel emboldened by Duterte’s overtures and highly cordial rhetoric.
As a gesture of goodwill to China, Duterte has refused to raise our landmark arbitration case at The Hague in multilateral forums, downgraded defense cooperation with America, and blocked any criticism of Chinese activities in the West Philippine Sea as the chairman of the ASEAN.
In exchange, what did we get in terms of concessions in the disputed areas? If anything, we know that China is expanding and consolidating its military installations on disputed land features, from the Paracels to the Spratlys.