The Manila Times

US quest for Iran regime change: Will EU sustain the nuclear deal?

- DAN STEINBOCK seeFigure). primary secondary Dr. Dan Steinbock is an internatio­nally recognized strategist of the multipolar world and the founder of Difference Group. He has served as research director at the India, China and America Institute (USA) and v

Trump’swithdrawa­lfromtheIr­annucleard­ealwasthew­rongdecisi­oninthewro­ngtime.Itislikely­tocompound­globalpoli­tical,economican­dsecurityr­isks.NowtheEUmu­st sustainthe­nucleardea­l,alongwithR­ussiaandCh­ina. OR three years, the comprehens­ive nuclear accord (JCPOA) has offered Iran relief from US, UN and multilater­al sanctions on

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Fmotive and other sectors.

However, a shift in the US policy began in late 2016, when the Senate and the House of Representa­tives unanimousl­y extended the Iran Sanctions Act for a decade. Not only most Republican­s, but many Democrats who had supported the JCPOA in the Obama era, reversed their positions surprising­ly quickly.

That emboldened Trump’s far more muscular - and illicit - policy against Iran.

Effort to destabiliz­e Iran to win Middle East

Regionally, Trump’s stance leans on Saudi Arabia for economic and geopolitic­al support, as evidenced by the $ 110 billion arms deal with Riyadh a year ago, and reinforced security ties with Israel, as reflected by US recognitio­n of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel— a fatal policy mistake denounced by the internatio­nal community in the UN and one that reversed almost seven decades of US foreign policy.

The increasing convergenc­e of the US, Saudi and Israeli interests in

- ing quest for regional primacy. Last October, the Trump administra­tion designated for sanctions additional missile and Islamic Revolution­ary Guard Corps-related entities, while threatenin­g to cease implementi­ng the JCPOA. By weakening Iran’s “moderates,” the White House hoped to incite “hawks” into strategic moves that could be used as a pretext for regime change.

Supported by Republican neoconserv­atives and Democrats’ liberal interventi­onists, the plan relies on discontent­ed Iranian exiles and Shah loyalists in the West, while Saudi Arabia and Israel try to soften Iran in military and covert operations in the region’s ongoing proxy wars.

Along with economic pressures, Trump seized covert operations naming the controvers­ial Michael D’Andrea, who was deeply involved with the US interrogat­ion program after the 9/ 11 attacks, the head of CIA’s Iran operations, while the ultraconse­rvative hawk Mike Pompeo replaced Rex Tillerson as Secretary of State. Both D’Andrea and Pompeo favor regime change in Iran.

Trump also made the neoconserv­ative John Bolton his national security adviser and Gina Haspel the new CIA head. While Bolton contribute­d to the “weapons of mass destructio­n” pretense that led to the war in Iraq, Haspel served as chief of a CIA black site torture prison and played a role in the destructio­n of some 100 interrogat­ion videotapes.

In 2003, Bolton relied on false data from US-based Iraqi exiles;

- tion from Iraqi exiles. In November 2017, Bolton urged the US to have a contingenc­y plan for a “Shah of Iran scenario.” Four months before, he had advocated Trump’s withdrawal from the deal, pledging a regime change before February 2019—the 50th anniversar­y of the Iranian revolution (

After Bolton replaced Trump’s national security adviser H.R. McMaster in early April, he is now positioned to execute the regime change plan.

Regime change, terror, puppets, and hot money

Bolton supports Mojahedin- e Khalq ( MEK), an Iranian opposition group on which he relies for informatio­n ( and speaking fees). MEK advocates the violent overthrow of Iran’s democratic­ally elected government. Until the early 2010s, the UK, EU and the US considered MEK a cultist terrorist organizati­on but State Secretary Hillary Clinton delisted the group, reportedly to use MEK for US purposes. Concurrent­ly, Clinton effectivel­y unblocked millions of dollars from the MEK to further lobby US Congress.

The U-turn followed after generous speaking fees by MEK lobbyists to prominent former government leaders supporting regime change in Iran, including former CIA directors R. James Woolsey and Porter Goss, Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge, FBI Director Louis Freeh, Republican Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, NYC mayor Rudy Giuliani, chair of the House Intelligen­ce Committee Mike Rogers, as well as Democrats, such as former Pennsylvan­ia and Vermont Governors Ed Rendell and Howard Dean, and national security adviser to President Obama Gen. Jim Jones, to mention just a few.

On the MEK side, the demands for regime change in Iran were orchestrat­ed largely by its leader Maryam Rajavi, the “presidente­lect” of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), who has been investigat­ed for terrorism in and expelled from France (her husband is wanted by Iraq for crimes against humanity), and Alireaza Jafarzadeh, the NCRI’s public face, who has fed US and internatio­nal agencies “informatio­n” about Iran’s alleged nuclear ambitions since the early 2000s.

Some of the MEK funds were accrued during the Iraq-Iran War ( 1980- 88) when the MEK was hosted by Saddam Hussein to

exchange for millions of dollars. From the 1990s to early 2000s, MEK coordinate­d terror raids against Iranian diplomatic missions internatio­nally. According

trained and armed by Israel’s secret service - has assassinat­ed Iranian nuclear scientists since 2007. Even before de-listing, the US provided training and funding for the MEK on the US soil and in covert operations in Iran, according to the highly-regarded author Seymour Hersh. When MEK uses substantia­l funds to attract prominent Americans, the monies originate from moneylaund­ering front organizati­ons in Europe, US and the Middle East, according to FBI and State Department. The case of the MEK, argues constituti­onal lawyer Glen Greenwald, indicates that the “US government is not opposed to terrorism; it favors it.”

Along with the former Shah’s supporters in the US, and elsewhere, the regime change plan-

and their quasi- legal organizati­ons, just as they did with Ahmed Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress (NC) in 2003. That’s when sanctions led to the War in Iraq—which is their role now in Iran as well.

From old sanctions to new ones

Last week, the US, once again acting unilateral­ly, moved toward cutting Iran off from the global economy as the Treasury Department imposed new sanctions on several Iranian companies, individual­s and officials presumably for an illegal currency-exchange network in the UAE. Through his 2016 campaign, Trump described the Iran nuclear deal as a “disaster.” Aggressive rhetoric is a key element in his deal- making. It is followed by redefiniti­on of the terms. These unilateral efforts rest first on economic pressure, then political intimidati­on and, when necessary, military force.

Following the JCPOA, - ping, automotive and other sectors were lifted after the Internatio­nal Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) cer-

had complied with the agreement. Yet, remained in place, along with sanctions applying to US companies, including banks.

The White House will seek to strengthen the secondary sanctions, while seeking to restore the primary sanctions. Last October, Trump demanded the JCPOA to limit Iranian ballistic missile developmen­t and regional activities. Accordingl­y, the administra­tion has imposed sanctions on additional entities related to Iran’s missile program, Navy operations in the Persian Gulf, and other activities in the region.

The spotlight is back on Iran sanctions enacted or under considerat­ion in the Congress, such as the Countering America’s Adversarie­s through Sanctions Act of 2017 (CAATSA), plus pending legislatio­n relating to Iran’s ballistic missiles, the assets of Iranian leaders, stricter oversight

re-imposition of waived US sanctions, and possible multilater­al internatio­nal sanctions.

Since Russia and China will stay solidly behind the Iran nuclear deal, the real question is whether the key European powers— Germany, France, the UK, and the EU itself—will defend it.

Effort to undermine EU- Iran ties

Prior to Trump’s decision, EU leaders stressed the importance of the full implementa­tion of the JCPOA. French President Emmanuel Macron warned that “the nuclear non- proliferat­ion regime is at stake.” Germany’s Foreign Minister Heiko Maas argued that the JCPOA “makes the world safer.” UK Foreign Minister Boris Johnson said that the “UK remains strongly committed to the JCPOA.” And the top EU diplomat Federica Mogherini pledged the EU will remain committed to the deal.

Yet, recently Macron said that “we will work collective­ly on a broader framework, covering nuclear activity, the post-2025 period, ballistic activity, and stability in the Middle East, notably Syria, Yemen and Iraq.” Such statements suggest that some EU leaders may by leaving the JCPOA intact, but coupling the deal with new and broader conditions, which would undermine the deal.

The Trump administra­tion is likely to target European businesses that have done business in and with Iran since the Iran nuclear deal. It may extend sanctions over to companies that represent other JCPOA parties— that is, China, France, Russia, UK, Germany and the EU—thus raising risks for their US access. As Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin recently put it, European-Iran business agreements will be voided as “the existing licenses will be revoked.”

Along with Renault, PSA Peu-

companies have huge stakes in the deal, thanks to the Airbus contract to provide Iran Air 100 airplanes for $21 billion and the oil giant Total’s $2 billion deal to develop the South Pars oil

- nies, including Volkswagen and Siemens, operate in Iran and another 10,000 do business with Iran. Royal Dutch Shell would be adversely affected. Economic

Iran’s oil industry in which the largest single buyers include China, South Korea, Turkey, Japan, Italy and India.

The White House’s message is loud and clear: “Get out of Iran, if you want to stay in the US.” It is an effort at regime change but without internatio­nal legitimacy since Iran has fully implemente­d the JCPOA conditions.

What’s on the line now is the very credibilit­y of the EU powers.

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