EDSA then and now: Slow killing of expectations

THE second part of this series on the EDSA People Power Revolution discusses the expectations of the dramatis personae in 1986 in contrast with the current years 2017 to 2021. Excerpts from my The Manila Times column of March 9, 2017 attempt to answer the conundrum posed in the first part of the series.

The original Cory Yellow army and the Catholic Church (read TMT, March 3, 2021):

“Some of us are no longer Yellows in 2017. Our perception of EDSA and our role in it runs counter to what is now being peddled, mostly by those of the recent past administration. For us, EDSA is not an Aquino family franchise, nor just a mere booting out of the Marcos family. And it is not a narrative of entitlements of two families.

“For many of us, EDSA was a decades-long seething anger against poverty, injustice and the emerging rule of the oligarchy not only in the economy but throughout the political structures. These were long exemplified by the pre-martial law Liberal and Nacionalista political parties; same faces of a political coin that held sway over the lives of the masses of Filipinos through their brand of traditional politics.

President Cory’s death

“The final capture of the color Yellow was consummated upon the serendipitous exquisitely timed demise of the EDSA icon when an opportunistic son rode on the people’s residual love and nostalgia to win power. Yellow from then on came to symbolize his own vengeful and exclusive ‘Daang Matuwid’ regime. PNoy, in his brimming arrogance, tried to exact from the people who once took part in the EDSA revolution, a certain sense of loyalty and adulation similar to that shown his mother. He failed.

“His double standards overshadowed his advocacy of transparent governance, and what we all witnessed was a man who used his power to inflict his wrath upon his political enemies. The economic policies that put the country in the international map, which in essence were intergenerational and a carryover from past administrations, were never properly attributed; in fact, his predecessor (President GMA) was incarcerated for the duration of his term in office.

Marcos loyalists 2017 to 2021

“The hundred yellow ribbons ‘round the old oak tree’ may soon be covered by red ones as Marcos supporters have slowly inched their way to political consciousness in the past few years from their solid base in the Marcos homeland in the north. This resurgence can be attributed to the tolerance and naïveté of President Fidel Ramos, a cousin, who allowed the return of the dictator’s remains under strict conditions agreed to by the Marcos family, but which they reneged on, perhaps with the quiet acquiescence of the FVR administration. This paved the way for the complete rehabilitation of the family by PRRD who has admitted to his own father’s debt of gratitude to the father, Ferdinand, and his fondness for the son, Bongbong. The son also did his part by demonstrating filial love, a trait much valued by Filipinos. On his run for the vice presidency, the Filipino millennial responded in kind. They are a powerful and versatile force that has clearly distorted the equation — partially alienating the Yellows.

The military 2017 to 2021

“Many of the major players have long been put to pasture and some tucked into the recesses of the bureaucracy. But the institution has a long collective memory, and it has

The somewhat awaited special meeting of the foreign ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) came and went without fanfare, perhaps partially due to the virtual nature of the meeting.

The meeting was awaited by many observers and stakeholders from within and outside the region because it was supposed to be taking place a month after the world learned of another military coup in Myanmar and was worried over the intensifying situation there.

Asean, being the regional organization of which Myanmar is a member state, was thought of as the body with the most interest in the latest developments in Myanmar and was perhaps the best equipped to deal with what was negatively unfolding in that country.

Some member states that are the most concerned about Myanmar’s sudden turn for the worse billed the online meeting as one which was supposed to exclusively discuss Myanmar. It is perhaps not an overstatement to say that many were pinning their hopes on some positive outcome from the meeting.

But at the end of the day, that was, again, not quite the case. To begin with, the meeting started in the late afternoon, nearing the news deadline for many media across the region. When the press release finally came out in the early evening, it was, to not mince words, somewhat of a disappointment.

For, reading through the press release that was slightly over two pages long, one would inevitably gain the distinct impression that Myanmar was perhaps an afterthought in the meeting’s discussions. One would have to read through nearly two pages of pleasantries and other general matters before encountering the summary of discussions on Myanmar that made up the last three paragraphs or so of the press release.

And the tone was one of trite reiteration of Asean’s governance principles and expression of regrets over what took place and passive calls for observation of nonviolence. Not many concrete, not to mention forceful, steps were laid out in the document to deal with the Myanmar situation. Same old, same old.

So, the meeting was apparently not even primarily over Myanmar anyhow, but discussed a range of many other admittedly worthy issues, including the coronavirus pandemic situation. Myanmar, at least for the moment, would have to take a backseat.

I emphasized keywords such as “somewhat” and “again” above, not so much as marks of indignation or disappointment as of expectation. There is not much to be cynical about here, at least for those of us who have observed this region and its practices over the years, but a sense of resignation and futility does creep in uncontrollably.

When I was working at the United Nations two decades ago, a senior colleague once told an initially very much idealistic me to the effect that the UN could only be as effective in carrying out its no doubt meaningful work as its member states want it to be, and no more. It took me a while to let the truism of that statement sink in, as I went through, often firsthand, the many setbacks and frustrations that have come to characterize much of the worthy international organization.

I think a similar observation is equally applicable when it comes to Asean, which is somewhat of a mini-UN for the region. Asean could only be as effective in its actions as its 10 member states want it to be. And, to be blunt about it, many, if not all, member states are reluctant for Asean to take a largerthan-life role in regional affairs.

Most Asean members guard what they consider to be their sovereignty and national interests very closely. Some take the notion of non-interference by Asean or its members in the domestic affairs of other member states very seriously.

I frankly suspect this emphasis on noninterference is not so much due to some Asean members’ respect or feelings of altruism for their neighbors, as their fear and worry that if Asean or its members were to do so, then a precedent would be set, and in future these same members’ own domestic affairs would be interfered with in turn, in a somewhat perverted logic of reciprocity.

This is especially so as some Asean members are themselves still mired in various forms of authoritarianism and are not shining examples of vibrant, genuine democracies. Those who are in power as such would of course not like to relinquish power under pressure from close neighbors.

In fact, some may even be in unspoken sympathetic solidarity with the military junta in Myanmar. The moral high ground to speak out or act against the military dictatorship in Myanmar is sorely missing.

This is coupled with the fact that Asean also famously reaches collective decisions by means of consensus among its members. That means any single member state could yield veto power over such decisions. Over the years, it is curious that where economic matters are concerned, Asean countries have reached decisions consensually with great speed, sometimes even ahead of schedule, despite the vast socioeconomic gaps among the members.

But when it comes to political or diplomatic matters, decisions on an Asean response were often stalled over the objection of one or two members. Various calls for reform of the Asean consensual decision-making process to allow for some degree of coalitions of the willing to take sterner measures have been stymied.

Of course, I am also not advocating for Asean to go for the other extreme of the cessation of partial sovereignty by its members to form a supra-national government along the lines of the European Union. Brexit has given us a vivid lesson as to what that sort of overenthusiasm could eventually lead to.

So, as Asean foreign ministers followed the instructions of their respective home governments, the collective upshot would be a compromise, which expectedly panders to the side advocating no stern measures against Myanmar. The irony of course is that Asean paradoxically owes its longevity to its underactivity.