Preparing for the worst
THE worrisome situation that continues to intensify across the Indo-Pacific theater — India-China border, Taiwan Strait, East China Sea, South China Sea — is subverting diplomatic efforts to restore peace and order, and escalating the prospects of an armed conflict due to clashing core interests of the great powers between China and the United States.
While our interdependent foreign policy seeks to push the peace envelope as the rational path towards diplomatic settlement for human and ecological security we, at the same time, are preparing for the worst, foremost of which is exemplified by the modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Our defense buildup has been hobbled by:
1. Fund diversions for civil defense due to the pandemic and economic disruptions;
2. Lack of government cohesion to remove legal, administrative, attitudinal and behavioral obstacles hindering speedy and trouble-free acquisitions;
3. Lackadaisical application of the National Security Policy and Strategy; and
4. The continuing failure to allocate a minimum of 2 percent of GDP for the AFP’s annual modernization and sustainment (parts, repairs, maintenance) needs.
We must resolve these asap. All those factors are within our control. Diplomacy must be supported by credible deterrence. There’s no excuse for our continued negligence to exercise our duty and responsibility to defend ourselves, protect our people, secure our resources and uphold national honor.
The government should use a portion of our foreign exchange reserves now reportedly at around $110 billion to offset the GAA’s diversion of modernization funds for social amelioration as well as accelerate the building of defense infrastructure and acquisition of air-sea-land weapons, systems and munitions.
If necessary, the National Security Council (NSC) and Legislative Executive Development Advisory Council (Ledac), both chaired by the President, should quickly shepherd the passage of a law warranting the one-time use of $10 billion under “emergency conditions” on top of the annual GAA budget. National security imperatives demand it in the interest of time and for our national survival.
These additional funds ($10 billion) should be employed for:
– Manpower buildup, doctrinal training and interoperable operations;
– Radar, integrated battlefield management systems and tactical data links;
– New bases and islands converted into forward operating combat outposts;
– Purchase of optimal quantities of platforms, weapons and munitions;
– Annual sustainment funding to maximize the useful life of capital assets.
Our new platforms, weapons and munitions need to have the quality, quantity, lethality, speed and range to effectively compete in fourth generation warfare, leaving our allies and defense partners to engage in fifth generation warfare. At present, our assets are qualitatively inadequate and insufficient in number to make a difference.
We need to have sufficient stocks in our inventory — manned and unmanned — to offset the qualitative and numerical advantage of potential adversaries and to sustain us for at least six months while likely fighting alone for our survival before our allies and defense partners manage to reinforce us.
Furthermore, our new assets on order (and in the pipeline pending approval) will take time for delivery, hence, procuring still in-service assets would be the practical thing to do to augment our brand-new assets given the probability of armed conflict among the great powers in the near term and to lower the cost average as well.
For example, Brazil has reportedly the most modernized version of the F-5E Tiger II, known as the F-5EM. It has 4 to 4.5 generation avionics. Upgrades were done by Embraer, where we sourced the Super Tucanos from. South Korea, too, has its own upgraded version, the KF-5E/F, which was done by KAI that supplied us with our FA-50s.
I assume that the cost of procuring these potent upgraded 4-to-4.5 generation F-5s from either country would be much cheaper per unit than either a brand new FA-50 or the Philippine Air Forces’ future multirole fighter. Make no mistake, I don’t mean forgoing the procurement of more FA-50s and the MRF. On the contrary, I mean augmenting, to add quantity with sufficient war-fighting qualities, to back up our new jets and future fighters.
As such, we could in the meantime acquire one squadron each of the upgraded F-5s from Brazil and South Korea, or 48 aircraft, which are replacing them with new fighter models. What’s critical are the avionics, long-range and penetrating capability of the air-to-air and air-tosurface/ship missiles, apart from their fuselage integrity and engine status.
We could, in fact, work out package deals with both countries. We’re actually buying 18 more brand-new Super Tucanos from Embraer. And we could buy at least 12 more FA-50s from KAI to complete a squadron. Completed deliveries of new and used by 2024.
As for the multirole fighter program, be it from Sweden or the US, the ideal would be to negotiate a package deal for a bundled procurement of capital assets to gain the most bang for our buck. We should apply the same approach to other major supplier countries like Israel, Indonesia, Japan, Australia and Poland.
For example, if we select Sweden’s Gripen (at least one squadron), we could negotiate a package deal to include Visby stealth corvettes, Gotland submarines and Rbs-15 Gungnir SSMs. If the US F16V Block 72 (at least one squadron) is selected, negotiate an advantageous package deal to include Himars, Naval Strike Missiles, P-3C Orions and precision strike weapons and munitions.
More importantly, whomever we buy defense assets from, we should enlarge the scope of our negotiating envelope to include strategic economic diplomacy. We must cultivate new trading partners and expand trade agreements with existing ones. If our economy is held hostage or crippled by hostile powers, there may be nothing to defend.
It’s noteworthy that the Navy is awaiting delivery of nine sea-going Shaldag V interceptors from Israel equipped with the NLOS SSM for completion, hopefully, within the next two years. It now has six Spike ER SSM-equipped MPACs for special operations in internal waters, a modest but good start.
Awaiting funding are six OPVs to be built by Austal in-country; two new ASW corvettes from South Korea plus two more Pohang corvettes for donation; two more landing docks from Indonesia; and new Scorpene submarines from France. Developing a formidable submarine force — at least six — should be at the top of the list.
And we could exert efforts to negotiate a package deal with Japan for at least three Hayabusa-class interceptors; four more new 94-meter Coast Guard OPVs in addition to the first two being built for us now; and at least three P-3C Orion maritime defense aircraft.
The Air Force is focused on at least a squadron (24 jets) of multirole fighters; 32 more S-70i Blackhawk helicopters; 18 more Super Tucanos; five more C-130H/J heavy transports; at least 10 attack helicopters; and at least three P-3C Orions.
It’s reassuring to know that the AFP has invested in air defense systems like the Spyder; standoff shore-based missile systems like the Brahmos; and a growing number of UAVs for ISR and EW in aid of all three service branches. It should, however, also place top priority on a quantum of cost-effective loitering, as well as precision-guided, munitions to sustain its war-fighting capability.
For example, Excalibur, Paveway, JDAMS and APKWS for precision- guided munitions; and mini-Harpy, Harop, Firefly, Skystriker, Warmate and Switchblade for loitering munitions fired from any platform.
As for our existing defense assets, there’s much that we can do to improve their lethality, interoperability and extend the range of their potency.
For example, we should accelerate the installation of the remaining weapons systems and munitions delivery for the two Rizal-class frigates, particularly its VLS multi-purpose missile system, SSM missile system and CWIS. Additionally, the two twin Mistral Sinbad launchers should be replaced with two six-tube Sadral Mistral launch systems.
The combat systems of the three Gregorio del Pilar frigates should be upgraded to that of the Rizal-class. That should bring up the total to five ships with the same systems and firepower. One Wildcat antisub helicopter (armed with Blue Shark torpedoes and NLOS SSMs) for each ship would maximize deterrence.
The three Apolinario Mabini-class patrol ships and Mariano Alvarezclass Cyclone should be upgraded for ASW and MCM warfare, led by the Conrado Yap-class Pohang corvette. Five ASW-MCM ships operating in our SLOCs would be reassuring.
Our two Tarlac-class landing docks and the Philippine Coast Guard’s five largest vessels should be appropriately armed with defensive weapons and systems — remote weapons systems, missiles, loitering munitions — against a well-equipped adversary.
The LDs ought to carry one AW-159 Wildcat and one AW-109 light gunship on board, and two guided missile MPACs in its well decks. The Coast Guard vessels could carry MD-500 light gunships of the PAF on board.
For our Army-Marines forces, let me cite some examples that need fast-tracking:
– ROROs to transport combat elements to the forward edge of their battle space;
– the Brahmos hypersonic SSM and Naval Strike Missile;
– MLRS such as Himars;
– More Spyder air defense batteries; and – Unmanned attack drones, suicide drones; precision guided munitions.
Deployment to selected islands and offshore facilities in strategic areas nationwide converted into EDCA forward operating combat outposts, and capable of repositioning themselves quickly from island to island to defend our SLOCs/EEZ and to interdict/ degrade incoming hostile forces.
Special mention for HADR: we need sufficient air and naval transport assets to operate in our high risk environment impacted periodically by typhoons, floods, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and tsunamis, such as:
– SAR heavy helicopters (Russia) – SAR amphibious aircraft (Canada) – SAR vessels, ROROs, hospital ships (locally built)
– DRRO, medical and engineer units (PA, PN, PM, PAF, PCG ready reserves)
We should prioritize local manufacturing in joint ventures with leading global defense contractors. Defense industrial parks in key locations around the country producing dual-use products for the civilian and military-security markets will spur national development and sustain national defense efforts.
Other fund-raising and financing initiatives to buy and sustain our defense needs stipulated in the national security strategy include the following:
– Sale of long-term bonds in capital markets, local and international;
– Lease of government land for technological, commercial-industrial development; and
– Lend-lease arrangements with allied nations for critical defense requirements.
If we don’t demonstrate our resolve to uphold our national interest, there’s no justifiable basis to expect our allies and defense partners to do it for us. They will place their own national interest above all else. They will not help a country unwilling to defend itself.
Our interdependent foreign policy places emphasis on being a “friend to all, enemy to none.” While our Constitution bars us from waging war, it expects us to defend ourselves against hostile threats, foreign and domestic. In that case, we should do everything we can to wage peace but, at the same time, prepare ourselves for the worst outcomes.
That is what every mature and responsible nation does to survive and progress.