Setting our wrongheaded defense policy right

AT the White House summit he hosted for Japanese Prime Minister Fukio Kishida and President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. on April 11, United States President Joseph Biden again assured that the US’ commitment to the Philippines’ security was “ironclad.”

Exactly how long would that protection last?

“For as long as President Biden is the president of the United States, the Philippines can count on him, and his team’s full support from proving our bilateral relationship and for meeting our commitment, our treaty commitments to the Philippines,” US National Security Communications Adviser John Kirby told the Philippine media accompanying Marcos in Washington.

So, America has our back for about nine months until its next president takes office on Jan. 20, 2025, if Biden loses or skips the November presidential election, or that same date in 2029 if he wins. In most of the latest voter surveys, Biden is slightly behind former president Donald Trump, almost surely his Republican opponent, who is not as keen on US military intervention overseas.

This highlights one big problem with our US-dependent defense policy: America can alter its commitment depending on its leadership and its changing global priorities. Thus, Washington did not help when Beijing took control of Mischief Reef in 1995 and Scarborough Shoal in 2012.

In the 1990s, the US was not competing with China, being the sole world superpower after Soviet communism collapsed. And in 2012, with its Pivot to Asia plan to move 60 percent of its naval forces to the region, false information from an American official led us to our Scarborough loss. It was then exploited to push for the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), signed two years later in 2014, escalating US military deployment here with access to bases of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

For now, with Biden’s National Security Strategy declaring as a top US global priority “Out-Competing China and Constraining Russia,” America has mobilized Japan, Australia, and European allies France, Germany and the United Kingdom to back our country in maritime frictions with China.

America, Japan, Australia and other Western countries have also boosted security, economic, energy, infrastructure and other aid, enterprise, and cooperation programs for us. This flurry of allied goodies aims to boost support for the US alliance and the Marcos regime despite the terrifying dangers they pose in making us a front line in the US-China conflict through the influx of American forces — the very same reason Japan invaded us in the Second World War.

Restoring our independence

But can we actually defend our ation without US protection?

Most Filipinos probably think not, and that has kept us hanging on the coattails of Uncle Sam even after regaining independence in 1946 and despite the departure of American forces in 1992 after Mount Pinatubo’s

eruption destroyed Clark Air Base and our Senate rightly blocked Washington’s continued use of the Subic Bay naval base.

In fact, most countries do not rely on outside forces, with Vietnam as the best example of a nation with China frictions and even actual hostilities, yet holding its own without foreign allies, bases and forces for its defense and foreign use of its territory against other nations — the very things EDCA brings, which could drag us into devastating war.

So, how can we devise a defense policy without overly relying on foreign nations? Even before we consider the size, capabilities and weapons for our military, let’s clarify our nation’s paramount security priorities and challenges.

The first has to be securing our archipelago and our people from immediate threats to peace and livelihood, from violent crime and insurgency to terrorism and piracy.

Hence, Rodrigo Duterte’s administration was right to prioritize ending Mindanao violence through the Bangsamoro peace initiative and the Marawi siege against Islamic State-backed terrorists. And when peace talks with communist rebels failed despite such concessions as appointing leftist Cabinet members, resolute counterinsurgency was also correct.

Also, part of securing our people are policies for the safety of millions of overseas Filipino workers, especially those in strife-torn areas. That means building transport capabilities and overseas cooperation for evacuation. It also means avoiding public statements that could provoke a terrorist attack on Filipinos at home, especially in Mindanao, and abroad, particularly in the Middle East.

What about invasion? That’s certainly a paramount security concern, but not an immediate threat, despite China frictions and President Marcos’ fear of becoming a wartime “front line,” as we were in the 1940s. And in addressing this second challenge, we must consider defensive and preventive measures. More on this later.

A third concern, now making headlines, is the assertion of our sovereignty and sovereign rights, especially those facing foreign encroachment and violation. In addressing this concern, we must balance it with other national priorities.

For instance, even if we claim Sabah as ours, based on the historic title held by the Sultan of Sulu, we have desisted from pursuing this claim to maintain peace with Malaysia and enlist its support in ending the rebellion in Mindanao.

As for our territorial claims over islands and shoals in the West Philippine Sea (WPS) and our assertion of sovereign rights in our exclusive economic zone, the Marcos government, prodded by the West and Japan, has taken a much stronger stance than past administrations.

After the Biden-Kishida-Marcos summit, our President expects greater stability and new dynamics with the enhanced security alliance between America, Japan and the Philippines. The argument is that this trilateral defense arrangement would curb China’s use of force in the WPS and enable us to better assert our claims and rights.

And — wait for it — the key to this security triangle, the USdriven narrative goes, is the use of EDCA bases by America and probably other allies, as well.

As our April 11 column argued, involving the West and Japan in our China frictions would only harden Beijing’s stance and probably lead to even graver incidents than water cannon, laser blinding and vessel collisions.

There are far better policies and measures to serve our security priorities without bringing war on ourselves, as our April 18 column will explain.