Justice fears more free porn on Web

SENIOR Associate Justice Antonio Carpio has warned his colleagues in the Supreme Court of the possible proliferation of free and open porn sites on the Internet in the aftermath of the high court ruling that upheld the constitutionality of cybersex as a cybercrime.

This is because the provision on cybersex only addressed prohibit and penalize “fee-based” websites “exhibiting sexual organs and sexual activity.”

“Instead of purging the Internet of pornographic content, Section 4(c)1 will trigger the proliferation of free and open porn websites which, unlike their fee-based counterparts, are not subject to criminal regulation under (that section),” Carpio said in his concurring and dissenting opinion to the Feb. 11 high court ruling on the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Cyber-crime Prevention Act of 2012.

He said the section should have prohibited and penalized free and open porn websites because they are accessible to both minors and adults.

“It is doubtful whether Congress, in failing to tailor Section 4(c)(1) to narrowly advance state interests, foresaw this worrisome and absurd effect. It is, unfortunately, an altogether common byproduct of loosely crafted legislation,” Carpio said.

Carpio had dissented on the position taken by Associate Justice Roberto Abad, who penned the high court ruling on the constitutionality of certain provisions of the cyber-crime law that Section 4(c)1 of the law penalizing cyber-sex was not equally violative of the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and expression.

Section 4( c)( 1) penalizes the “willful engagement, maintenance, control or operation, directly or indirectly, of any lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or consideration.”

In his 32-page concurring and dissenting opinion, Carpio said he voted that the provision be declared unconstitutional since it failed the “strict scrutiny” test which was “the most stringent standard of review for speech restrictive laws.”

“Under this heightened scrutiny, a regulation will pass muster only if the government shows a compelling state interest justifying the suppression of speech; and that the law is narrowly-tailored to further such state interest,” he said, noting that “the government failed to discharge its burden” on these two requirements.