Why Duterte is failing
Let’s start with the simple fact of failure. Last week, the data scientist who studies COVID-19 statistics for ABS-CBN, the indispensable Edson Guido, presented the existing data from the Department of Health in a different way—and, for me and for many others, it seemed as though the fog of pandemic had lifted. The reality of failure was there for all to see.
He ran a short list: number of cases reported per month. It looked like this:
March - 2,078
April - 6,385
May - 9,546
June - 19,284
July - 55,594
Aug. 1 to 12 - 51,092
In other words, the coronavirus pandemic is anything but contained. Indeed, by Aug. 15, the total number of cases for August alone had reached 65,661; the total for the first two weeks of August was higher, by a staggering 10,000 cases, than the total for the whole month of July.
Yes, it could have been worse—but IT IS TERRIBLE AS IT IS.
In a subsequent tweet, Guido presented the data in yet another way:
Mar > Jan + Feb
Apr > Jan + Feb + Mar
May > Jan + Feb + Mar + Apr
Jun > Jan + Feb + Mar + Apr + May
Jul > Jan + Feb + Mar + Apr + May + Jun This pattern is the very opposite of containment, the exact antithesis of we-have-thisunder-control. Guido added a note: “Number of confirmed cases in August is on pace to exceed the Jan to July total of nearly 93,000. Hope things improve in the coming weeks.”
As of Aug. 17, the total number of cases reported for August is 72,395. It is only a matter of mere days before we can say, in anger and sorrow, that the same, nightmarish pattern of failure has been followed:
Aug > Jan + Feb + Mar + Apr + May + Jun + Jul Why has the Duterte administration failed to contain the pandemic? Or, to be more precise: Why has the Duterte administration failed to contain the pandemic—despite the proven cooperation of the public, the unprecedented outpouring of corporate and other private-sector contributions, and, especially in the first months of the lockdown, the phenomenal volunteerism of thousands of Filipinos?
First, because the administration, from the President down, initially—and instinctively— understood the coming coronavirus crisis as a public relations problem. The government bureaucracy took its cue from President Duterte’s early pronouncements, when he downplayed the gravity of the crisis (denied, in fact, that it was a crisis) and said he wanted to track the virus down so he could slap it. Posturing is Duterte 101 (and, as I’ve written before, in “Slapping Duterte,” slapping someone in the face is the longtime city mayor’s preferred mode of showing contempt and inflicting humiliation). When the health secretary, already lacking credibility even in administration circles, spends official time handing out washable face masks, thus acting like a candidate for office instead of the country’s top health official in the middle of a health emergency, we can trace the public relations impulse all the way back to the President’s time-tested governance approach of striking a pose.
His die-hard supporters should not take offense at this label, because their support for him is based in part on this macho posturing; they love him for making these larger-thanlife gestures, for pleasing them with spectacle. That is why there is a straight line linking the presidential candidate’s (spectacular but unfulfilled) promise to ride a jet ski to defend the country from China to the President’s (spectacular but unfulfillable) promise to be the first to try the Russian vaccine.
Second, because President Duterte, after belatedly recognizing the significance of the pandemic, decided to approach the crisis not as a public health emergency but as a crisis in peace and order. Again, this was in keeping with his character and with a political temperament shaped by two decades of virtually unchallenged success as a local executive. That is why the lockdown was and remains the government’s main response; that is why emergency powers were among the first to be demanded; that is why the police have assumed an oversized role in the crisis. The President understands the worst public health emergency in a hundred years as a law enforcement problem. The many unsettling and unnecessary appeals to the public to cooperate, to show discipline, come from a police mindset.
To be sure, a new twist was added: The President placed retired military generals in charge. They may be competent officials, but, for the most part, their training and their experience work against them in a public health crisis: They work in top-down decision-making structures, they value certainty and find it difficult to deal with ambiguity, they see medical services as ancillary to their main objectives.
Third, because the Duterte administration is distracted by factional infighting. This can be seen in slow motion in the ongoing Senate and congressional hearings on alleged corruption in Philhealth, the state-owned health insurance agency, but the tug-of-war can also be seen in other government departments. For instance, former information and communications technology undersecretary Eliseo Rio (to be sure, another retired military general) is now documenting instances of infighting within the government during the pandemic. That helps explain why the longest lockdown in the world has failed to contain the coronavirus.
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