Illegal?

As we go to the polls today, let us hope and pray that the real choice of the people will still be ascertained by the questionable machines to be used in the voting and counting. Despite the ComelecÕs assurance of Òall systems goÓ there are still doubts and apprehensions on whether the Automated Election System Þrst used in the 2010 presidential election will enable us to legitimately exercise our right of suffrage.

Since this system was adopted, voters do not anymore personally write on the ballots the names of the candidates or party list organization they are voting for which is the most important and sacred aspect in the exercise of this right. Instead they just shade the numbered ovals assigned to these candidates and organizations and let the machines do the rest. The ballots are no longer opened and their contents read allowed by the teachers, in their presence which enables them to witness the vote by vote tally at the precinct level. Now the ballots are merely scanned by the machines which churn out the results of the count.

Ordinary voters of course have not heard of, nor can they fully comprehend or even care to know the meaning of the many technical terms connected with these machines. This is the Þrst time indeed when they have come across the much talked about words like Òsource codeÓ Òcompact ßash cardsÓ and Òdigital signaturesÓ. They are not really aware of their importance in preventing electronic fraud or computerized cheating.

In fact the Comelec Chief himself earlier said that the automated election can proceed even without the source code since no such code has yet been submitted by Smartmatic at that time. And when Smartmatic belatedly submitted a source code, he himself admitted in a press conference that it is merely the source code for the 2010 elections which was enhanced in 2011.

Obviously, this late submission has not allayed the apprehension of the electorate about the possible illegality of the coming election. The law itself (RA 9369 as amended) is quite clear and categorical here. First of all, it requires a source code for this election and not the source code for the past election even if enhanced. And the reason is quite simple. We are electing different sets of ofÞcers now than in the last presidential election. Secondly, the law requires a review of the source code before the election. Even a non IT expert can easily see that such technical review cannot be completed in a weekend before the election. What happened last weekend was that the alleged source code contained in a computer disc was only shown on a desktop computer for viewing by those present prior to its hand over to the Central Bank for safekeeping. DeÞnitely, this is not the kind of review contemplated by law which takes several weeks.

The law requires such review prior to the election because according to Fr. Romeo J. Intengan, S.J., it will Òdetect any unintentional technical mistakes which could render the results erroneousÓ, and more importantly, it will detect Òany malicious programming or vulnerability to malicious programming that could intentionally be used to intentionally perpetrate electronic election fraudÓ.

Another reason for the continuing apprehension of the electorate in todayÕs election is the persistent disregard by the Comelec of another safety measure provided by law. And this is, according to Fr. Intengan again, Òthe afÞxing of the digital (special bar-code type of electronic) signature of each member of the BEIs and BOCs (Board of Canvassers) to the election returns and certiÞcates of canvass (CCS), before these are transmitted electronically from the PCOS to the CCS at various levelsÓ.

ÒThese digital, bar-code type electronic signatures, unique to each BEI and BOC members, is generated within the PCOS machine when two button keys have been inserted into the appropriate receptor cavity in the PCOS machine. One key is the Òpublic keyÓ in possession of the BEI Chair to open the machineÕs transmission function. This is the key inserted Þrst into its designated receptacle cavity. The other keys, the Òprivate keys,Ó unique to each member of the BEI, are supposed to be produced for COMELEC by such agencies as the National Computer Center, and provided to their respective owners shortly before the election. When the private key of a BEI member is inserted into the appropriate receptacle cavity of the PCOS machine, after the public key has been previously inserted, the PCOS machine produces the unique bar-code type digital signature of the BEI member, afÞxed to the electronic election returns that the PCOS will transmit electronically to the CCS (Canvassing Committees).

The law says that the transmitted electronic election returns are the ofÞcial returns. These are the bases for counting of votes and the proclamation of winners. The printouts churned out by the PCOS machine and given to PPCRV and other citizensÕ watchdog group, and also to the media (KBP), are not ofÞcial, and in case of conßict, the printouts give way to the electronic transmissions. Without the BEI signatures, there is no way to differentiate between the authentic and spurious transmissions received by the municipal or city CCS, and all the way up to the provincial and the national levelsÓ.

The apprehension here, as Fr. Intengan pointed out, is that the digital signatures of BEI members will not be attached to the election returns before their electronic transmission. So Òwithout (digital electronic) signatures of the BEI, there are no ofÞcial election returns (ERs). Without the ofÞcial ERs, there is no legal basis for counting votes. Without legal basis for counting votes, there is no legal basis for proclaiming the winnersÓ.

These are really some valid observations that place in doubt the legality of this election and the election last 2010.

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