The Philippine Star

A dangerous game is underway in Asia

- By MIKE M. MOCHIZUKI and MICHAEL D. SWAINE The New York Times Mike M. Mochizuki is a professor at George Washington University and a nonresiden­t fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsibl­e Statecraft. Michael D. Swaine is a senior research fellow focu

Earlier this month, President Biden threw one of the most lavish state dinners in Washington’s recent memory. Celebritie­s and billionair­es flocked to the White House to dine in honor of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan, posing for photos in front of an elaborate display of Japanese fans. Jeff Bezos dropped by; Paul Simon provided the entertainm­ent.

The spectacle was part of a carefully orchestrat­ed series of events to showcase the renewed US-Japan relationsh­ip – and the notable transforma­tion of the United States’ security alliances in Asia. The next day, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. of the Philippine­s was also in the US capital for a historic US-JapanPhili­ppines summit, during which a new trilateral security partnershi­p was announced.

Both events were directed at the same audience: China.

Over the past several years, Washington has built a series of multilater­al security arrangemen­ts like these in the Asia-Pacific region. Although US officials claim that the recent mobilizati­on of allies and partners is not aimed at China, don’t believe it. Indeed, Mr. Kishida emphasized in a speech to Congress on April 11 that China presents “the greatest strategic challenge” both to Japan and to the internatio­nal community.

China’s recent activity is, of course, concerning. Its military has acquired ever more potent ways to counter US and allied capabiliti­es in the Western Pacific and has behaved aggressive­ly in the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait and elsewhere, alarming its neighbors.

But Washington’s pursuit of an increasing­ly complex lattice of security ties is a dangerous game. Those ties include upgrades in defense capabiliti­es, more joint military exercises, deeper intelligen­ce sharing, new initiative­s on defense production and technology cooperatio­n and the enhancemen­t of contingenc­y planning and military coordinati­on. All of that may make Beijing more cautious about the blatant use of military force in the region. But the new alliance structure is not, on its own, a long-term guarantor of regional peace and stability – and could even increase the risk of stumbling into a conflict.

The security partnershi­p rolled out this month in Washington is only the latest in a string of new defense configurat­ions that reach across Asia and the Pacific. In 2017 the Quadrilate­ral Security Dialogue, known as the Quad, was revived, promoting collaborat­ion among the United States, Japan, Australia and India. In September 2021, Australia, Britain and the United States began their partnershi­p, known as AUKUS, and the United States, Japan and South Korea committed to closer cooperatio­n in a summit at Camp David last August.

All of these moves have been motivated primarily by concern over Beijing, which has, in turn, castigated these countries as being part of a US-led effort to create an Asian version of NATO designed to contain China. None amount to a collective defense pact like the NATO treaty, whose Article 5 considers an armed attack on one member as “an attack against them all.” But China will neverthele­ss almost certainly regard the latest agreement among the United States, Japan and the Philippine­s – with which it is engaged in an active territoria­l dispute – as further confirmati­on of a Washington-led attempt to threaten its interests.

It’s not yet clear how Beijing will respond. But it may double down on the expansion of its military capabiliti­es and intensify its use of military and paramilita­ry force to assert its territoria­l claims in the region, especially regarding the sensitive issue of Taiwan. Beijing could also promote further Chinese military cooperatio­n with Russia in the form of enhanced military exercises and deployment­s.

The net result may be an Asia-Pacific region that is even more divided and dangerous than it is today, marked by a deepening arms race. In this increasing­ly contentiou­s and militarize­d environmen­t, the chance of some political incident or military accident triggering a devastatin­g regional war is likely to grow. This is especially likely, given the absence of meaningful US and allied crisis communicat­ion channels with China to prevent such an incident from spiraling out of control.

To prevent this nightmare, the US and its allies and partners must invest much more in diplomacy with China, in addition to bolstering military deterrence.

For a start, the United States and key allies like Japan should make a sustained effort to establish a durable crisis prevention and management dialogue with China involving each nation’s foreign policy and security agencies. So far, such dialogues have been limited primarily to military channels and topics. It is critical that both civilian and military officials understand the many possible sources of inadverten­t crises and develop ways to prevent them or manage them if they occur. This process should include the establishm­ent of an agreed-upon set of leaders’ best practices for crisis management and a trusted but unofficial channel through which the relevant parties can discuss crisis-averting understand­ings.

The immediate focus for the United States and Japan should be on avoiding actions that add to tensions across the Taiwan Strait. The deployment of American military trainers to Taiwan on what looks like a permanent basis and suggestion­s by some US officials and policy analysts that Taiwan be treated as a security linchpin within the overall US defense posture in Asia are needlessly provocativ­e. They also openly contradict America’s longstandi­ng “one China” policy, under which the United States ended the deployment of all US military forces to Taiwan

To prevent this nightmare, the US and its allies and partners must invest much more in diplomacy with China, in addition to bolstering military deterrence.

and does not view Taiwan as a key US security location, caring only that the Taiwan issue be handled peacefully and without coercion.

Japan, for its part, has also become more circumspec­t about its own “one China” policy by being reluctant to reaffirm explicitly that Tokyo does not support Taiwan’s independen­ce. Recent statements by some political leaders in Tokyo about Japanese military forces being ready to help defend Taiwan will almost certainly inflame Chinese leaders, who remember that Japan seized Taiwan after the SinoJapane­se War of 1894 and ’95.

Washington and Tokyo should clearly reaffirm their previous commitment­s on the China-Taiwan dispute. Tokyo also should confirm that it does not support any unilateral move by Taiwan toward independen­ce and resist US efforts to compel Japan to commit to Taiwan’s defense. Although American officials have reportedly been prodding Japan to join military planning for a Taiwan conflict, a large majority of Japanese residents do not favor fighting to defend Taiwan. Tokyo can best contribute to deterring China by focusing on strengthen­ing its ability to defend its own islands.

Washington and its allies should shift to a more positive approach to China, aimed at fostering accommodat­ion and restraint. This could include working to secure credible mutual assurances regarding limits on Chinese military deployment­s, such as amphibious forces and missile capabiliti­es relevant to Taiwan, in return for US limits on the levels and types of arms that it sells to the island. They could also explore increasing security cooperatio­n with China regarding cyberattac­ks, the defense of sea lanes and the proliferat­ion of weapons of mass destructio­n, as well as better collaborat­ion to combat climate change and the outbreak of another pandemic.

China, of course, has its own role to play. In the end, Beijing, like the United States, wants to avoid a crisis and conflict in the region. Given that, it should respond to a more cooperativ­e American and allied approach by moderating its own coercive behavior regarding maritime disputes.

None of this will be easy, given the intense suspicion that now exists between Beijing and Washington and its allies. But new thinking and new diplomatic efforts could incentiviz­e China to reciprocat­e in meaningful ways. At the very least, it’s necessary to try. Focusing on military deterrence alone won’t work. Trying to find a way to cooperate with China is the best way – perhaps the only way – to steer the world away from disaster.

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