The hard work in Libya has only just begun
What sounds to Biden now like the easiest approach on Iran will rapidly embroil America back in renewed Middle East
chaos
For now, we can only celebrate what little progress is being made, in the hope that it is all building up to a major turning point for Libya
It is indeed promising that in less than a month Libya’s new interim Government of National Unity (GNU) claims to have united about 80 percent of critical state institutions from the executive authority itself to the legislature, central bank, energy and various other ministries. This initial progress delivers some measure of confidence in the GNU’s ambitious plans for the remaining months of its mandate, which expires at the end of this year with elections on Dec. 24 elections. However, uniting state institutions was low-hanging fruit. Numerous challenges remain, even as a new constitution and electoral laws are being drafted under the auspices of the temporary transition authority. The biggest hurdle, and perhaps the first test of whether the GNU will be able to achieve much of its agenda, is whether the various, often warring, stakeholders will agree to a draft constitution to replace an over-amended Constitutional Declaration from almost a decade ago. What Libya needs now is a permanent constitution, one that enjoys broad public support and can quickly establish an interim constitutional basis for the December elections.
Beyond holding the promised December elections, Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah’s government has pledged to improve the living conditions of Libyans who are exhausted by years of political division, economic hardship, the pandemic, corruption, the lack of public services, crumbling infrastructure and a decimated healthcare system. International assistance and donor aid will only go so far in reversing more than a decade of decline and disrepair. Besides, the lack of a properly unified government will only complicate the accessibility and delivery of critical public services to some of Libya’s most vulnerable.
These failures result in communities grudgingly welcoming armed groups such as local militias, or even hosting foreign fighters and mercenaries, in pursuit of some measure of security or stability. This is why a single, unified and functional government is crucial to delivering on the promise of improved living conditions, which in turn will address some of Libya’s pressing challenges with regard to internal security, criminal justice and post-war reconstruction.
However, uniting governments accustomed to operating separately for over five years is no easy feat, despite GNU claims. Unification entails audits, restructuring and reforms to modes of operating, not to mentions massive debts incurred by the two previous governments, all of which will undoubtedly face stiff resistance, especially when it comes to accounting for each government’s expenditures. Officials are unlikely to be forthcoming in their responses to inquiries, refusing to participate in any initiatives to curb the impunity they enjoyed in an environment lacking accountability and transparency, and rife with corruption. It is not sufficient to simply paper over malfeasance, waste and corruption with talk of unity, especially when bloated bureaucracies consistently steal a third of the state budget annually.
An urgent test for the Dbeibah Cabinet is the resolution of the feud between Mustafa Sanala, chairman of Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC), and Sadiq Al-Kabir, the central bank governor. Oil remains the lifeblood of Libya’s economy and primary key to its prosperity, which makes the ownership and distribution of oil revenues a major source of contention. The advent of the interim government and rush to unity has not stopped the dispute between NOC and the central bank, with Sanala demanding that oil revenues flow directly to the NOC and not the central bank, given the latter’s checkered past of paying salaries to a wide range of militias. It remains to be seen whether Dbeibah’s strategy of appointing an oil minister, a position that did not exist under the previous government, will actually work. It may simply introduce yet another element to the NOC-central bank rivalry, since oil revenues will now be paid to the new ministry, under the sole discretion and responsibility of the GNU. Assuming the temporary government succeeds in controlling the revenues, it could accelerate reforms, invest in much-needed infrastructure and revitalize parts of Libya still ravaged by years of fighting. Unfortunately, the interim government will find it difficult to equitably distribute funding in parts of the country still disconnected by roadblocks manned by heavily armed militias. Disarming them before December is simply not feasible. The new government has yet to signal how it plans to continue operating, let alone hold elections while thousands of well armed, well funded nonstate actors remain active. In addition, dealing with local armed actors is one thing, but when it comes to expelling more than 20,000 mercenaries from Chad, Sudan, Syria, Turkey and Russia, the bar is far too high for a government meant to last for only nine months. Meanwhile, the presence of these foreign troops continues to impugn Libya’s sovereignty and imperil its national security. Worse yet, the military commission established to deal with Libya’s security situation in tandem with talks to settle its governance crisis has more or less given up, punting the onerous task of seeking their removal on to the UN.
For now, we can only celebrate what little progress is being made, in the hope that it is all building up to a major turning point for Libya.
Despite all the optimism, Libya’s future is still in serious doubt.