Political equation offers little hope for Syrian reconstruction
More than a decade after Syria’s civil war began, the country remains fragmented between competing factions and the economy is falling apart. More than a third of the country’s infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed, while more than 80 percent of Syrians struggle to survive below the poverty line. In a country where many people remain deeply dependent on humanitarian aid for daily life, talk of post-conflict reconstruction can feel premature; however, it is important to consider how Syria’s economy and society can recover.
The US, European countries and some Middle Eastern nations blame the regime and its allies for much of the death and destruction in Syria. The countries with the most resources to help the country rebuild face a fundamental dilemma. Without assistance for reconstruction, Syrian society will not recover, leaving many Syrians languishing in poverty and insecurity. However, any reconstruction funds that go to regime-controlled areas will enrich the regime, ensure that the predatory winners of the conflict economy remain in charge of resources, and reinforce corruption, while failing to do much to help average Syrians rebuild their lives and displaced Syrians to return. Furthermore, Western countries are loath to spend their own taxpayers’ money to reward the actors that destroyed much of the country.
Tragically, Syria lacks the necessary conditions for successful post-conflict reconstruction. First, the conflict is not over.
The government does not control all of the country’s territory, including its oil fields and multiple key transportation routes and nodes. There is no single authority capable of ensuring peace or any sort of standard economic regulations. For example, many Syrians in the northern part of the country that is controlled by Turkey have started using Turkey’s lira. Another problem is the lack of resources. Syria has limited natural resources and the government does not control the most important ones. One of the country’s pre-war strengths was a relatively vibrant private sector, but the war has destroyed or distorted that sector’s infrastructure, trade links, financing, and business networks. The country is dependent on foreign assistance, but the regime’s main supporters — Russia and Iran — have limited resources to offer and limited willingness to help rebuild. The US and Europe have stringent sanctions against the Syrian regime that discourage some other potential sources of state aid and private investment. A third obstacle is the lack of any political resolution to the war that might build long-term confidence. The Assad regime has demonstrated no interest in compromise with other political actors. Furthermore, the regime is not trying to unite and heal the country, but rather to engineer post-Syrian society to its advantage. Credible economic recovery would require an inclusive type of reconstruction focused on providing infrastructure, housing and economic opportunities to a wide range of Syrians and on facilitating the return of displaced Syrians. However, the regime has displayed no tolerance for inclusive reconstruction. Instead, it has set up legal and practical structures designed to economically reward loyalists and foreign allies and punish opponents. The regime has also taken steps designed to make it difficult for displaced Syrians to return, including seizing the property of some who fled.
Syria’s economic future is likely to include fragmentation between areas controlled by the regime and by other forces. It is also likely to feature predatory economic practices that benefit regime loyalists and warlords who exploited the wartime economy. There will be some investment opportunities for domestic and foreign investors, but those opportunities will be limited and risky and will benefit a small elite to the disadvantage of most Syrians.
Russia and Iran lack the resources to fund Syria’s reconstruction, but they hope that their businesses will benefit if other, wealthier countries start pouring money into the country. The Assad regime has made it clear that it would prioritize contracts for the allies who ensured its survival.
Despite Russian efforts to encourage other states to fund Syria’s recovery, European countries and the US have repeatedly made it clear that they will not provide reconstruction assistance to regime-controlled areas until a political transition process is underway. They do not want to reward a regime responsible for killing so many of its own citizens and violating fundamental international norms. Furthermore, Europe is unlikely to provide reconstruction aid unless it would clearly encourage refugees to return — a goal the Assad regime does not share. In Washington, there is some debate about US sanctions against Syria, but American policy on sanctions, let alone reconstruction aid, is unlikely to change significantly anytime soon. The Gulf Arab states have been cautious in their approach. The UAE has indicated an interest in investing in Syria. The Gulf states and China are the Assad regime’s best hopes for reconstruction aid, but they are likely to move cautiously, if at all. Some Gulf Arab states are reluctant to take steps that would benefit Iran. Some reconstruction assistance might flow into non-regime areas, including the areas controlled by Turkey. However, as a whole, the Syrian economy is unlikely to recover for many years. The destruction is so widespread, the corruption and conflict economy dynamics so entrenched, and foreign assistance so lacking that it will be difficult to rebuild basic infrastructure and housing, let alone develop the types of production, investment and trade that characterize a healthy economy. Unfortunately, the most likely outcome for the next few years is an ongoing conflict economy with little to offer most Syrians.