Europe’s attempt to court Iran not a safe bet
Ebrahim Raisi’s victory in last month’s Iranian presidential election raises concerns about the likelihood of a more hawkish policy toward Europe, rather than the openness the continent had come to expect under outgoing President Hassan Rouhani. These concerns were heightened by Raisi’s first public address after his election win, in which he harshly criticized Rouhani’s policy of rapprochement with the West.
Raisi reiterated that he puts no faith in reconciliation with the West to resolve
Iran’s political and economic problems, emphasizing ominously that Iran’s ballistic missile program is non-negotiable. His incendiary comments appear to be diametrically opposed to the European countries’ preference for dialogue and engagement to maintain their interests.
The US withdrawal from the nuclear deal in May 2018 was a test for European-Iranian relations, with the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” strategy obstructing Europe’s efforts to attain its goal vis-a-vis Iran. Europe’s stance of strategic autonomy was diminished, especially in the context of trade with Iran, after it appeared unable to protect its partners and economic interests in the face of US sanctions. This meant that it lost its influence with the leadership in Tehran, as well as facing unprecedented pressure from the Trump administration. This may have been the motivation behind the European parties’ drive to “invest their political capital” in preserving the 2015 nuclear deal and obstructing the Trump administration’s plan to reinstate international sanctions, thwarting the creation of a global consensus against Iran.
When Trump departed the White House and the Biden administration took over, the European countries increased their pressure to revive the nuclear deal. Europe’s strategy is primarily based on prioritizing the strategic importance of the nuclear deal, which it views as an effective blueprint to address nuclear proliferation issues and safeguard European security amid threats arising from the Middle East.
On the economic front, the nuclear deal enables Europe to restore its position as Iran’s most important trading partner. The deal is also seen by Europe as a stepping stone toward holding bilateral dialogue and followup negotiations on an array of outstanding issues, including Iran’s ballistic missiles program, its destabilizing role in the region and its human rights violations. Finally, the nuclear deal is also seen as a way to bring Tehran into closer alignment with the West.
The problem is that, while Europe has given Iran a tremendous opportunity to end its isolation and fix its economy by reviving the nuclear deal without reaching any definitive settlement on the outstanding issues — deferring discussions to the follow-on negotiations, a repetition of the exact same mistake made in 2015 — all of Europe’s interests now seem to be at risk.
The importance of appointing Raisi as president cannot be overstated, since he is widely considered to be Ali Khamenei’s potential successor. He has a deep, unshakable belief in the principles of the so-called Islamic revolution of 1979 and a zealous commitment to following the line drawn by Supreme Leaders Ayatollah Khomeini and Khamenei.
From the regime’s viewpoint, Raisi is the best custodian to ensure the future of the regime and implement Khamenei’s foreign policy priorities at this crucial and delicate juncture.
All this means that Europe’s hopes of weakening the conservatives’ grip on Iranian decision-making by pursuing a policy of openness with Tehran is nothing but a fantasy. The West’s lack of close familiarity with the Iranian regime’s domestic policy dynamics means that it still fails to understand the supreme leader’s absolute control over the main actors in the Iranian political landscape, regardless of whether the president is nominally reformist or conservative.
Raisi will open the floodgates to a further strengthening of Iran’s relations with Russia and China to strike a balance in its relations with the US and Europe. And, more importantly, Raisi will take advantage of the nuclear deal’s revival to make economic gains to further strengthen the power of the conservatives, thus helping them restore their eroding legitimacy. This outcome is diametrically opposed to what Europe intends via reviving the nuclear deal and pursuing a policy of dialogue and partnership with Iran.
Ultimately, Europe’s attempt to increase the scope of its influence in Iran and across the entire Middle East outside of the US orbit, as part of the ongoing global “rebalancing” and as part of its pursuit of greater autonomy, is an unsafe bet. This aim cannot be achieved on the ground in light of the Iranian regime’s lack of confidence in Europe and of the possibility of it acting independently of the US, especially once Raisi becomes president.