Red Sea’s complex security scenario
America last month established a new Combined Task Force 153 within the Combined Maritime Forces in the Middle East to focus on the Red Sea. The new task force reflects growing international interest in the Red Sea area.
CTF 153 aims to “enhance security and stability” in the region, according to US Navy Vice Adm. Brad Cooper, who included combating human trafficking and narcotics and weapons smuggling as part of the mission.
The Houthi threat is currently the most urgent security risk. Since 2016, Houthi forces have harassed, attacked and seized multiple vessels. The Houthis have used mines, maritime drones, aerial drones and anti-ship missiles.
They have attacked vessels from multiple countries but have especially focused on Saudi ships and ports. Today, they pose a threat to freedom of navigation, making it a global concern.
Regional and international actors that are involved in maritime security in the Red Sea region have multiple other concerns too. Migration and refugee flows pose a challenge. Instability and weak governance in several littoral states pose risks, as does the potential for conflict between Ethiopia and Egypt over the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.
Multiple regional and international actors have business interests in the littoral states. The Red Sea is critical to China’s Maritime Silk Road. Furthermore, regional states have extended their competition for power and influence to the Red Sea. While littoral states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia have obvious interests, countries such as Turkey, Qatar and the UAE have also sought to extend their influence in the region. Iran’s efforts to establish a
presence have mostly failed beyond its support for the Houthis. US-China competition has extended into the region since Beijing established its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017.
Increasing interest in the region has prompted a notable rise in military activity.
This includes significant forms of cooperation between states with mutual interests in regional security and the free flow of commerce. CTF 153 is an important example. There are multiple multinational forces and groups involved in Red Sea regional security, including the EU’s Operation Atalanta.
However, there are significant challenges to cooperation. While many countries share mutual interests in freedom of navigation and general security in the Red Sea region, many of those countries are also rivals. For example, Washington and Beijing both want functioning trade routes but also compete for influence in Africa and the Middle East. Even partners often have different priorities. Egypt wants assistance in ensuring security but also seeks to maintain independence and to limit the role of non-littoral states.
As more actors seek to protect their interests and extend their influence into the Red Sea region, maritime security will become increasingly important. Ensuring security will require enhanced coordination and cooperation between partners and rivals with mutual interests.
Kerry Boyd Anderson is a writer and political risk consultant with more than 18 years of experience as a professional analyst of international security issues and Middle East political and business risk. Her previous positions include deputy director for advisory with Oxford Analytica.