Accident Report - Gyrocopter accident mystery
Description primary accident report SACAA – 9993
On Monday morning, 3 May 2021, the pilot and the passenger on-board a Magni M16 gyrocopter registration ZU-BDY took off from Laingsburg Airfield en route to Morningstar Airfield. While en route, the gyrocopter engine stopped. This led the pilot to execute a forced landing because of the gyrocopter losing thrust and height. However, the forced landing was unsuccessful and the gyrocopter impacted the ground. A post-impact fire ensued, which destroyed the gyrocopter. The passenger was fatally injured during the accident sequence and the pilot was hospitalised after sustaining serious injuries.
Comments by Charlie Marais
Experiencing a real engine cut is surreal. I have had my share, but it is the most difficult thing to describe how I felt during the entire episode. If I never had the chance to speak to the pilot involved in this accident, which is most probable, I would have had to write a fictitious rendition of the accident in real time. The following is how I imagine it would have felt, well knowing that many of the small details I could only add due to my experiences and knowledge of accidents in general. I do this with respect as I need to somehow get the attention of all to not want to live this story in the real world.
The engine went silent and so did the cockpit. It was a silence of shock, disbelief and denial. The denial very quickly became acceptance as the aircraft’s loss of mechanical energy only meant one thing – we are going down. The sickening feeling was already there when the cold shiver of fear turned into dread as I just did not know where to start. With thrust gone, the pitching moment was clearly towards the ground. The ground was exactly where I did not want to be as it was rugged, without a landing strip and the ramifications did not play out as an argument, but rather as a total and instant understanding that it was not good, not good at all. It took me a few seconds to gather myself to the point where I had to do something. Fuel! My head shot to the fuel gauge and it seemed sufficient, so I quickly checked the fuel flow. Obviously, there was none as the engine stopped and the low-level electrical fuel pump was not on. I now got busy with the magnetos and tried to start the engine by just cranking the starter. No, I was not following procedures. There was no time to get hold of a checklist and I simply could not use memory recall to follow the prescribed sequence of checks, so common sense had to do the trick.
As the ground came closer I subconsciously started to reduce the speed by lifting the nose slightly through the control stick; I needed some time and although I clearly did not know what to do with extra time, it somehow felt better. To trim the speed was not on my mind and the rotor speed was somehow neglected as I desperately tried to get the engine going. I was now becoming aware, at a heightened level, of the approaching ground and I did what came naturally and that is to pull back even more on the stick to impact as flat and as slow as possible. I started to flare to gain some energy from the flare effect, but to my utter disbelief, the rotor RPM was too low. I do not remember much more, but the noises were horrendous and the impact more severe than I could ever have imagined. Then all went quit and I became aware of being inside a destroyed cockpit and I instinctively knew I had to get away. I somehow managed to get myself out just before the aircraft fuel ignited. I saw the aircraft burning and for a moment I was amazed on how quickly the entire aircraft was consumed to only a pile of ash. My passenger did not make it and short before long and more so during the days of recovery, survivor’s guilt played havoc with my mind.
No, this did not happen to me, but I have no way to describe the anxiety during such an engine failure. I have had an aircraft engine failure at night in the circuit, but I could make the runway and landed without any damage or injury. I never tried to start the engine again and opted to prepare the aircraft for landing as that was a very clear possibility. With more than 1000 hours on type, I must have selected flaps, which was preceded by pushing another lever to energise the system, literally about 6000 times, if not more. But that night, I just could not find the activation lever to energise the system. I thought by myself on how strange it was that I could not find a lever that one could never see but placed so that it could be activated with the left hand. To reach the lever was no big deal as you only had to drop your hand next to the seat and it would in most all cases touch this activation lever. I desperately needed flaps to the full position, or I would overshoot the runway. An overshoot was dreaded as this would definitely take away the undercarriage and with a slight sand wall before a water ditch, landing on the roof of the aircraft was pretty possible. I really, really did not want to look down into the cockpit, but that was the only way. The lever was where it should have been and I activated it while rushing my head to the outside to see the probabilities that needed to follow. My heart was now pounding in my head as I forced the aircraft’s, a Harvard, main wheels on the ground. This was definitely going to be an overrun and then I did something I learned to do while flying for the Harvard aerobatic team; I used brakes with the tail still in the air. This is tricky as a little too much brake would mean the aircraft flipping forward onto it’s back. With control stick fully in the stomach and the brakes keeping the tail in the air, the Harvard decelerated and stopped around three meters from the edge of the unchartered ground. I got out and as soon as the emergency response people arrived, told the student to go to his crew room and went to my crew room and sat there until my legs became fully functional.
Back to the accident under discussion. During the engine failure, which was confirmed by the status of the propeller on the wreckage, I can imagine that the pilot did not expect the unexpected and that his natural feelings post the trouble starting, to be very much as I described. That he was distracted from flying the gyrocopter is a very strong possibility, which led to speed and rotor RPM decay. The Gyrocopter has a very wide rotor RPM range of 200 to 550. When the engine stops, the rotor is still turning and would follow the normal increase and decrease of rotor RPM as in a helicopter. This mechanical ‘parachute’ does work wonders, but it requires energy.
The only energy available after the mechanical energy is cut, would be the potential energy or height, which could be converted into speed and speed, a kinetic energy, can be converted into rotor kinetic energy, or rotor RPM. This means that the only energy available to maintain speed and rotor RPM is by sacrificing height. When this pot of energy is depleted, indicated airspeed can now be converted into rotor RPM in order to reduce forward speed to minimise impact speed energy, as well as to reduce vertical rate of descend (ROD) to an absolute minimum which can be absorbed by the undercarriage of the gyrocopter.
The height energy cannot be used to stretch the glide as there is not enough energy stored to then maintain the recommended speed and rotor RPM. No matter how natural it would be to try and reach outside the autorotation distance of the helicopter, available energy must always first serve the basic requirements of flight and then, should there be more available, for distance purposes. Note that one of the most useful effects of a rotor system is that of flare effect. When the ‘g’ on a rotor system is increased, the rotor RPM will increase, which in turn can be converted to reduce ROD.
The engine cut, the stress / performance relationship and distractions are all contributing factors to the end result, which in this case was predicted as fatal. Once the dust is settled and eventual anger of the death of a loved one becomes inevitable, the peripheral actions or inactions will kick in to haunt the person responsible for maintaining the air vehicle administratively as well as mechanically. The pilot will be scrutinised for procedural adherence in terms of licencing and following the CAR and CATS as and when applicable. Legal matters have tentacles to reach as far back as it can to prove a history of compliance to rules and regulations.
During the preliminary investigation, it was established that:
• The pilot’s medical expired on 31 December 2020, which would mean that he was flying with an invalid licence at the time. The preliminary report mentioned a Class 1 and a Class 2 medical, of which the class 1 is unlikely for the type of licence held. For a person older than 50 years the class 2 is valid for 12 months according to Civil Aviation Regulation 67.00.6(3)(d).
• The gyrocopter was involved in an accident, probably a landing accident where the nose wheel broke off. This accident was not reported to the SACAA. This obviously would lead to questions on who fixed the gyrocopter and who released it back into service. The owner, who is the responsible person regarding the gyrocopter, will have to answer these questions.
• The Authority to Fly (ATF) expired on 31 May 2020 and no information to a renewal or application for a renewal is available.
Please note that all the above is in the preliminary report and facts may change as the investigation progresses. The reason for mentioning this information as released by SACAA, is to take notice of legal and other factors that would make for safer and legal flights, should they be neglected. As the investigation is ongoing, this discussion is in no way suggesting factual status, or suggesting alternate outcomes or findings.
Recommendations
There are two very distinct groups of recommendations to cover this type of accident. Firstly, there is the pilot capability, licencing and human factors and secondly the administrative issues such as aircraft licences, incident or accident history, serviceability and so on. Note that both these fields have legal consequences besides pain, suffering and death.
Looking at the pilot information it leads me to believe that the pilot, due to the licencing system, probably received emergency training around 18 months before the accident. That is by accepting that emergency training, covering this specific scenario has taken place during the previous revalidation test. Be it as it may, once every two years between emergency training, I mean the tough ones, are simply not supporting flight safety. Engines will fail, no doubt about that, but would the recipient of such a surprise be recent enough to be successful as expected he should be. The mechanical failure is one aspect of flight safety, but not the only aspect that must be pursued. Once the failure occurred, the pilot is still in one piece and the possibility of walking away from the scene, more than 50%. Quite a bit more should averages count. This means that, if we take unsuitable terrain or uncontrollable aircraft into consideration, it still leaves space for pilot survival and here I include the passengers.
Let me presume for a moment that the surface conditions are entirely favourable and the air vehicle entirely controllable, the survivability of an accident depends on how the air vehicle arrives at the accident site. If the pilot could handle the situation, the accident would in all cases be recorded as survivable, but if the pilot screwed it up, the resultant wreckage could probably be recorded as non-survivable. My point is that there is no substitute for training. Not training the easy ones, any half-witted pilot can do that, but those hard ones everyone wants to shy away from. To avoid being uncomfortable to experience and handle an adverse situation, will lead to one being uncomfortable when such a situation arises, not just as a surprise, but as a feared surprise. Training is the only method to optimise the stress / performance relationship.
Speed. Yes, craft and rotor speed (RPM) must be controlled deliberately before height runs out. The idea is to keep on flying till the end of the happening. Flying depends on speed and rotor RPM, with height as the only energy source to manipulate. So, pay attention and always trim as this gives you more brain space to handle other necessary functions without losing speed. Excessive speed means excessive eating into the height energy pie, which is not a good idea.
Pay attention to what is most needed at the time, or for that matter, at any time. I pay most attention to the things that have the most possible chance of hurting me. In a helicopter or gyrocopter, when the height is limited, the landing spot and technique takes most of my attention.
It is not a discussion to ‘if’ I will arrive at ground level, rather ‘when’ I arrive at ground level, the energies to successfully do a forced landing must have been expended wisely to finish the job in style. Get the knowledge and then practice. Oh, by the way straight and level experience does not count.
All goes well in paradise until stock taking by the authorities. You and your aircraft history cannot be entirely disguised. Yes, some get away with it, but many do not. Let me put it this way; If all ends well, it is well, but if all do not end well, it is hell.
The insurance does not ask if you knew. They see your licence and they are entitled to derive that you know as your licence is proof of that. Please stop playing the innocence card, it is not recognised in a court of law.
Really guys and girls, are we still at that stage where we find it difficult to maintain our administrative duties regarding our aircraft?
I can give you an electronic management tool for free, but the problem is that you will have to feed it some information for it to be able to remind you in time. However, I suspect you are probably either too lazy, too arrogant, or too careless to use the tool properly, in which case it will not help. If you cannot help yourself, at least give the job to someone who cares or is paid to care about your bootie.
I know it is difficult to read these words as it stings and seems to criminalise many of us. I am not worried what you have done in the past, but I am here to implore you to straighten the future path for the sake of yourself and your loved ones and yes, our safety statistics.