Helmoed Römer Heitman
Ways to reduce the negative economic effects of defence spending.
DEFENCE spending is a necessary evil, a grudge purchase much like burglar bars and insurance premiums. But there are ways to reduce the negative economic effects of defence spending in the longer run and to steer portions of defence spending to support development goals.
One possibility that could have an immediate effect on many small communities would be to exempt the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) from the centralised purchasing dictated by the State Tender Board and its “term contracts”.
For instance, why should an infantry unit in Phalaborwa not be able to buy its vegetables from emerging farmers in its immediate vicinity, who are struggling to find markets, rather than from a wholesaler in the Johannesburg area?
That would be more efficient for the unit and would give the local farmers a boost.
Similarly, why should SANDF units all purchase their diesel fuel from a single company in a province far from where most units are located?
Other immediate potential lies in making use of SANDF assets and capabilities to help further development in rural areas. The available potential is not as great as some might like to think — underfunding has caused its damage here too — but there are some possibilities to consider.
Army engineers, for instance, have a range of skills and equipment that would be useful to help small rural communities to deal with problems such as damaged bridges, broken borehole pumps and washed-away sections of road.
The engineers need to practise their skills and their equipment does not improve by standing in a war reserve park. Similarly, South African Military Health Service personnel can assist in rural clinics and medical drives in truly outlying areas, while at the same time developing their experience base and skills. Some of this is already being done but we could be doing more if this was policy, and if the National Treasury could be persuaded to provide the small amount of additional funding needed to, for instance, pay for fuel to move a bulldozer to where it is needed, or to deploy medical teams by helicopter or light aircraft where road access is difficult, which would also give the South African Air Force valuable additional flying hours for its aircrews. Even fighter units have a potential role: a thermal imaging reconnaissance pod can be a valuable tool to support agricultural planning and monitor bush-fire and flood lines; and, in the latter case, to do so quickly and provide real-time information to emergency services.
Looking somewhat further ahead, one could also consider developing a basing policy that is primarily focused on military need and efficiency, but secondarily focused on placing units in areas where there is serious underemployment. Combine such a basing
‘Why should SANDF units buy their fuel from a company in a province far from where most units are located?’
policy with one of decentralised procurement and you have a major cash-flow injection for small rural towns.
A major military base not only consumes a lot of food that could be purchased locally, but also a range of other ordinary civilian goods, from cleaning materials to stationery, all of which could be purchased from local suppliers. A major base also requires a range of services that could be provided by local firms, from minor construction work, electrical installations and plumbing to servicing and repairing its ordinary bakkies, cars and trucks.
And, of course, the soldiers and their families will be spending some of their salaries in their new home town.
Over time, a locally focused recruiting policy could also be implemented to draw people from the surrounding community into the unit, some of them serving their period of duty in the unit itself, others perhaps being posted elsewhere and finding new opportunities there once their service has been completed.
The SANDF has again been given responsibility for border protection, with the bulk of the burden falling on the South African Army, which will have to establish new units if it is to perform this task effectively.
This presents an opportunity to develop a new basing policy as outlined here, with careful planning enabling the army to establish battalion and company bases where they will facilitate optimal border patrols but also support impoverished rural communities.
Also looking further forward, the SANDF could work with other departments to develop a short-service system that combines regular and reserve service with vocational training; perhaps a 10-year contract com- prising eight years’ service in a regular unit, the last four in a border patrol unit with a duty schedule that facilitates part-time vocational training, and two years in the active reserve while undergoing full-time vocational training to qualify in any particular trade.
That would give the army, in particular, the large number of soldiers and junior noncommissioned officers it needs, without the problem of not having promotion posts for them, and give those short-service soldiers a proper career once their service period has been completed.
A similar system could combine short service with a university bursary, to provide the junior officers the military needs but for most of whom there are no regular posts beyond the rank of first lieutenant or perhaps captain. Again, the military would have the junior officers it needs and those young people could obtain a tertiary education they might other- wise not be able to afford. While neither of these examples shows any immediate economic benefit, they would serve to develop for SA the artisans and graduates that we will need for our future economy, many of them from backgrounds that would not otherwise have enabled them to obtain that training or that education.
There are good, working examples of all of these suggestions to be found in countries such as Brazil, Indonesia and Pakistan, among others.
And it is not just in developing countries that it is common to make use of military capabilities outside their primary functions. In Germany, it is often army helicopters with medical corps teams that are pre-positioned along the main routes during holiday seasons, and armoured reconnaissance vehicles use their thermal imaging sights to look for soft spots in riverside dikes when rivers are in heavy flood.
There are similar examples to be found all over the developed world.
Similarly, the US Reserve Officer Training Corps provides university bursaries in return for specified periods of regular military service, and also provides funding for tertiary education after periods of voluntary reserve service. Again, there are similar examples to be found in several countries in Europe.
No worthwhile defence force is cheap, and the military is certainly no alternative to either the relevant government departments or to private enterprise. But a developing country, which is what SA is, must make the most of its assets. Making intelligent use of the various “collateral” capabilities of the military will not only reduce the sting when paying the bill, but will support wider national development goals.
And, as a final thought, when we do buy equipment, why can we not phase acquisitions to ensure that the quantities justify, and timing allows, local development and manufacture where that is technologically a practicable option?