World peace now most at risk since end of Cold War

CONTRARY to expectations, the world has become a more violent, more dangerous and more unpredictable place since the end of the Cold War. Terrorism, the never-ending conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria, Russian assertiveness in it’s “near abroad”, and China flexing its muscles in the Asia-Pacific are some constant reminders of the deficiencies of peace mechanisms in the anarchical world we live in.

This drift towards more anarchy was epitomised particularly by Russia’s bullying of Georgia, its annexation of the Crimea and its role in the destabilisation of the Ukraine.

Particularly with the emergence of major powers such as China and Russia, and the decline of US power of deterrence and important guarantor of international behavioural norms, it’s a moot question whether international law and conventions, and mechanisms for collective security developed since the Second World War will inevitably give way to atavism in world politics.

Indeed, the fault lines are becoming increasingly evident. Russia’s annexation of the Crimea was roundly condemned by the West as illegal. Nonwestern nations, on the other hand, remained mostly noncommittal, giving the impression that they were either neutral or tacitly supportive of the act.

Russia, on its part, insists that the annexation was legal. On face value, it is at least reassuring that Russia does not regard itself as above international law. Even so, on the evidence, it is highly doubtful that the land grab would pass the scrutiny of an independent court of international justice.

More important, particularly with power shifting from West to East, this dichotomy about legality might well introduce a dangerous precedent, threatening the foundation of peaceful international coexistence. At its worst, it might even reverse interstate relations to the brutal nationalistic era of power politics, replacing the predominating rules-based international state system.

Apart from the fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin skillfully, if not cynically, aided and abetted chaos in Ukraine to facilitate Russia’s annexation of the Crimea, he has calculated his timing carefully, knowing that the West would be hard pressed to go beyond limited peaceful retaliation.

So, with the West in apparent decline and the East on the rise, the question is whether Russia’s grabbing territory and China’s bullying its neighbours — both being permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council — are harbingers of things to come in the international system? This creates a dangerous dilemma for many states, particularly those that thought they might resolve territorial disputes in accordance with international agreements.

Although the West’s history is interspersed with examples of flouting international law, it was also, since the Peace of Westphalia (1648), the main creator and custodian of the basic principles and voluntary ceiving themselves to be bound by a common set of rules and share in the working of common institutions”. The degree of peace the world enjoys today is made possible because states generally, albeit not always absolutely, abide by the rules of international society, because it is in their interest to do so in an interdependent world.

But as world power shifts from West to East, it is important to reflect on the universality and legitimacy of these basically European-western rules and norms. According to US political scientist Samuel Huntington, there are various signs that the “monocivilisational” paradigm on which international society is based is losing legitimacy. During the 19th and 20th centuries, the European international system expanded to become universal, encompassing all cultures in a multicivilisational world, but with decreasing relevance and usefulness.

Obama cannot present the world with an alternative paradigm to the reigning imperfect realist-militarist one

norms of behaviour of an orderly international society in which nation states are the primary role players and subjects of international law. It stands to reason that without nation states’ voluntary adherence to these principles, a Hobbesian “war-of-all-againstall” type of scenario, as we saw during two devastating world wars last century, might have been the permanent fate of mankind.

In an international system, according to Australian international relations expert Hedley Bull, states have a sufficient effect on one another’s decisions to cause them to behave in some measure as part of a whole. In fact, the expectation of reciprocal behaviour is a primary deterrent against untoward behaviour but, as we have recently witnessed, unfortunately not in all cases.

In its more advanced form, namely international society, Bull continues, states have “common interests and common values, con-

As far back as 1918, German historian Oswald Spengler denounced the myopic view of history, being based solely on western experience, as an “empty figment of one linear history”. However, in spite of this and other warnings, writes Huntington, the illusions and prejudices “have blossomed forth in the widespread parochial conceit that the European civilisation of the West is now the universal civilisation of the West”.

In this sense, with a common global culture or value system nonexistent, the world is at best probably still only a putative, if not primitive international society. The inability of the UN, supposed to be the apogee of international society, to get consensus on important issues affecting war and peace and human rights in particular, is precisely due to East-West ideological, power-political, and cultural cleavages, particularly evident in the Security Council.

Of course, disputing the universality of western norms dominating international society contradicts the way international law comes about. International law is essentially universal positive law: states voluntarily acquiesce to abide by its prescriptions. There is no dispute, for instance, over the universality of international law in regard to the status and rights of internationally recognised states. Unfortunately, however, Russia and China brazenly apply double standards in pursuit of self-interest.

Under the circumstances, it is clear that international law is not a sufficient or ultimate guarantor of peace, nor is international society sufficiently universal to enforce common behaviour by all states, hence the propensity of powerful states to act according to their particular interests. The inadequate role of international law and society is particularly evident from a recent analysis in The Economist lamenting the erosion of US power, as it becomes “no longer as alarming to its foes or reassuring to its friends”.

US President Barack Obama may be doing the world a huge favour by resisting pressure from hawks to use the US’s immense military power in places such as Syria and Ukraine. In a recent speech on US foreign policy at West Point, he emphasised that the US would go to war only in the last resort, when its core interests and the safety of its allies are at stake. Yet Obama cannot present the world with an alternative paradigm to the reigning imperfect realist-militarist one.

Obama should apply his leadership and legitimacy to lead the world towards an inclusive future as his predecessor did. Otherwise we might well be faced with the prospect of an authoritarian China, in lockstep with an authoritarian Russia, substituting the US as the principal custodian of world order.

Gerrit Olivier, a former South African ambassador to Russia, is with the Department of Political Sciences at the University of Pretoria. Michèle Olivier teaches at the Law School, University of Hull, UK.