Business Day

SA can’t afford proposed nuclear build

- HARALD WINKLER and BRENDA MARTIN

NEWS of an agreement signed between Russia and SA on Monday indicate broad plans for long-term nuclear-related co-operation. The scale of the potential deal or its detailed form in relation to procuremen­t is still unknown. What seems obvious is that the R1-trillion (or so) nuclear investment will not be free.

SA treats nuclear power procuremen­t differentl­y from other options. The Electricit­y Act, which explicitly excludes “new generation capacity derived from nuclear power technology”, governs energy procuremen­t.

A simple average of the range estimates for the proposed nuclear build is R881bn; by comparison, the arms deal was worth R72bn in today’s money. Internatio­nal experience also indicates that cost overruns on nuclear build are usually anything between 50% and 200%. Even if we do not take likely cost overruns into account, the proposed programme is likely to end up costing us four to 20 times as much as the arms deal. We all know how important a transparen­t and trusted procuremen­t process at this scale will be.

SA’s previous tender process for nuclear power supply was abandoned in 2008 after it was deemed to be financiall­y unviable. Eskom had expected a price of $2,500/kW, but bids came in at $6,000/kW. The Department of Energy’s Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) 2010, formally published in May 2011, included 9,600MW of nuclear power. Estimates of the investment costs for a 9,600MW nuclear build programme range from R320bn to R1.4-trillion — excluding likely cost overruns.

In 2011, the National Developmen­t Plan advised: “Although nuclear power does provide a low-carbon base-load alternativ­e, SA needs a thorough investigat­ion on the (10 listed) implicatio­ns of nuclear energy, including its costs, financing options, institutio­nal arrangemen­ts, safety, environmen­tal costs and benefits, localisati­on and employment opportunit­ies, and uranium enrichment and fuelfabric­ation possibilit­ies. An in-depth investigat­ion into the financial viability of nuclear energy is thus vital.”

In his state of the nation address in June, President Jacob Zuma identified energy security as a priority for enabling SA to achieve economic growth of 5% by 2019. Then the Presidency announced that a Cabinet subcommitt­ee on energy security had been establishe­d to “oversee the developmen­t of SA’s future energy mix”. The new subcommitt­ee is chaired by Zuma and includes the following ministries: energy, internatio­nal relations and co-operation, public enterprise­s, finance, state security, trade and industry, economic developmen­t, mineral resources, environmen­tal affairs, and defence.

In her budget speech in July, the new energy minister signalled a top-down approach deriving from “injunction­s” from Zuma. She appears to be a minister determined to make decisions — regardless of sector expert advice.

The IRP2010 Update Report released by the Department of Energy in November last year specifical­ly recommende­d that “nuclear procuremen­t only be reexamined in 2015 — if demand exceeds 270TWh and there is no shale gas developmen­t”, it might “then go ahead”. This is broadly consistent with our own research.

On September 15, the Treasury announced that the Cabinet energy security subcommitt­ee had approved a bail-out for Eskom. Three days later, a Treasury official told Parliament that “government guarantees for state-owned companies, which stand at about R466bn, had reached the upper limit of what could be considered prudent in the current economic and fiscal context”.

If Eskom cannot finance a new nuclear build programme and the Treasury cannot guarantee it, where will the money come from? Financing a huge investment such as 9,600MW of power carries high financial risk. While the tight electricit­y system makes us mindful of the costs of underinves­ting, SA has already experience­d the huge costs of overinvest­ing. Coal-fired power stations were “mothballed” a few decades ago — at significan­t cost to our economy and society.

The best available informatio­n indicates that no decision on nuclear power investment is needed until next year or 2019, depending on demand and comparativ­e prices of other options. Why a large investment is being promoted so strongly can only have political reasons. Political rationalit­y is fine, but not if it ignores good informatio­n. Right now, SA simply cannot afford this scale of investment.

Winkler and Martin are with the Energy Research Centre

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