Safety regulator needs new tack

Separate repeat violators from less risky miners

WHEN Mineral Resources Minister Ngoako Ramatlhodi made the annual mine safety statistics announcement in January, he pointed to the fact that last year’s fatality rate was the lowest yet — and congratulated a string of companies that had recorded 12 or more fatality-free months.

The industry can claim much of the credit for the improvement in safety, and that includes workers as well as their bosses. The government can claim credit too as the safety regulator.

There has been extensive engagement on the issue in recent years between the industry and government. And there is no doubt that the greater focus on safety has yielded dividends in a difficult industry in which many of the mines are ageing, deep and inherently dangerous.

Last year’s 84 mine fatalities were still too many — but the number was better than the previous year’s 93 and the hundreds of deaths every year in the early 1990s.

Admittedly, SA’s mining output was a lot larger then, but even so, the improvement in safety reflects concerted efforts on all sides.

The difficult question is whether the safety dividend justifies the huge cost mines are having to incur as a result of the regulator’s wielding of its powers in a manner that is sometimes a blunt instrument rather than skilled scalpel.

This was highlighted in a leaked Chamber of Mines document, which found that safety shutdowns have cost mines more than R13.6bn in lost revenue since 2012 while the industry has been struggling to survive amid crashing commodity prices and rising input costs.

The Department of Mineral Resources mines safety inspectorate is entitled to impose safety stoppages on sections of mines (or entire mines), in terms of section 54 of the legislation, if there has been an accident or a safety issue. Clearly these shutdowns are justified under certain circumstances. The problem is the inspectorate is using them even when the issue could easily be remediated and when the company involved has a good record of taking whatever action the regulator requires on time. The legislation provides for remedial action in section 55 without the need to shut down operations.

Section 54 shutdown notices are often issued, it seems, when section 55 remedial notices would be adequate. The shutdowns often include unaffected areas and for lengthy periods.

The mining industry is paying the price.

The Section 54 habit seems in part to reflect a lack of experience among regulatory officials, who may panic and overreact when something goes wrong at a mine, even when it is something quite easy to fix.

It hasn’t helped that the department tends to come under fire from politicians when there are mine accidents — and officials often take the fall, making them even more likely to be overly cautious.

But industry players cite inconsistent and unfair

Greater focus on safety has yielded dividends in a difficult industry in which mines are ageing and inherently dangerous

application of the shutdown rules too, and there clearly is some abuse by regulators of their powers to penalise mines. Any abuse must be investigated and halted.

The high potential cost of infringing safety regulations is certainly one of the factors that has helped to improve SA mines’ safety records.

But we expect that the companies would have worked hard to stop mine deaths anyway. And herein surely lies part of the solution.

The department could surely regulate safety more effectively, while burdening the cashstrapped industry less, by adopting a more risk-based approach premised on trust.

Stamp hard on those mines that are high risk and where safety is poorly managed. But avoid shutdowns as much as possible where mines are committed to safety, and have a proven record of taking remedial action when (and ideally even before) the regulator requires it.