Trump’s messaging translates to: ‘The US is overextended’
The key contenders for the presidency of the ANC have lost no time weighing in on the strategic implications of Donald Trump’s election as the 45th US president.
Speaking last week in Davos, Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa endorsed Chinese President Xi Jinping’s defence of international economic integration. SA has to follow China’s example, Ramaphosa said, and learn how to “swim in the globalisation ocean”.
Outgoing AU Commission chairwoman Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, meanwhile, bemoaned the threat of global protectionism and called for Africa’s much-touted continental free trade area to be kick-started. The government has wisely maintained a diplomatic silence, perhaps because it is difficult to predict the direction of US foreign policy under Trump.
Only one geopolitical forecasting guru, George Friedman, has persuasively translated Trump’s tweets and utterances into a reasonably consistent foreign policy framework.
According to Friedman, Trump’s “core strategic argument” is that the US is “overextended” as a result of relationships that place burdens and risks on it without corresponding commitments from the various beneficiaries.
The US has been protecting the EU against Russia for decades. Yet few North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) members commit even 2% of GDP to defence (a Nato yardstick) despite the EU’s GDP. One US priority since 9/11 has been “the Islamic world”. Yet Nato countries (other than the UK) have shunned US-sponsored “interventions” in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. Friedman observes that: “Nato lacks significant strategic capabilities [and] its members can and do elect to avoid those conflicts that matter most to America.”
Trump’s insistence that the US will exit Nato if Europeans do not share its burdens and goals is mirrored in his stance towards Asian allies. He has suggested that military pacts with Japan and South Korea be recalibrated so that risks are better shared and treaties benefit both parties.
Trump’s prioritisation of Islamic radicalism predisposes him to work with partner regimes that are trying to crush their own Islamic rebels. Russia, in particular, has resources it is willing to deploy to serve congruent objectives.
The new administration’s trade policy philosophy runs along similar lines.
The US wants to “protect domestic employment”, but broad multilateral trade agreements cannot be fine-tuned to protect domestic workers. Hence they should be replaced with bilateral or regional treaties.
Although no analyst (yet) claims Trump possesses a shimmering geopolitical vision, the growing economic power of Asia is something he clearly understands. Taking Barack Obama’s abortive “pivot to Asia” to one of its logical conclusions, he intends to use Japanese resources, and alliances with India and Russia, to contain Chinese assertiveness.
HE HAS SUGGESTED THAT MILITARY PACTS WITH JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA WILL BE RECALIBRATED SO THAT RISKS ARE BETTER SHARED
Historian Paul Kennedy popularised the idea of “imperial overstretch” — when great powers begin to weaken, they react by building up their military forces, just as Trump intends to do. But, as military spending grows, productive investment falls and this ultimately results in slower growth, domestic political discord and the growing unaffordability of future military expenditures.
Trump is not the first imperial leader to think he can square this circle: he is going to keep America great, but he thinks he is going to get others to pay for it.