Europe’s failure is worse than America’s
IF THE Afghanistan pullout has been a disaster for the US, its European allies arguably have suffered even greater ignominy. At least the superpower is an actor: it makes its own decisions, and it could, at least theoretically, make different ones if its leadership wanted to – at comparable and bearable cost. The Europeans have pretty much lacked agency since the beginning of the crisis, mainly because of domestic political issues and a paralysis of will. At the same time, the political and economic costs of failure are higher for them than for the US: it’s much easier for Afghan refugees to reach Europe than North America.
The nations involved in Afghanistan include three nuclear powers, the US, UK and France, and one of the world’s greatest economic powers, Germany. These mighty nations would have us believe that they can’t stay in Afghanistan a minute longer than the US does, because, even together, they are unable to hold back a ragtag force like the Taliban – not even long enough to evacuate their own citizens and the Afghans who had worked with them. Yet to what extent is that powerlessness real?
“The west could not continue this US-led mission – a mission conceived and executed in support and defence of America – without American logistics, without US air power and without American might,” UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson told parliament last week. This is a two-part justification: firstly, it was the US’s adventure, not Europe’s; secondly, Europeans lack the military capability necessary to stay in Afghanistan for any length of time after the US goes.
The second argument strikes me as somewhat disingenuous. During the Nato operation in Libya in 2011, Europeans led the air war. The French flew the most missions. Theoretically, European Nato members could bomb the Taliban into temporary submission long enough to complete the evacuation.
There’s no way Johnson, French President Emmanuel Macron, or the potential successors to German Chancellor Angela Merkel, now in the last weeks of an election campaign, could justify to their voters a last stand in Kabul after the US leaves.
There could be another reason why Europeans don’t want to stick around longer than Americans. In a way, the fewer refugees make it to Europe, the better for the European leaders. Some 2.2 million Afghans were seeking asylum in neighbouring countries as of the end of last year; 2.9 million people were internally displaced then and almost 600 000 have been added since. Now that the Taliban has overrun the country, the potential for outflows approaches that of Syria in the middle of the last decade, and mainstream European politicians know that could bring a recrudescence of rival populist parties whose growth had recently been blunted. As recently as August5, several interior ministers from European countries, including Germany’s Horst Seehofer, objected to the Afghan government’s request that they stop sending rejected asylum seekers back to Afghanistan.
The troubles of European leaders will truly begin once the evacuation ends. First, the same voters who probably wouldn’t buy an extended military presence will wonder why their governments should get involved in further US-led operations. Formally, Nato allies went into Afghanistan because of the organisation’s Article 5, to help the US respond to a terrorist onslaught. But this month’s events have left no doubt that it’s they who require US help – the initial setup in 2001 was all about the tail wagging the dog.
Europe’s involvement in Afghanistan was for the most part a symbolic investment in the US security guarantee. European nations did pay a price in soldiers’ lives, though, and have little to show for it.
“At times, Nato decisions are de facto made in Washington, and Nato in Brussels hardly has any chance to have a say but merely operationalises them,” German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said in a recent interview with Der Spiegel. “We need a lot more political discussion before we send our soldiers anywhere. Otherwise, we run the risk of merely always following Washington’s decisions regardless of who is president there.”
After the US acted unilaterally in Afghanistan, repeatedly ignoring allies’ objections, a nagging doubt about the reliability of the US security guarantee will always be present. That means some kind of Plan B is necessary. But building up the European Army project, mostly a fantasy now despite years of discussions and half-hearted proofof-concept deals, can only undermine US willingness to provide an effective umbrella. That’s why Maas spoke only about building up Nato’s European pillar, not a fully-fledged EU military force.
The refugees are coming no matter how many fences are built along Central Asian, Middle Eastern and southern European borders. Afghanistan’s neighbouring states, such as Uzbekistan, where many Afghans have been hastily evacuated, don’t have the infrastructure or the wealth to support large refugee populations, and even if Western money is forthcoming, their authoritarian regimes likely cannot afford the instability that would come with hosting the Afghans long-term.
Germany received 10 035 new asylum applications from Afghans in the first seven months of the year, before the Taliban seized Kabul – more than the 9 901 that came in during full year 2020. Obstacles can’t stop many people from seeking their fortune, and the number of Afghans unwilling to submit to Taliban rule cannot be realistically assessed.
If nothing else, perhaps the threat of increased immigration should serve as a wake-up call for Europe’s leaders: they need to develop more than “strategic autonomy”.
What they lack, more than anything else, is the ability to make bold and independent decisions.