Coalition crossroads: MPC parties’ dilemma
WHAT will a Multi-Party Charter (MPC) party do when the ANC approaches it after the 2024 general elections to form a coalition? This question is no doubt already besieging the minds of prominent politicians from the DA, the IFP, and the FF+, among others.
To take such a deal would violate the eponymous MPC charter, but political promises have never truly been binding.
An MPC party will not consider this offer because they desire such a coalition, but because they are under the mistaken impression that such a coalition is the “better alternative” to the ANC forming a pact with the EFF or the MK Party of Jacob Zuma.
The reality they do not yet appreciate is that no MPC party is likely to remain in a coalition with the ANC for long, meaning the ANC would end up with the EFF or MK Party eventually anyway, unless there are smaller, generally pro-ANC parties (like GOOD or the ATM) that can get it across the line.
No sincere MPC party will be able to reform the ANC’s corruption, and they will not want to stick around for long enough to allow voters to begin to associate ANC corruption with their new partners in government.
I have argued before that if the DA or any other MPC party wishes to keep the EFF or MKP away from the levers of power, they should enter into a “confidence and supply” arrangement with the ANC after the elections.
Briefly, this means the opposition party will do two things: support the ANC in confidence votes, and approve the ANC’s annual budgets. But it will not enter into a coalition, and it will not become part of the government, meaning it will still fulfil its opposition role.
Confidence and supply is complex, but it is better than getting into bed with an irredeemably tainted party.
The ANC will remain corrupt, and that corruption will reflect on the new coalition partner, whether it participates in the corrupt activities or not.
The coalition partner will also be forced to support the ANC’s policies in most cases. An FF+ minister of justice in an ANC-majority Cabinet, for example, will have no choice but to defend (and enforce) the ANC’s hate speech legislation, regardless of the fact that the FF+ opposed it in Parliament.
Confidence and supply is simply the better alternative to a coalition.
But confidence and supply remains the best of bad options. The ideal is if the MPC secures a majority in 2024 or if it is able to govern with smaller, historically pro-ANC parties that are not the ANC itself, the EFF or MK.
But if an MPC party makes the wrong choice and goes into a grand coalition with the ANC – which is not unlikely – it must set preconditions.
In the early 2000s, while the New National Party (NNP) and the ANC were merging, the NNP also set conditions – but these were “post-conditions” that would ostensibly follow the merger. NNP members were promised high government office and various party mechanisms to resolve policy disputes.
Needless to say, the ANC kept promising that they would get around to it “eventually”, but never did. The ANC hollowed out the NNP because the latter was naive, believing the ANC to be an honest political actor.
The MPC party must set at least two true preconditions – meaning the condition must be met before the coalition formally begins.
The first is the immediate removal of specified (in a very, very long list) corrupt and ideologically compromised individuals from all spheres of government. The second and more important condition is the federalisation of the South African state.
Now, South Africa is constitutionally already a (flawed) federation, but it is governed as if it were a unitary state.
The best place to start – within hours of the Electoral Commission calling the outcome of the vote – is for the police minister to immediately “devolve” policing powers to the provinces and municipalities. The “federal” aspect comes in where the minister states clearly in the directive that the devolution would only be revocable at the request of the respective provincial legislatures or municipal councils.
The transport minister can do likewise regarding the management of our key ports, railways, and highways. Both these mandates must be funded from the National Revenue Fund, while National Treasury immediately begins a process of involving the provincial governments in the determination and administration of the tax system.
A strict parliamentary agenda, including bills that assign labour relations primarily to provinces and municipalities, must also follow quickly (perhaps within a set time frame of 100 days). If not met, the MPC party will immediately dissolve the coalition. Crucially, no extensions to the time frame must be possible, otherwise we will be back where the NNP was.
This would amount to a “muscular devolution” that might inculcate a spirit of true federalism.
It is easy enough to tell the MPC party to “just say no” to an ANC proposal for a coalition. The reality is that the publicists in these organisations probably understand that the centreleft columnists living in Sandton and Bishopscourt will write scathing criticisms of them, if they do not take the hand of friendship offered by the so-called “reformist” faction of the ANC.
The best path is to table a set of reasonable preconditions that will substantially change South Africa for the better if accepted, but which the ANC will likely reject. What if the ANC is not interested in these preconditions?
The MPC party must – and can – then return to the opposition benches with its head held high. Under such circumstances, it would be the ANC that said “no”, not the MPC party.
To be clear, I would want the ANC to accept the preconditions, because if it does, the cost of the grand coalition will be less than the immediate benefit of substantial political decentralisation. But while we can and should dream, our consciousness of what is achievable must ultimately govern our behaviour.
◆ This article was first published by BizNews on March 20.