Monitoring the money flow
THE deal with Iran is finally done, and the outcome appears largely consistent with the framework agreement announced on April 2. The most important achievements of the framework remain intact: The number of centrifuges in operation must be reduced to 5 060 from the current 9 500, and Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched uranium must be cut from 10 000kg to 300kg. The former must be observed for 10 years, the latter for 15.
The extensive monitoring of the entire supply chain will continue for 25 years, and the Iranians will be obligated to observe the Additional Protocol of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty forever.
In practice, these limitations make it highly unlikely that the Iranians could divert materials for a covert programme, or would be in a position to break out to weapons-grade material in less than a year for the up to eight-and-a-half to 10 years that the restrictions apply. And with no reprocessing permitted, a plutonium pathway to a bomb is essentially blocked.
However, it is worth noting that the Iranians are not required to dismantle their enrichment infrastructure. They are allowed to continue at least limited research and development and will be permitted to build as large an industrial nuclear programme as they want after year 15, making Iran a threshold nuclear state. The gap between threshold status and weapons capability will necessarily become small, and not difficult for the Iranians to bridge.
The deal will also relieve sanctions once the Iranians have implemented their major nuclear obligations, and that is likely to take about six months. This means that Iran, aside from being able to sell its oil, will regain access to as much as $150 billion (R1 863bn) in frozen accounts in the coming year.
Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, this year asked rhetorically: “If Iran gets back this money, what will it do with it?” This might explain why other Arab and Israeli leaders are concerned.
Meanwhile, as it considers the deal, the US administration may also need to explain why possible violations will not become new negotiations to, ultimately, be drawn out again.