Remembering the real Verwoerd
IN HIS piece “Remembering Verwoerd” at http://www.politicsweb. co.za and in previous book-length publications, The Afrikaners: Biography of a People, and The Last Afrikaner Leaders: A Supreme Test of Power, eminent Afrikaner historian Prof Hermann Giliomee presents a highly personalised, arguably apologist perspective on Prime Minister/ Dr Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd. In the end, he concludes that Verwoerd may be an historical “scapegoat”. His arguments are not persuasive.
I guess the primary effect Verwoerd had on Giliomee and many of his adversaries (for example, prime ministers John Diefenbaker and Harold Macmillan, historian CW de Kiewiet, editor Allister Sparks, diplomat Dag Hammarskjöld and politician Frederik van Zyl Slabbert) is mesmerising.
They agree with Giliomee, regarding Verwoerd as a political “genius” committed unswervingly to the development sensu lato of the Afrikaner volk (especially the poor), mediated through “hard-wired”, “white”-dominated apartheid and Separate Development.
To that end, Verwoerd’s ideological perspective on apartheid was much more strongly influenced by policies encountered in 1920s USA than those in Germany. Indeed, many of his German mentors suffered under Nazism. Nevertheless, he encouraged pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic journalism, and opposed war on Nazi Germany while he was editor of Die Transvaler. He never argued for inherent biological “white” superiority over “blacks”.
Moving into politics in 1948, he became minister of Native Affairs under DF Malan and JG Strijdom, and initiated the transformation of native (“Black”) reserves into autonomous states (Bantustans).
Now, as to why Verwoerd is not a “scapegoat”. Verwoerd engineered Strijdom’s election – over the “moderate” NC Havenga – to succeed DF Malan. Strijdom was an aggressive, but not innovative, white supremacist whose political strategy was essentially “baasskap”.
His major political “achievements” were an unscrupulous pursuit of removing “coloured” voters from the common voters roll (opposed by Malan/Havenga) and initiating the failed/protracted Treason Trial of 156 activists.
Strijdom died and was replaced by Verwoerd after a closely contested battle against TE Dönges.
Building on his previous “achievements”, Verwoerd immediately, dramatically and relentlessly transformed apartheid, “perfecting” it into “Separate Development” to deal with “blacks swarming everywhere, uncounted and uncontrolled”. In the end, he laid the groundwork for and was the prime mover in drafting and implementing more than 300 oppressive/emasculating acts of legislation including:
The Population Registration Act (1950), which required South Africans to be classified according to “racial” characteristics.
The Group Areas Act (195057), which confined resident racial groups to different housing and business sections – urban apartheid.
The "black" (Natives) Laws Amendment Act (1952), which stipulated that all "blacks" older than 16 were required to carry passes and could not stay in an urban area more than 72 hours.
The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (1953), which legalised the racial segregation of public premises, vehicles and services.
The Bantu Education Act (1953), which suppressed missionary/church school education for "blacks" and developed state-funded, deliberately deficient education.
The Promotion of Black Self-Government ("Homelands") Act (1958) marketed as "decolonisation".
The Bantu Investment Corporation Act (1959) to finance homelands.
The Extension of University Education Act (1959), which created separate universities for "blacks", "coloureds" and Indians, and excluding them from "white" universities.
The Physical Planning and Utilisation of Resources Act (1967) to promote homeland industrial development.
The displacement of some 80 000 Africans from Sophiatown, Martindale and Newclare to the newly established townships of south-western Johannesburg (Soweto); and with strong support from his justice minister (BJ Vorster), declarations of a state of emergency to repress demonstrations, censorship of the press, and the banning and imprisonment of anti-apartheid individuals and parties.
In this transformation, Verwoerd was strongly influenced by his ideological partner (perhaps even mentor) Prof Werner Eiselen, who had a deep knowledge of African culture and languages, and genuinely believed that Separate Development could actually succeed. De-emphasising a biologically based racist approach, Verwoerd marketed Separate Development as a cultural/ ethnically significant step towards co-operative development of a “commonwealth” of “self-governing” southern African states founded on a “policy of good neighbourliness”. But Separate Development was always a cunning ploy to promote, if not enshrine, “white” domination. Eiselen eventually realised this and quietly parted ways with Verwoerd.
Given what’s happening literally today on South African university campuses, Verwoerd and his henchmen behaved particularly shamefully when they marketed Bantu Education as a means of: salvaging inadequate missionary/church schools, “rescuing black” children from illiteracy and gangsterism, and preserving “African heritage”. Bantu Education, especially in “white areas”, was effectively limited – financially, in curriculum content, years of education and teacher competence – to prevent “black” development beyond vassal status. This situation worsened over time.
In 1961, Verwoerd manipulated voting laws/rights to engineer South Africa’s departure from the anti-apartheid British Commonwealth and to entice support from English-speaking “whites” for apartheid policies.
There were key points during 1960-61 which the Verwoerd regime could have exploited to ameliorate the impact of apartheid:
The aftermath of the Sharpeville Massacre when the economy collapsed and many "whites" feared violent revolution.
When Nelson Mandela sent him two letters offering to create a Codesa-like gathering.
Harold Macmillan’s “Winds of Change” speech.
UN secretary-general Dag Hammarskjold’s fact-finding visit.
The aftermath of Verwoerd’s first assassination attempt when acting Prime Minister Paul Sauer (supported by ministers Donges and Ben Schoem and by the nationalist newspaper Die Burger), expressed the need for fundamental reform.
Yet, Verwoerd chose to “tough it out”. Mandela’s letters were ignored. He rebuffed Macmillan with his “we have nowhere to go” reply. Hammarskjold was sent packing. Sauer was forced into the political wilderness. Liberal historian CW de Kiewieit described this as “destroying those with whom it could deal and breeding a generation of exiles with whom it will not be able to deal”.
During the 1960s, Verwoerd also exploited “swart gevaar” generated by turmoil in Africa to the north from “forces of evil reign(ing) chaos and genocide in a total onslaught”, and the benefits of local massive economic growth (including employment of young “blacks”), international investment and military capacity. By the time of his assassination, his power was unassailable.
The 1966 South African general election resulted in another comprehensive NP victory (105 vs 49 opposition seats), with Helen Suzman barely retaining her seat. He had no reason to divert politically.
My own view of Verwoerd is decisively negative. His toxic implementation of Eiselen’s “philosophy” during his time in power, especially his years as prime minister, caused the cultural, educational, psychological, political and socio-economic emasculation of “non-whites”, especially black Africans. This precipitated the transformation of the ANC from a non-violent organisation into a revolutionary “army”. His bumbling and brutal successors followed a tragic political trajectory that further isolated/embittered the ANC/PAC and engendered the development of the Black Consciousness Movement.
In his various analyses, Giliomee describes Verwoerd as an honest, brilliant, principled, deeply religious family man, and explains his policies and actions within a historical context and based on poor projected demographics for “blacks”. In his post-mortem analysis of Verwoerd, Die Beeld editor Schalk Pienaar summed up Verwoerd perfectly:
“Man and policy, creator and creation had grown so much together in the crisis of our time that the one cannot be easily seen as separate from the other.”
Without Verwoerd’s repeated and resolute pivotal political intervention, apartheid may not have morphed into a “coherent ideology that followers could believe in with utter conviction”, and could have fallen three decades earlier.
Crowe served as an academic in the Biological Sciences Department of UCT for 40 years, retiring in 2013. He is a lifetime fellow at the university.