SA pivotal in driving Africa agenda
THERE are great expectations on the continent…
Even though BRICS ostensibly presents perhaps the most cohesive and ambitious vision of the global South, it is clear that there are many faultlines in this five-some grouping.
Last week saw the convening and closing of the 10th BRICS summit in Johannesburg. As always, the annual forum provided an opportunity for the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa to propound the emerging powerscum-global South vision and narrative.
As in the case with the first BRICS summit on African soil in Durban in 2013, the 10th instalment was framed on the BRICS in Africa theme.
For good measure, there was the customary side event for African leaders dubbed the “BRICS Outreach Dialogue Session and BRICS Plus”.
Rwandan President Paul Kagame, probably as the rotational chairperson of the AU heads of state, was on hand to speak to the continental integration efforts and the potential of BRICS.
Among some of the other African leaders in attendance were João Lourenço of Angola, Macky Sall of Senegal, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Emmerson Mnangagwa of Zimbabwe, Hery Rajaonarimampianina of Madagascar and Mokgweetsi Masisi of Botswana.
Since its establishment in 2009, scholarship on BRICS as a geopolitical formation has garnered great interest from wide-ranging academic disciplines, popular platforms such as the media and geographical viewpoints.
The early inclusion of South Africa in December 2010 has served to ensure that perspectives on the implications of the relatively new bloc on Africa are explored.
The “cement” that holds the BRICS together includes fast-growing economies, large populations and hegemony, in their respective regions.
For instance, although it is good that South Africa’s presence in BRICS ensures that African interests are considered within the ranks of these economically fast-growing nations, it is also acknowledged that the country doesn’t fit if factors such as economic size and demographics are considered.
While India is the largest open democracy globally, China operates a different political system known as socialism, with Chinese characteristics.
Russia’s membership has been contested in some quarters on account that it is an old or established “empire”, rather than an emerging one.
Of all the five BRICS member states, the one that stands head and shoulders above the rest is China, the world’s second largest economy after the US.
This was evident in the lead up to the summit, with the Chinese soft power and public diplomacy juggernaut setting in motion a communication agenda that saw Beijing dominating most of the headlines in the South African media.
South Africa’s membership in BRICS as representative of Africa is predicated on the fact that it is considered the continental “superpower”.
This has been contested by countries such as Nigeria and Egypt, which reckon that they have better claims to continental prowess than Pretoria.
Abuja has also bristled at being passed over by the BRICS nations, so much so that former president Goodluck Jonathan reportedly declined an invitation to attend the 2013 summit .
Critics who have dumbed down on South Africa’s role on the continent miss the important point of the country’s role as the continent’s interlocutor on the global stage.
It is probable that were it not for the appreciable level of South Africa’s foreign policy sophistication relative to other African peers, African interests would be largely missing in agencies such as BRICS.
To a great extent, the African leaders being side-chatted by Narendra Modi of India, Michel Temer of Brazil, Vladimir Putin of Russia and Xi Jinping of China, would not have got the opportunity were it not for South Africa’s BRICS membership.
At any rate, South Africa assumes the rotational chairmanship of BRICS for the next year, meaning that African countries that might have BRICS-inclined strategies would do well to court the Cyril Ramaphosa administration – at least until the middle of next year.
It is also worth noting that South Africa hosts the African regional headquarters of the BRICS’ signature institution, the New Development Bank which, as indicated will be looking to do business with Africa, especially with regard to financing African infrastructure projects.
The major problem with the Africa-BRICS relationship is one of expectations on the African end.
The hard-nosed reality is that the BRICS nations are at the core of the engagement and African nations can be considered only secondary, despite talk of south-south solidarity.
A related reality check is that all the BRICS countries have witnessed economic downturns that served to stymie the initial optimism that greeted the formation of the BRICS group.
Another challenge is that while BRICS is moving towards greater institutionalisation as a geopolitical entity, the individual BRICS nations seem to prefer doing the bulk of their business at a bilateral level.
The long and short of all this is that African nations need multipronged approaches: engage South Africa in the context of the BRICS, develop AU-level relations and fashion direct links with Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
In this vein, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni’s call during the summit for Ramaphosa, and therefore South Africa, to serve as the co-ordinator of the African BRICS strategy should be heeded.
One pathway in this respect is for the AU to develop an African policy framework in order to implement African needs towards the BRICS as a collective.
In other words, the continent needs to evolve a framework of engagement with BRICS as one entity above the strategies that have been developed towards BRICS nations at an individual level.
In so doing, African nations would do well to use the AU’s Agenda 2063 as the starting point in what would amount to African agency.
It helps that the Agenda 2063, which places continental integration at the core of Africa’s future, was developed and launched during the tenure of South Africa’s Minister in the Presidency in charge of planning and policy, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma.
In other words, South Africa played a pivotal role in rolling out the continent-wide developmental agenda and has a moral duty to see the plan through to fruition.
South Africa’s membership in BRICS provides yet another opportunity for the mobilisation of the resources that would assist in the realisation of the continental integration vision, especially with regard to transport infrastructure as a basic ingredient for the envisioned integration.
The balancing act South Africa will have to juggle is that like Brazil, India, Russia and China, it has to consider its own national interests while at the same living up to its continental representation role.
This is a challenge, especially to South Africa, because the other BRICS countries are not seen as representing their respective regions.
But because South Africa is in BRICS on the strength of its continental prowess, Ramaphosa has to simultaneously pursue the narrow South African goals while driving the broader agenda for the continent of Africa.
It would be a significant loss of the soft power capital that lifted South Africa into BRICS, if other African nations perceived it as exclusively pursuing of self-interest.
Dr Wekesa is a media and geopolitics scholar at the University of the Witwatersrand, bobwekesa@gmail.com