China’s belt and road initiative offers myriad options for Africa
R15.2 trillion investment to improve rail and road connectivity between 65 countries
CHINA’S ambitious belt and road initiative (BRI) is set to connect over 65 countries at a cost of about $1 trillion (R15.2 trillion) to improve the connectivity between China, Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Africa in a process closely linked with the domestic changes in the Chinese economy.
Proposed by China’S President Xi Jinping in 2013, the initiative is developing a vast network of railroads and shipping lanes between China and countries along the continental belt and maritime road.
Based on my recent plenary address at the 8th China-Africa Think-Tanks Forum in Beijing, I would argue that the responsibility lies with African stakeholders at state and non-state levels to co-operate with China in a way that enhances African priorities.
While bilateral relations remain integral to Africa’s international relations, the continent could use the BRI to support its regional continental and maritime interconnectivity projects agreed to by the regional economic communities and the AU.
The increased co-ordination would assist in enhancing African agency and build capacity for implementing regional infrastructure projects. A nod in this direction was the first mid-year meeting of the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in July in Niger to build greater cohesion and co-ordination across the continent.
The AU representative office in Beijing is now also up and running, and should be able to assist in coordination efforts in the Chinese capital on sustainable projects that serve as catalysts for African development.
Recent years have seen efforts by the African continent to exercise greater agency and ownership in pursuing its development efforts. This aspiration is captured in Agenda 2063, the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), and priorities identified in the report on recommendations for the institutional reform of the AU, which was presented to the 31st Summit of the AU last year.
What these initiatives have in common is a contemporary effort to identify and act on African priorities, and thus spearhead an endogenous development effort on the continent.
If African countries, especially those that wield greater influence, prioritise the identified areas in Agenda 2063 they will create greater cohesion in the continent’s international relations, enhancing African agency in partnering with China and other countries along the BRI.
The World Bank estimates that Africa needs up to $170 billion in investment a year for 10 years to meet its infrastructure requirements.
The African Development Bank has posited that if Africa positions itself well, it can source some of this from the BRI and channel it to the AU’s infrastructure master plan, the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA).
African stakeholders must also decide how to partner with China on the implementation of some of the 12 identified flagship projects of the AU.
Much of the funding for the BRI comes from policy lenders, with the more prominent ones including the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China (Exim Bank) committing over $1 trillion.
There is also a Silk Road Fund, which holds $40bn in investment funds and is supervised by China’s Central Bank. The Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank is also an important player and has a capital base of $100bn. Advocates of the BRI point to the potential increased private Chinese investments in tourism, real estate, agriculture and infrastructure projects.
The BRI is also increasingly seen as a catalyst for African regional economic integration and competitiveness in research funded by the UN Economic Commission for Africa, which found that East Africa’s exports could increase by as much as $192 million annually if new BRI projects are used diligently.
The African continent is strategically located along Beijing’s important supply lines, ensuring the existence of mutual interests. But as the Indian Ocean grows in importance, it is crucial that African countries and regional economic communities ensure that they safeguard the continental and maritime space in a way that enhances their development interests.
It is equally important to understand that while African countries – especially those along the Indian Ocean perimeter – would be important for China’s strategic calculations, there will be no automatic flows of capital from China.
While some projects would be seen to have more than just an economic rationale for China factoring in geopolitical calculations, many of the projects financed would have to be of a sound nature and seen to be profitable over the medium to long term, especially after greater scrutiny of BRI projects and Xi’s rhetoric on quality, transparency, and sustainability at the recent BRI Forum in Beijing.
Given the importance of Central Asia and Southeast Asia for China’s strategic calculations, it will be important for African countries to look towards greater co-ordination of their efforts through the AU and the RECs.
While China no doubt leads the BRI, opportunities would be created along all of the countries on the ancient routes, providing opportunities for those countries that are better organised at the state and non-state levels. It will also be important for African stakeholders to increase their own maritime capabilities and be prepared to mediate in their interests, when tensions among the great powers flare up from time to time.
Realising these opportunities would require co-ordination, continued dialogue and research on various levels. It would also require the research community, through think-tanks and universities across the African continent to conduct more empirical research in partnership with Chinese institutions and embassies.
This is important to ensure that throughout the implementation and identification of BRI projects in Africa, the research community understands the perceptions of various actors towards China and the BRI projects. This can then act as an early warning mechanism where there is discontent, and allow for multiple stakeholders to discuss research findings related to the BRI and Africa.