Is Putin an authoritarian terrorist? Why does it matter?
Russia’s leader has embraced his country’s age-old repressive style. With that comes state-sponsored terror — at home and abroad.
Russia’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine has no clear exit ramp for Vladimir Putin, except a hollow “mission accomplished”-style withdrawal – but speculation about his motivations fills articles, conferences and commentary.
Less examined is what kind of authoritarian political leader Vladimir Putin actually is. What are the historical antecedents for this behaviour, or is it something new? There is a related question of how he managed to rise to high office despite a less than distinguished career in the old Soviet KGB intelligence apparatus.
Is state terror an essential element of Putin’s brand of 21st-century authoritarianism, or is it an incidental byproduct of his war? These questions can be central for determining how best to respond to Russia’s aggression — and for thinking about what comes after the invasion collapses as devastation in Ukraine is truly massive and the political stability of Russia is threatened.
Stretching back to the Russian state of Moscovy, absolute authoritarian rule has largely been the style of governance – up to the beginning of the 20th century. Absolutist rule has its origins in yet older influences, back in the vast Mongol empire that began with the Khanate of the Golden Horde.
In the 19th century, a reform-minded czar would be followed by a repressive one. The vast population of serfs in lifetime indentured status were finally freed from restrictions in the 1860s, but most were still bound to masters by tradition. In industrialising cities, unions were strongly repressed.
Simultaneously, throughout the 19th century, the political, cultural and linguistic repression of subject minorities remained the norm. Opposition figures were forcibly rusticated to distant parts of Russia’s vast empire and publications suppressed,
By the early months of the 1917 revolution, the new government tried a broad-based, more democratic system. But, given opposition from the communist and socialist left, and in the context of growing economic and social upheavals, Alexander Kerensky’s provisional government could not respond to demands for “bread, peace and land”.
With communist-linked militias trying to seize control of state assets, the provisional government could not secure control. The country slid into a civil war of great barbarity over nearly four years, with foreign interventions and armed bands despoiling the countryside. Stability became a key objective for the new communist government. Stability has remained key.
The end of the civil war brought the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to complete control. Its authoritarian bent was undergirded by an ideological basis of state control. As Joseph Stalin succeeded Vladimir Lenin, methods included the arrest of and often death of political opponents (real or perceived), severe restrictions and internal exile of ethnic minorities, mass famines engineered by the government, state control over media, and subordination of all political and economic movements.
Almost nothing from this history offered guidance for a democratic tradition.
By the mid-1980s, as Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, glasnost and perestroika policies — transparency and renewal — had become urgent to maintain state stability.
During this period, Putin was assigned to East Germany. A loyal servant of the KGB worldview, he was on site as Communist Party control of East Germany evaporated. He was a junior political figure as the Soviet Union itself imploded. Lessons learned from those experiences were that strong government mattered, and limits on political opposition were vital. Further, it was crucial to align oligarchs, who insinuated themselves into control of formerly state-owned enterprises, into deliberately subservient relationships with himself — making Putin the key chokepoint in access to opportunities.
Though policies initially seemed more liberal, with Putin a subaltern to Boris Yeltsin and then, unexpectedly, his successor as president of a separate Russia, old impulses towards authoritarianism at home (and towards Ukraine) have been resurrected.
But it is a version of authoritarianism with differences. Daniel Treisman, a political scientist writing in Foreign Affairs, noted:
“Now, Russia is a brutally repressive police state run by a small group of hard-liners who have imposed ever-harsher policies both at home and abroad.”
The Kremlin’s home-front offensive on Russian society has included the closure of almost all liberal media outlets and restricted access to social media platforms.
Given the history and current policy, the challenge is for terrorism to be called for what it is — both inside and outside Russia. It is going to be important to seek charges under international law against those who have carried out reprehensible actions. It is time to seek reparations for Russia’s victims — likely by seizing Russian reserves held outside the country.