WHAT AFRICA CAN EXPECT FROM BIDEN
THE Trump administration’s policies affected Africa in detrimental ways.
Under his administration, investment policy was driven by the push to open up markets for US goods and services. Its trade policy favoured bilateral, rather than multilateral, agreements. This shift, if sustained, could have undermined the growth of smaller countries, such as Lesotho. This is because such economies may not be of enough economic interest to the US to warrant a separate trade deal.
There were also punitive measures against countries that went against the administration’s expectations of reciprocal “free” trade. For instance, Rwanda was suspended from tariff- free access to the US market after it introduced substantial duties on imports of second- hand clothes.
US foreign direct investment in Africa decreased from $ 50.4 billion ( R766bn) in 2017 to $ 43.2bn in 2019. This 14% decline came at a time when other countries like China were increasing their investments in the region.
Joe Biden’s administration will likely result in some change and some continuity in Africa policy. Official ties are expected to become more diplomatic and certain policies – such as the so- called “Muslim travel ban” – may be reversed. But some significant questions remain as to its direction.
Combined with the scale of domestic problems arising from the Covid- 19 pandemic and the perceived imperative to contain China, Africa will likely elicit only occasional strategic interest.
US focus on its national security imperatives will remain a primary policy area. New partnerships and initiatives – with Nigeria and Mozambique, for instance – are informed in large part by Islamic fundamentalist insurgencies there. The Trump administration greatly expanded the use of American air and ground strikes in hot spots like Somalia.
This is a policy that Biden is likely to continue, even if operations are scaled back somewhat.
The Trump administration’s “Prosper Africa” plan, meant to double US- Africa trade and investment, was presented as a US response to China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”. However, Prosper Africa lacked the funding to accomplish its goals. In reality, it amounted to a co- ordination and consolidation of the different strands of US bureaucracy on the continent.
Biden’s administration will likely continue the existing discursive pattern of great power competition. But the focus, given his policy history, may move to revitalising multilateralism and supporting the African Continental Free Trade Agreement.
With regard to trade, the big question facing the new administration will be the future of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which expires in 2025. Though tariff- free access retains bipartisan support, the Trump administration was in the process of moving towards bilateral engagement, as evidenced by its ongoing attempt to create a “model” free trade agreement with Kenya.
Such free trade deals would change the nature of the US- Africa trade partnership in two main ways. They would give further emphasis to reciprocal trade concessions and would likely require further watering down or elimination of policies designed to help nascent economic sectors in African countries, particularly manufacturing.
Finally, the US- Africa relationship has been characterised by “signature” initiatives. Obama’s administration had “Power Africa” and Trump touted Prosper Africa. Biden will likely seek to continue this tradition, though exactly how remains to be seen.