The impact of state capture on the dominant political party system in South Africa

We were all captivated by the events at the Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, also known as the Zondo Commisssion, during April.

What caught my attention in particular was the role and function of a dominant party in a democratic system.

One can accept, in general, that political parties contest for political power in a democracy, and that changes in government are a given in this field. But there is an exception, and in the study of politics we refer to it as a dominant party system, or a predominant party system. This means that one political party among a large number of parties contesting elections usually wins the contest. Some argue that if a party wins four consecutive elections, that party becomes the dominant one. There are some good South African examples of this, such as the NP, from 1948 to 1994, and the ANC, from 1994 to the present.

A PARADOX

The ANC carries in itself two paradoxical party-political characteristics that in part facilitated the state capture period during the years of Jacob Zuma’s presidency.

The first is the ANC’s own description of itself as being a liberation party with a very specific political culture.

The second is, of course, the ANC as a predominant party, winning all elections since 1994 with the exception of provincial elections in KwaZuluNatal (1994) and the Western Cape.

At the local government level, the ANC dominates, governing

90% of all local governments.

Liberation movements usually start out as a process of regime change, but over time develop into modern political parties.

Dominant parties and liberation movements tend to obliterate the divisions between state and party, and this complicates policy formation and decision-making, creating the ideal environment for state capture.

A dominant party shares with a liberation movement the fact that it is usually a broad church with political interests bound into a central political purpose, the South African case being opposition to apartheid. Decisionmaking in this type of organisation is often very slow and cumbersome.

A second characteristic is that there is a strong urge to recreate society to fit the organisation’s dominant ideology. In terms of the ANC, this is, of course, the notion of transformation. The state capture investigation has already shown that cadre deployment as an instrument to bring about change has been a major factor in the failure of state-owned enterprises.

A third feature of all dominant parties is that they weaken the opposition through a process of delegitimisation. This means that opposition parties are not regarded as political opposition per se, but viewed almost as ‘the enemy’ in ideological terms.

Dominant parties tend to internalise opposition by providing positions for strong voices in the executive; this replaces critical debates on public forums with closed meetings such as the National Executive Committee and the Parliamentary Caucus.

Dominant parties have strong ideological views, but are often contradictory in that some factions in a dominant party may have political views that contrast with the party’s mainstream ideas. The Radical Economic Transformation faction is a case in point with regard to the ANC’s policy positions.

This includes the fact that they often have many political prophets, such as Nelson Mandela and Chris Hani.

Following a successful transition, liberation movements have a high level of legitimacy, which usually carries them for at least one generation. Within 20 to 30 years of governing, however, this legitimacy must be converted into good governance, failing which the party slowly loses its dominance. This is exactly where the ANC alliance finds itself today, 27 years after democracy.

A MODERN POLITICAL PARTY

The ANC is currently stuck in a process where it is battling with the transition from liberation movement to modern political party.

The translation of high levels of legitimacy to efficiency comes with pain and time. The crisis brought about by state capture, which can be defined as institutional corruption on a grand scale, has brought about the urge for renewal in the ANC, and the outcome of the Zondo Commission will be felt in the ANC for a long time to come.

Nonetheless, liberation parties can be efficient, if they are disciplined. South Africa’s smoking legislation is a good example, as well as the efficiency of the South African Revenue Service before the Zuma years. These parties can also be self-correcting, and we are seeing this in the ANC now. It is difficult for the party to get the process going due to the pushback from factions such as that of ANC Secretary-General Ace Magashule, but over time these factions will be unsustainable. This introduces the question of whether the ANC will break apart after the state capture report.

Dominant parties don’t break up; instead, they slowly erode when small factions break away. PAC (1959), the UDM (1997), COPE (2008), and the EFF (2012) are examples of this in South Africa.