CYRIL’S COMPROMISES
Ramaphosa had to pacify various factions and interest groups in putting together his first cabinet. The result is not ideal in some views — but it’s certainly a lot better than what came before
If Jacob Zuma’s cabinet appointments were marked by secrecy and unilateral decision-making, President Cyril Ramaphosa has taken a decidedly different tack. Ramaphosa’s cabinet — announced late last Wednesday — did not come together overnight, or even in a week. It followed a level of consultation not seen in the SA executive in years.
In the lead-up to the announcement, Ramaphosa held a series of meetings, where discussions centred on what the reconfigured cabinet would look like, and what principles his decisions should be based on.
Talks about who would actually hold ministerial positions only took place on Wednesday morning. And unlike previous years, no information was leaked — probably because those who consulted with Ramaphosa that morning were in lockdown, their phones reportedly taken away.
When Ramaphosa announced his slimmed-down executive — he cut the number of ministers from 36 to 28, and deputies to 34 — representatives of the ANC’S alliance partners (Cosatu, the SACP and the SA National Civic Organisation) were present.
But Ramaphosa would have had no easy task in choosing the cabinet he’d promised: competent, credible and forward-thinking.
For a start, he did not have an unlimited range of choices: his appointees would in large measure come from the list the ANC
With unemployment at a record high and the economy not growing, Ramaphosa cannot afford to go about business as usual submitted to parliament (the president may appoint only two ministers who are not MPS). But, more importantly, he had to factor in gender and regional representivity, as well as the interests of alliance partners and business. And factionalism in the ruling party.
Susan Booysen, director of research at the Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection, says Ramaphosa’s cabinet is a reflection of the “serious political bills” he has to pay.
“We know the battle for the ANC is not over, and if Ramaphosa does not remain in charge of the ANC, there [will be] no implementation of his cleanup agenda,” she says. “He really has to watch his back, and that means keeping the opposing faction [in the ANC] as happy as he can afford to, otherwise he might be out of power in a year or two, and then there is no reform agenda.”
The result is a cabinet that political analyst Somadoda Fikeni says is not ideal, but is better than average
— and certainly better than what came before.
One concern is that a number of ministers have simply been moved to different portfolios.
But Fikeni says this is indicative of Ramaphosa’s political power: he won the party presidency with a slim margin, and he remains beholden to the national executive committee’s deployment process.
“Some of the people here … have never worked anywhere else, and some of [them] are senior [party] members,” he says. “So there is no room to say, ‘I’m going to make drastic changes’, and then still want support from them.”
Ramaphosa also had to balance the demands of the labour movement, says Fikeni. Reducing the number of ministries introduces job insecurity for ministry staff. He adds: “[Ramaphosa] will need these people to support him when he starts wielding the axe against those who are seen to be corrupt.”
Because the government alone cannot solve SA’S problems, Ramaphosa had to appoint ministers able to mobilise different sectors of society.
Retaining Tito Mboweni as finance minister creates a balancing act in the economic cluster.
His market-friendly neoliberal views will run counter to those of left-leaning former trade unionist Ebrahim Patel (at trade & industry) and former Young Communist League president David Masondo (now deputy finance minister).
The appointment of Masondo and justice minister Ronald Lamola suggests Ramaphosa was looking to elevate up-andcoming leaders who are seen as competent, while the movement of senior ANC leaders to key departments indicates which areas he will prioritise.
Nkosazana Dlamini-zuma has been moved to co-operative governance & traditional affairs; Zweli Mkhize to health; Naledi Pandor to international relations & cooperation; Lindiwe Sisulu to human settlements, water & sanitation; and Thoko Didiza to agriculture, land reform & rural development. Pravin Gordhan
What it means: