Back to the future as parties talk
Numbers rather than national unity will dictate how parties coalesce after 29 May
Recent comments by Democratic Alliance (DA) leader John Steenhuisen that the door was not closed to a potential governance arrangement with the ANC have sparked speculation about the creation of a government of national unity (GNU) after the 29 May elections.
The DA was at the forefront of creating the opposition Multiparty Charter for South Africa, a pre-election coalition agreement aimed at dislodging the ANC, but Steenhuisen’s comments appear to indicate a realisation that they may not achieve their objective.
The ANC’S electoral losses are likely to rob it of its majority nationally, and past experience of attempting to manage coalitions made up of large numbers of small parties at the local government level — and with the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) — may nudge it in the direction of convening a government of national unity instead with the DA.
The inability of either the charter partners or the ANC to secure an outright majority on 29 May is likely to determine which way the parties coalesce, rather than the pre-election agreements the DA and its allies have made so much of since last April.
Political analyst Susan Booysen said it was clear to both the ANC and the Multi-party Charter that neither was going to win an outright majority in the national and provincial polls.
“While there are a number of medium-sized, small and micro parties in the charter, when you add up the percentages in the more credible opinion polls, they do not add up to 50%,” she said.
“At this point, I do not think that the DA has got any illusion that it will be able to get an outright majority.”
At the same time, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) was, like the ANC, being affected by the emergence
of the breakaway umkhonto wesizwe party led by Jacob Zuma, losing numbers to it in by-elections since January, Booysen said.
This would hurt the charter because it was depending on the IFP to pick up votes in Kwazulu-natal, which it had been doing until the MK party appeared on the scene and started “mopping up” votes that might have gone to the IFP.
While the parties had covered their respective bases by entering into the tentative pre-election negotiations, it was the numbers that they secured on 29 May that would ultimately determine which way they coalesced.
“After the elections, what happens is going to be determined by the election results,” Booysen said.
She said if the ANC scored close to 50% and came just short, it would be able to make it over the line by working with a small party, as it had done with parties such as the Minority Front and the National Freedom Party in the past.
But, if it secured 43% to 45% of the vote, it would be more likely to use the government of national unity approach, rather than a traditional coalition.
Nelson Mandela formed a government of national unity after the 1994 elections involving the National Party (NP) and the IFP, both of which had reached the threshold of 10% of the vote. The agreement allowing for this was reached during the negotiations at the Conference for Democratic South Africa and was contained in clause 88 of the Interim Constitution agreed upon in 1993.
The government of national unity was responsible for overseeing the transition to democracy, the establishment of integrated institutions of the new state and the implementation of the Reconstruction and Development Programme aimed at uplifting black South Africans and ending spatial apartheid.
It was also responsible for the creation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which held hearings into human rights violations during the anti-apartheid struggle.
NP leader FW de Klerk, who served as Mandela’s second deputy, led the party out of the government of national unity on 30 June 1996, after disagreements over the TRC process and other issues. But the IFP remained in the GNU until its term expired in 1999.
Booysen said recent actions and comments by both the ANC and DA made it “clear both are making themselves available” for a potential postelection cooperation agreement.
The ANC had learned hard lessons from coalitions with small parties and with the EFF, which had been a “volatile” partner in the past.
The ANC’S recent plan to “sacrifice” leaders tainted by evidence at the Zondo commission of inquiry into state capture such as Malusi Gigaba and Zandile Gumede by removing them from the party lists would make it easier for the DA to sell an agreement with its constituency.
The ANC’S “reforms” might ultimately be an indication of it making itself more attractive to the DA and make the selling of an agreement to its constituency easier.
Likewise, the recent announcement by Deputy President Paul Mashatile of working agreements with trade union Solidarity to address infrastructure issues and to help with service delivery would also help prepare the ground for cooperation at the cabinet level, Booysen said.
“This will all make it easier to sell to the constituency. It is clear to the DA at this stage that they are not going to win power, not in this election or in any foreseeable election,” Booysen said.
Sydney Mufamadi, who served as minister of safety and security in the first democratic government, said there were both comparisons and contrasts between the political conditions — and motivation — today and during the transition.
Mufamadi said that the agreement for a government of national unity had been secured during the negotiations with the ANC, which understood that “what we would require in South Africa is non-racial unity as the basis for building a democratic future”.
The decision was not forced upon the ANC by its election numbers, but by the desire to ensure a peaceful transition and to provide South Africans with some level of reassurance during a difficult time.
“The posture of the liberation movement had to be one that gave assurance to the population at large, addressing the aspirations of those who were hitherto oppressed, but also the anxieties of those who benefitted from the apartheid status quo,” Mufamadi said this week.
The idea of an inclusive government was “not something that was
drawn from us by our interlocutor as a concession”.
The leadership at the time understood that although change was necessarily disruptive, care had to be taken to ensure the country moved forward with a sense of balance.
“It is something that we put forward because we felt that even if the ANC were to get, for example, 80% of the votes in the first elections, you were not going to have the appeal that you want to have to the farmers who are giving the country food security,” Mufamadi said.
They had inherited a military and a police force that were loyal to the old regime and a business community that was “unsure about who we were”, and an inclusive government assisted in dealing with this.
“The imperative of national unity — a universal task of postcolonial societies — is what made us feel that we needed to have a government which gives assurances to non-anc supporting patriots,” he said.
“We could also not ignore the reality that we are coming into a situation of electoral politics and constitutionalism, and therefore we had to merge the nation-building considerations with an insistence on an element of some representativeness.”
This resulted in a 10% of the vote threshold that parties had to cross to be invited to serve in Mandela’s cabinet. Mufamadi said it was “so good” that the IFP had made the cut because “violence was proving to be the single biggest obstacle to the transition” and having then party leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi in the cabinet assisted in dealing with it.
“That was also a consideration — how do you remove the impediments that stand in the way of the transition?” he said. “The idea was that it would be in place for a limited duration in order to allow the transition to gain traction.”
Mufamadi said that although the NP had pulled out over De Klerk’s “tantrums”, the IFP had stayed in the GNU until it lapsed and had been invited by Thabo Mbeki to serve in his first cabinet in 1999.
He said that should any form of coalition government be formed after May, “it will not be a novelty”.
Mufamadi believes that once again the national interest — and not electoral numbers — should be fuelling the debate on whether such an initiative is necessary.
“I think the obsession with numerical considerations tends to divert attention from the political and strategic considerations which should be the basis on which you discuss whether there is a need for the formation of a coalition,” he said.
There was still a “lot of work to do” among South Africans — and the political class — to socialise them “to understand the importance of ensuring that no sectarian interests should trump the national interest”.
The challenges of the day “require a political class that is sufficiently aware of its responsibilities as a custodian of the national interest”.
Mufamadi said the experience of serving in government had helped leaders of parties that had been at war with each other to understand that their former enemies were also humans.
“When you are sitting together addressing issues, the first thing to dawn on you is that you may have spent years trying to kill each other, but this person is a human being, just as you are a human being,” he said.
“A lot of things get demystified when you get to know and understand each other.”