Riah ‘buried the evidence’
Damning findings point to Marikana killing cover-up
NATIONAL Police Commissioner Riah Phiyega was aware of, and consented to, an attempt by senior cops to hide evidence from the Marikana commission.
That damning evidence will add to mounting pressure for her head to roll. The report found:
An extraordinary meeting of the SAPS national management forum – at which it was decided in advance that August 16, 2012, was “D-Day” – was not mentioned in the police’s initial submission to the inquiry.
Details of the meeting emerged months after Phiyega had testified and she had to be called back for further questioning, when her testimony was “singularly unhelpful”.
“She claimed to be unable to remember most of what was discussed,” the report said. When asked whether the meeting had discussed the need to keep bloodshed to a minimum, she said there must have been such a talk but she could not recall “those pedantic details”.
A memory stick with a recording of the meeting mysteriously disappeared.
The decision to try to disperse and disar m striking workers on the Marikana koppie if they refused to put down their weapons was, therefore, not in response to an escalation of tensions on the day.
“That decision,” the report states, “was the decisive cause of the 34 deaths on August 16”.
Evidence leaders called the SAPS response to questions about the critical meeting a “disgrace”, leaving them with “a feeling of absolute despair”.
The report was critical of her competence as the top cop.
Phiyega and then-North West provincial commissioner Zukiswa Mbombo took “irrelevant” political considerations into account in their decisionmaking, the report said.
The report found that neither Mbombo nor Phiyega should have been taking decisions on operational matters because they had limited operational policing experience.
Mbombo had a year of experience in crime prevention, after which she rose through the ranks in administrative and financial positions. Yet she took two “critical decisions” on August 16. Both were described as “reckless” in the report. Mbombo retired last month.
Phiyega, the report said, was “if anything, in an even worse position”, having never served in the police before becoming national commissioner.
The report also noted Phiyega’s words at a police parade the day after the tragedy.
“Whatever happened represents the best of responsible policing,” she told the gathering of SAPS members.
Phiyega is to face an inquiry into her fitness to hold office and President Jacob Zuma said he had written to her to inform her of this. But political parties and policing experts are baying for her head.
Gareth Newham, head of governance, crime and justice at the Institute for Security Studies, said she should be held to account “as a matter of urgency”.
DA leader Mmusi Mai- mane said former police minister Nathi Mthethwa, now Minister of Arts and Culture, and Phiyega should be “summarily dismissed”.
“The fact is Phiyega and others took a decision they knew would result in bloodshed, failed to stop the operation when the shooting had begun, left miners to die without medical help, congratulated the police for their tactics, and went to great lengths to mislead the Farlam Commission.”
The DA would announce further steps tomorrow to ensure accountability, redress and refor m of the police, Maimane said.
African Christian Democratic Party leader Kenneth Meshoe said Phiyega should be suspended immediately, pending the outcome of the inquiry.
IFP MP Albert Mncwango also called for Phiyega’s suspension.Freedom Front Plus police spokesman Pieter Groenewald said she should resign immediately.
AfriForum said the massacre had been a consequence of Phiyega’s “inept leadership”. Levels of violent crime had increased on her watch and the massacre was the “cherry on top”. “Phiyega’s head should roll,” it said.
The advance decision that Phiyega and the cops tried to cover up forced operational commanders on the ground to come up with a plan at short notice – in the few hours between the realisation on the morning of August 16 that the strikers would not disperse voluntarily and the after noon, when it had to be executed while there was still enough light.
The plan they came up with was woefully inadequate, didn’t reflect the live situation, was never properly interrogated to test possible worst-case scenarios, did not include input from experienced public order policing officers, was poorly communicated to commanders of the units involved and began to unravel almost as soon as it was put into motion.