The truth must emerge from the fog of war
What were South African troops doing in central Africa, asks
HE death in combat of 13 South African soldiers in the Central African Republic raises questions about the deployment of our forces to that country.
Early indications are that the soldiers were fighting alongside forces of the CAR to prevent the advance of Seleka rebel forces on the capital Bangui.
The facts are not clear and information from official sources has been limited.
Even the decision to send South African troops was controversial. First, there were the specific reasons for the deployment and the manner of its announcement by President Jacob Zuma in parliament. The constitution is clear on the requirement for parliament to be informed and to agree to the deployment of the South African National Defence Force.
Then there is the question of costs. It is safe to assume that this deployment will have consequences for South Africa beyond the tragic deaths.
The CAR deployment raises the question of longer-term consequences, specifically for the future role South Africa can, and would like to, play in Africa. A critical issue in this context includes the external context. Why is the SANDF in the CAR?
The official explanation from the
TSouth African government is that a bilateral agreement between the governments of South Africa and the CAR, dating back to 2001 and extended for another five years in December 2012, forms the basis of the deployment.
The agreement mandates the SANDF to provide military and transformation training to the CAR defence force. It may have included some protection to the now ousted CAR president, Francois Bozize.
It seems that the protection of South African interests also became part of the mandate. What these interests are is not clear.
Another potentially problematic dimension relates to how the SANDF is supposed to ensure stability in the CAR.
The deployment of the SANDF without an African Union or United Nations mandate is another complicating factor. This is a potentially high-risk approach by the South African government, because it may create serious tension with continental and other regional role players. This again raises questions about why or what the South African interests are.
Post-1994 South African military involvement in Africa has been guided by the principles of multilateralism. Any deployment of the SANDF took place in the context of peacekeeping missions with the support of the AU or UN, or regional organisations such as the Southern African Development Community.
A consequence of any deployment based on a bilateral agreement is that the SANDF is dependent on its own logistical capabilities for the movement of troops and equipment. Being so far from South Africa must be a serious additional strain on the already constrained ability of the SANDF to supply troops and equipment.
The high levels of instability in the CAR and the region must complicate these processes even further, hence South Africa’s reliance on routing supplies through Entebbe in Uganda.
A possible consequence of this is the deployment of troops without heavy equipment and additional support.
Regional dynamics also play a part. The CAR lies between regions and states characterised by instability and conflict: Chad, Mali, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The domestic context in the CAR is also a difficult factor. The ousted Bozize is another of Africa’s dictatorial leaders, initially coming to power in a military takeover and winning elections thereafter. These elections have been the subject of much controversy.
Questions are again being raised about the constitutional and legal requirements for deploying South African troops. They centre on the role of the president as commander-in-chief of the SANDF and his responsibilities to act in terms of specific constitutional requirements regarding the deployment of troops. Parliament has specific responsibilities with regard to the deployment of the SANDF.
The potential risks to South Africa’s external interests and established foreign policy guidelines of bilateral actions in countries such as the CAR must be weighed.
One of the key features of South African foreign policy since 1994 is that of multilateralism and the balancing of foreign policy engagements with being a responsible global citizen.
A heavy emphasis is placed on the African agenda and African solidarity as determinants of South Africa’s foreign policy.
South Africa has endured much criticism in the past for refraining from decisive foreign policy actions in order not to cause tension or in any way threaten the interests of other African states.
A last issue emanating from the development is that of communication with the public and legitimate interested parties in South Africa.
It is understandably difficult to provide complete communication on such an unfolding situation. It is, however, important to provide factual and timeous information on a major development such as this.
The SANDF functions in an environment in which information is available very soon after any incident occurs. The inability, or unwillingness, to provide information leads to rumours and a reliance on other, unofficial sources of information.
The animosity exhibited towards some interested parties and persons with legitimate interests and responsibilities with regard to the SANDF is a matter of concern and cannot be tolerated.
The SANDF is a public institution and as such needs to act with responsibility, in accordance with and within the ambit of the constitutional and democratic state.
The situation in the CAR and the actions of South Africa are not what South Africans have become accustomed to post-1994.
It is therefore important to differentiate between the political issues and the military issues and the different role players need to stick to clearly defined roles with regard to communication, particularly in public communication.
The consequences for South Africa and the SANDF of the engagement in the CAR are not going to be clear immediately.
The accounts of the bravery and effectiveness of the soldiers will undoubtedly have a positive impact on the SANDF and its reputation, especially in future deployments.
The commitment of the South African government in supporting and taking responsibility for the actions of the SANDF is also positive and important for the SANDF and its commanders.
The domestic and external political consequences and possible negative outcomes of South Africa’s engagement in the CAR will only become visible over time.
The political risks for South Africa acting in Africa outside the established guidelines of multilateralism are significant and may result in even more scepticism from African governments in terms of the real intentions and desires of South Africa.
Henwood is a lecturer in the University of Pretoria’s department of political sciences