France ‘threatened’ by SA’S role in CAR

Experts say two countries have ’difficult issues’ in Africa

THE March coup in the Central African Republic (CAR) that cost the lives of 15 South African soldiers and forced its dictator president, François Bozizé, into exile has drawn a veil of diplomatic silence from Pretoria to Bangui and Paris.

Despite Bozizé defending his relationship with South African President Jacob Zuma (see report alongside) and now denying he told the Sunday Times last week that Zuma had not delivered on a back-room deal, a senior adviser to Zuma on foreign relations said this week that Bozizé was “yesterday’s man”.

Bozizé had claimed in an interview with the Sunday Times in Paris that he had believed his agreement with Zuma would involve more South African troops being sent to the CAR. When this did not happen, Bozizé lost the presidency and was forced into exile.

“As far as the South African government is concerned, Bozizé is out,” said the Zuma adviser, who asked not to be named. “He is yesterday’s man. He is in France with all the other retired or exiled heads of state and rebel leaders from Africa — that’s where they all go. President Zuma supports the UN and African Union position on the CAR; Bozizé features nowhere in their road map.”

A foreign affairs adviser, two diplomatic observers and a senior analyst working inside and outside government this week all agreed on one aspect — South Africa’s troops in the

When push came to shove, Mali asked France to help rather than SA

CAR must be understood in the context of the country’s relations with France and France’s role in Africa.

According to them, the following incidents played a significant role in the decision to send South Africans to the CAR on New Year’s Eve last year:

March 2011: Operation Harmattan.

France and South Africa were pitted against each other over Libya. France, forming part of a multi-state coalition, began military intervention in Libya, implementing a UN Security Council resolution. Zuma launched a scathing attack on the council for allowing the Nato military strikes that played a key role in Muammar Gaddafi’s downfall. South Africa abstained from authorising military action, arguing that the AU had its own political initiative, “which was complete- ly ignored in favour of bombing Libya by Nato forces,” said Zuma;

July 2012: The African Union presidency.

Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma broke AU tradition by going head-to-head with Gabonese (and French-speaking) candidate Jean Ping. Only after a third round of voting did Dlamini-Zuma win, broadly splitting votes along linguistic lines — English-speaking countries supported Dlamini-Zuma and French-speaking countries supported Ping; and

January 2013: French military intervention in Mali.

In March 2012, Malian president Amadou Toumani Touré is ousted in a coup d’état. The government of Mali asked for foreign military help to retake the north. The French military began operations against the Islamist forces. Other AU states were deployed only later.

A senior adviser to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, who asked not to be named, said South Africa’s role in the CAR “only makes sense against the backdrop of French involvement in Africa”.

“At the end of the colonial period, France, a colonising power, left the house [Africa]. But they only took their jackets. They left their briefcases behind. It’s the metaphor of how important Africa still is to France. They are threatened by South Africa. France sees us as a competitor and that’s why we have difficult issues between us.

“France still plays an active role in parts of Africa. They intervene in domestic politics. At one stage it was so bad that Jacques Chirac [then French president] told Thabo Mbeki he ‘doesn’t understand Africa’.

“How insulting is that? To tell an African leader that you don’t understand Africa. The military defeat South Africa suffered in the CAR must be seen against this backdrop. Our troops were killed and pulled out. The French troops stayed. There are more than 400 French troops still in the CAR,” he said.

Dr Paul-Simon Handy, senior researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, said South Africa made a “massive mistake” sending troops to the CAR. “There are many things that we don’t know about our involvement in the CAR because South Africa did this in complete violation of its own foreign policy principles. Sending troops to the CAR revealed a level of unprofessionalism and hastiness on South Africa’s side,” Handy said.

“[It] was a hasty decision taken without consideration of the specific context and in total ignorance of the regional organisation’s own efforts to stabilise the country.

“The consequences for the South African defence force was deadly.”

Handy stressed that South Africa had a “deep-rooted world-vision of imperialism with us [South Africa] as the good guys and them [France] as the bad guys”.

“To understand why South Africa intervened in the CAR, you must consider that the main push factor was the role of France. French troops being deployed in Mali hurt South Africa’s pride, which wants to see itself as a major role player on the continent. When push came to shove, Mali asked for France to help rather than turning to South Africa,” said Handy.

The media adviser for Michel Djotodia, self-appointed president of the CAR, told the Sunday Times this week that the security situation in the country was dire after more than 5 000 people fled to the national airport in fear of their lives.

The UN High Commission for Refugees said 10 people had been killed and thousands fled their homes in a confusing security situation.