A sharp and tough negotiator of destiny
White leaders who handed power to the ANC pay tribute to Mandela’s decisive role
FORMER president FW de Klerk and some of his erstwhile National Party colleagues yesterday remembered Nelson Mandela as a tough negotiator during South Africa’s transition to democracy.
“My first meeting with Mr Mandela was in December 1989 when I was president and he in prison,” De Klerk told the Sunday Times yesterday.
“We met in the presidential office in Tuynhuys that at the time was mine and would become his.”
De Klerk said he had been well briefed by colleagues who had negotiated with Mandela in prison.
“He was taller than I expected, dressed in a neat suit, and he exuded decency.
“We did not discuss anything we would later have to negotiate about. He spoke of his interest in the Anglo-Boer War, especially the high regard in which he held generals Koos de la Rey and Christiaan de Wet.
“We sized each other up. As is evident from our respective memoirs, each felt the other was someone he could do business with.
“He then went back to his house on the grounds of Victor Verster Prison near Paarl.
“Our second meeting took place in the same office on the Tuesday or Wednesday before his release from prison.
“I had unbanned the ANC on the previous Friday [February 2 1990] and informed Mr Mandela that he would be released on the Sunday [February 11].
“He said it was too soon. The ANC needed more time to prepare. I told him we would negotiate about many things in future, but not about the date of his release.
“We wanted to release him in Johannesburg, but he insisted on walking to freedom from the prison where he was held. We relented.
“Insofar as Mr Mandela as a negotiator was concerned, I dealt with him more in the period of negotiations about negotiations than in the phase of proper negotiations.
“We were discussing the basic principles and bedrocks of the process, rather than the detail.
“As a negotiator, Mr Mandela was very difficult to read. He could throw a smoke screen like
We sized each other up. As is evident from our respective memoirs, each felt the other was someone he could do business with
no other and his body language was very hard to fathom.
“On the one hand he could be very stubborn on issues about which he felt strongly, like the identity of the TRC [Truth and Reconciliation Commission] commissioners, which we disagreed with very strongly. But he understood very well that there were issues we were not in a position to compromise on.
“Our shared strength was that we understood and respected the nature of the other’s constituency.
“We both understood that we had to compromise. The ANC, for instance, was prepared to acquiesce to our insistence that the constitution be the highest law, superseding the powers of parliament and keeping the executive in check.
“For me, the most painful compromise was on amnesty. I felt no amnesty should be given to perpetrators of violent crimes and that amnesty had to be granted to both sides of the conflict on the same footing.
“The ANC felt very strongly that freedom fighters and state security forces could not be judged on the same terms.
“We had to compromise on crimes committed with a political motive, and the ANC had to bite the bullet and agree to equal treatment for their fighters and the members of the security forces.
“In the final analysis, I believe Mr Mandela was a tough and analytical negotiator who was able to differentiate between what was important and what was not, and was prepared to negotiate for a reasonable compromise.”
Former National Party chief negotiator Roelf Meyer believes Mandela was very calculated in getting exactly what he wanted from the negotiation process.
“He was a very, very clever man. He knew exactly how to exploit the other side’s weaknesses,” Meyer said.
“One of our main weaknesses was our uncertainty about il-
The ANC felt very strongly that freedom fighters and state security forces could not be judged on the same terms
legal violent acts by the security forces. We had forbidden it and clear, uncontested evidence was hard to come by, but the rumours persisted, placing president De Klerk in a horrible position.
“Mr Mandela used it very effectively after the Boipatong massacre, when he suspended negotiations on national television without consulting us, realising the balance of power had shifted. This led to the ANC campaign of rolling mass action, which was only terminated in favour of a return to negotiations after the Bhisho massacre.
“The strange thing was that Cyril Ramaphosa [ANC chief negotiator at the time] contacted me within minutes after Mandela’s television announcement to create an informal channel of negotiation.
“This could only have been done with Mr Mandela’s knowledge and indicates his tactical prowess.
“Thus, as a result of months of daily negotiations through the informal channel, we were able to agree to the record of understanding very soon after the Bhisho massacre had illustrated the need to return to the negotiating table.
“To my mind, the record of understanding laid the foundation for the democratic transition and was the highlight of the negotiations process.”
Former minister of labour Leon Wessels recalled the 1991 debate between De Klerk and Mandela, when Mandela grabbed a final chance and attacked De Klerk from the podium.
“That night, Mr Mandela taught me that no problem is insurmountable.
“After the clash with FW, a scheduled cocktail function had to take place. It was a dreary affair, but Pik [Botha, then minister of foreign affairs] and I stuck around.
“The next moment, Mr Mandela came up behind me and
Ramaphosa contacted me within minutes after Mandela’s television announcement to create an informal channel
said the old guys, meaning Pik and himself, had to talk.
“After they had concluded their discussion, he came to me and said I need not worry. He and Pik had talked and found a way forward.”
Wessels also values Mandela’s sense of history.
“After the constitution was finalised in 1996, Mr Mandela could have just signed it in his office. But he decided it had to be signed in public, and he decided it had to be done on December 10 at Sharpeville near Vereeniging.
“Explaining his decision, Mr Mandela gave three reasons.
“First, he recalled that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights came into existence on December 10 1948 and the constitution brought South Africa in step with the worldwide human rights culture.
“Second, he recalled that the Peace of Vereeniging, ending the Anglo-Boer War in 1902, was what he called the first betrayal of the British and the Boers — referring to the decision not to extend the vote to black South Africans.
“Third, he decided the constitution had to be signed in Sharpeville, scene of the 1960 pass protest shooting that left 69 people dead, so that the township’s people would know their struggle was not in vain.”
Botha agreed that Mandela had been a skilled negotiator.
“Mr Mandela’s cherished belief was that political power achieved through violent means will not endure. His death is irreversible, but his legacy lives. The choice left to us is to honour his path, or to deviate from it. That will define our destiny.”