Democracy suffers under cleft between rich and poor
Social stresses are testing foundations of SA constitution, say researchers
TWO research papers published recently by local and international economists flag the risk posed to South Africa’s democracy by the stresses it is subjected to.
They examine the possibility that these stresses may result in the collapse of some of its foundational principles.
The most recent of these papers analyses post-apartheid South Africa using the frame of liberal democracy, which the authors describe as characterised by property, political and civil rights. All three are guaranteed by the constitution, making South Africa one of the world’s few liberal democracies.
The authors of this paper, published by the National Bureau of Economic Research, are Dani Rodrik, a professor at the John F Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and Sharun Mukand, an economics professor at the University of Warwick.
Rodrik was a member of the international panel on growth that was appointed by the National Treasury in 2005 to help the government identify constraints to shared growth and how to overcome these.
Some background is necessary. Liberalism preceded electoral democracy in the West and developed out of the Protestant Reformation and the subsequent religious wars.
Rodrik and Mukand explain that early liberals were property elites, landed gentry and wealthy taxpayers who sought to prevent the crown from exercising arbitrary power over them.
Then industrialisation, which forced people off the farms into urban areas, forged a class of people who fought for and gained electoral democracy.
By contrast, in developing coun- tries, mass politics came about as a result of decolonisation and national liberation wars. The relevant societal cleavages in this case were based on ethnicity or nationality, not class or economic status, as was the case in the West.
Mukand and Rodrik say the biggest beneficiaries of property rights are the propertied elites, whose primary objective is to keep and accumulate their assets. Political rights benefit mostly those who want electoral power so that they can choose policies that improve their economic conditions. Minorities want civil rights that guarantee them equality under the law and the right not to be discriminated against.
South Africa’s political settlement, therefore, was a case of the elite (a propertied class drawn from a racial minority) seeking both property and civil rights in return for the transfer of political power to the majority. In this case, the cleavages that distinguished the majority from the minority and the elite from the nonelite were closely aligned.
Rodrik and Mukand identify two societal cleavages that play a crucial role in societies. First is the divide between those who own property (used here not in its everyday meaning but as an economist reference to wealth) and the poor majority.
The second is between a majority and a minority, a cleavage that exerts a variety of influences on the prospects for liberal democracy. It makes, for example, the majority favour electoral rather than liberal democracy. The ballot makes it possible for the majority to claim more state expenditure than the minority.
Mukand and Rodrik point out that South Africa’s democracy operates under considerable strain. They point to recent xenophobic violence as an example that the country is straying from its liberal principles.
The strains of post-apartheid South Africa are also underlined in a paper by Brian Levy, Alan Hirsch and Ingrid Woolard.
Levy is academic director of the Graduate School of Development Policy at the University of Cape Town, Hirsch the director of the same school, and Woolard a UCT economics professor.
They say that for the first 20 years of democracy South Africa has been ruled by an inclusive political alliance within the framework of a robust constitutional order. But holding the political centre has become increasingly difficult, putting “a strain on the formal institutions of governance”.
They single out stark inequality as the major cause of these strains, which are eroding governance. Another factor is the absence of genuine competitive politics, which has reduced pressure on the ANC to deliver on its promises. This dominance also enables the ruling party to use public resources to strengthen its networks of influence.
Inequality at the top was partially addressed through deracialising employment, asset ownership and business opportunity.
These low-hanging fruits have been picked. Much inequality remains. Hence the recent mantra of radical transformation and discussions whether the constitution is a hindrance to transformation, specifically in relation to land reform.
Demands that banks and insurance companies should do empowerment deals until the metaphorical cows come home is another example of this tension.
Hirsch, Levy and Woolard are optimistic that the islands of excellence found in the public sector can help South Africa pull through.
The conclusion by Rodrik and Mukand, however, warns that the identity cleavage that characterises South Africa is less conducive to a polity where political, property and civil rights exist happily ever after.
They single out stark inequality as the major cause of these strains, which are eroding governance
Sikhakhane is deputy editor of The Conversation Africa