Obama misread canny Putin. Will Trump fare any better?
US President Donald Trump will have to wake up and smell the coffee if he wants to deal effectively with Putin’s ambitions for Russia and beyond, says Gerrit Olivier
NEWLY sworn-in US President Donald Trump promises to “reset” relations between Russia and the US, something his predecessor failed to achieve.
This might indeed happen as the Kremlin seems to be over the moon about his election, while he says only good things about Russian President Vladimir Putin.
However, assuming Trump is not totally naïve, the honeymoon may not last long. His friendship with Putin can only endure on the basis of concessions that could amount to Western capitulation and his own political demise.
Obviously, a modus vivendi between Russia and the US is of wider interest, particularly in the North Atlantic zone and the Middle East.
But it will be difficult. Trump is an inexperienced, erratic transactional politician, while Putin excels in geopolitical diplomacy, driven by an insatiable territorial greed and a penchant for prestige and recognition.
Horse trading may take place and both sides will be under pressure to deliver. Trump, in particular, will have to satisfy public opinion at home as well as allies of the US.
He will need to demonstrate that he is capable of “making America great again”, and guard against being portrayed as Putin’s poleznye durak (useful idiot).
It is common knowledge that mutual animosity played a role in former US president Barack Obama and Putin’s strained and failed relationship. The question is: how will Putin and Trump get along?
According to the Economist: Trump “appears to view life, whether in business, politics or trade negotiations, as a series of fights from which only he emerges with credit”.
Needless to say, this negotiation style will cut no ice with the obdurate Russians, and Putin will again come out on top.
Patience is called for and Trump should apply the basics of foreign policy making, particularly a clear understanding of national interests, diplomatic guile and power politics.
What he should bear in mind from the outset is that the US and Russia are not allies but competitors. It is an asymmetrical situation as, by a wide margin, Russia is not the equal of the US as an international role player and its interests are in conflict in critical areas.
The national capabilities, soft and hard, of the US dwarf those of Russia.
Trump can bargain from a position of strength, something Obama failed to do, being outwitted by Putin’s bold revisionism, risktaking, and strategic and tactical acumen.
Russia dictated much of the US foreign policy agenda and Putin was seen as “the winner”. The question is: will history repeat itself under the Trump presidency?
Alarmingly, Trump does not seem to understand the basics of high-level diplomacy. Early signals from Washington are not reassuring at all.
What should cause particular concern in Western capitals is the utter confusion on the part of Trump and his team on how to deal with Russia, Nato, the EU and the Middle East.
Trump seems to make foreign policy on the hoof. No overarching US foreign policy doctrine based on critical national interests as a guide to decision making seems to exist.
Rex Tillerson, Trump’s nominee for secretary of state, his nominee as secretary of defence, James Mattis, and Nikki Haley, nominee UN ambassador, have widely divergent views on the Kremlin’s intentions, also differing from those of Trump himself.
No doubt, this situation will be exploited by the Kremlin.
By most accounts, Trump is totally unprepared and ill-equipped to face what could be waiting. The wisest thing his administration could do is not rush things, keep its powder dry, do its homework properly and build a broad consensus involving all major role players.
Trump regards Putin as “sharp” and, given his competitive nature, the US president will try to best Putin — and will lose face in view of his diplomatic naivety and inexperience.
It’s obviously not in the US interest to allow Russia to continue to dominate its foreign policy agenda. It should deal with the Kremlin with its own “yes-able” agenda.
At the outset, the two countries may well agree on issues such as greater respect for and recognition of Russia’s status in international politics, the elimination of sanctions, the need to curb the menace of terrorism — particularly Islamic State, cyber incursions, nuclear proliferation (with a focus on the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea) and the expansion of trade relations.
Resolving fundamental issues will be a different matter.
Russia will expect Trump to do away with the debilitating sanctions regime, condone the annexation of Crimea, agree to the new geopolitical status quo in Russia’s “near abroad” and diminish the role of Nato.
With the exception of sanctions, it would be suicidal for Trump to acquiesce to any of these.
What he should insist upon is a restoration of the status quo ante.
His Russophile instincts should make way for realpolitik. Unlike Putin, a quasi-dictator, who deThis termines Russian national interests as he sees fit, Trump cannot act solo. He will have to deal with divisions in his cabinet, satisfy US public opinion, congress, and the country’s partners in Europe.
Only at his peril will he isolate himself from these forces.
While Trump wants to “make America great again”, Putin has the same ambitions for Russia. This is a central feature of “Putinism” and a lodestar of Russian foreign policy.
It holds serious implications for Europe and the wider world order. Trump and his team should be particularly aware of this.
At Davos, US Vice-President Joe Biden said: “Under President Putin, Russia is working with every tool available to them to whittle away at the edges of the European project, test the fault lines of Western nations and return to politics defined by spheres of influence . . . dangerous autocrats and demagogues have tried to capitalise on people’s fears throughout history . . . the purpose is clear: to collapse the liberal international order.”
What Biden said tallies exactly with the Russian Security Strategy of December 31 2015, proclaiming that “consolidating the status of the Russian Federation as a world power” is a fundamental priority of Russian national interest.
The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, signed by Putin late last year, promotes the thesis that the West is in inexorable decline. The overarching objective of Russian foreign policy is to elevate its status in the international hierarchy of powers, which the West tries to contain.
The new struggle is to determine the parameters of the new system with Russia as a rising power. Russian foreign policy focuses on status projection, creating a favourable external environment, strengthening Russia’s position as a vital global centre of power.
The message is clear: Russia will continue to challenge the status quo, taking new risks to achieve its aims.
Trump would be naïve to think he can make the Kremlin change its mind. What he can do is obstruct it.
A tactical game lies ahead. The Kremlin will obviously use a “reset” of relations as breathing space to consolidate its geopolitical gains in Ukraine, Crimea, Georgia and Syria.
With debilitating sanctions lifted, Russia will get the breathing space it needs to get its faltering economy going, avoiding the risk of military over-extension and domestic turmoil.
For the moment, obviously, Putin regards Trump as an ally.
He should bear in mind from the outset that the US and Russia are not allies but competitors