Scramble for power
Balance of Power: Ramaphosa and the Future of South Africa by Qaanitah Hunter is published by Kwela Books, R280. This is an edited extract from the book
Aday before the Nasrec conference began, the account of the Special Operations unit of the State Security Agency (SSA) was raided and R20m was taken out in cash with no explanation given. The Special Ops, or SO, had become the personal intelligence army of Zuma and, it later emerged, a cash source for him and his allies. As the December 2017 elective conference loomed, the race appeared increasingly tight and the desperation to secure a definitive outcome became notably urgent. It may not have been the political equivalent of David versus Goliath, but the contest proved to be unequal as the candidate on one side was carried on the shoulders of state machinery and resources. Though Zuma and his allies were confident that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma would win, nothing was left to chance.
As part of the Zuma camp’s efforts to secure victory for their candidate, intelligence officials were placed in each bus that ferried ANC delegates to the conference to keep tabs on them, take the pulse of their mood, and ensure nothing would disrupt their confident prediction of a Dlamini-Zuma win. The officials wore ANC T-shirts and blended in well enough with the delegates while reporting any areas of concern. At every part of the conference SSA agents monitored delegates’ movements. Some party leaders even believe that delegates’ communications were intercepted with the use of a “grabber”, the nickname of a spy machine that can pick up cellphone signals within a certain vicinity.
But these efforts by the Zuma camp to secure a victory for their candidate by relying on state resources went back much further in time, so it emerged later. Perhaps the first time they were put to use was in January 2016, when the ANC held its annual birthday rally in Rustenburg. The Special Ops unit boasted in their annual report of that year that one of their achievements was intercepting a bus from Gauteng with ANC supporters wearing CR17 regalia. The ANC in Gauteng was for much of Zuma’s tenure as ANC president a thorn in his side. They were the first to demand that he take financial responsibility for the upgrades to his personal home at Nkandla when it was quite unpopular to do so in the ANC.
By January 2016 there was already support emerging for then deputy president Cyril Ramaphosa to replace Zuma as ANC president.
Just a month before, Ramaphosa had publicly broken ranks with Zuma over his decision to axe finance minister Nhlanhla Nene and replace him with the unknown Des van Rooyen, a move that cost the South African economy billions of rands when the markets reacted negatively to the news. The firing of Nene prompted Ramaphosa to become more assertive as Zuma’s deputy. But it was the subsequent firing in March 2017 of finance minister Pravin Gordhan, who had replaced the short-lived Van Rooyen, that set in place Ramaphosa’s resolve to challenge Zuma and his proxy candidate for the position of ANC president that year.
Once again, the state intelligence services were involved in the debacle. Gordhan and his then deputy, Mcebisi Jonas, were on a routine roadshow to the UK and the US to encourage international investment in SA when they were recalled home by the president. Armed with an intelligence report entitled Operation Checkmate, which he presented to the ANC’s top six officials, Zuma claimed that Gordhan and Jonas were planning to meet foreign businessmen on their travels in an effort to undermine him and discredit his leadership.
“The bankers are going to be told that the ministry of finance and treasury stand together against the president and the corruption of the Guptas. They will also be told that there is a movement to fire finance minister Pravin Gordhan and deputy finance minister Mcebisi Jonas and Treasury director-general Lungisa Fuzile by the president,” the so-called intelligence report noted.
The document went on to say: “They [the investors] will be given proof of what they are selling of the corruption by the Guptas and how the investment banks need to stand to fight the president.
“They [Gordhan and Jonas] will inform the banks that if they are fired, the financial markets in SA will collapse and the rand will go to R18 to R20 to the dollar. They will also tell the banks that they have the support of many in the ANC and other parties to force the president out.”
But Ramaphosa, by his own account, was distrustful of this intelligence report and challenged Zuma head-on in their meeting.
“That was the most unintelligent report that I have ever heard of,” Ramaphosa said publicly days after Operation Checkmate had been used as the basis to fire Gordhan and Jonas.
“I told the president that I was totally against this move. And I reminded him that I was once a victim of a false report. I reminded the president, I said, ‘Your name was also on that list. You were also supposed to be party to a false plot against president Mbeki.’”
Not only did Zuma come to the meeting with the top six bringing his bogus intelligence report, but he also came with the proposal that Brian Molefe become the next finance minister to replace Gordhan. Jessie Duarte later recalled how Zuma had presented Molefe as his candidate. “He did say: ‘Here’s a young man who’s put Eskom straight‚ why can’t he assist us elsewhere?’ Zuma told the meeting that for nine months he had had a problem with Gordhan, who was given to instructing the president in cabinet.”
Gordhan was allegedly arrogant with other ministers too and communication between the finance minister and the president had broken down irreparably. The meeting of six of the most powerful people in the country then degenerated into a screaming match as accusations and counteraccusations were hurled from both sides. Ramaphosa, Gwede Mantashe and Zweli Mkhize, in particular, vehemently opposed the move. Ramaphosa himself was clear that the finance minister couldn’t be fired merely on the basis of an intelligence report.
“I raised my concern and objection on the removal of the minister of finance, largely because he was being removed based on an intelligence report that I believe had unsubstantiated allegations,” he said a week later.
By the time Zuma’s meeting with the top six ended, Gordhan and Jonas were already on their way back from the UK. On landing at OR Tambo airport the next day, they went straight to Luthuli House, where they met Mantashe, the ANC’s secretary-general. Mantashe told the pair that Zuma intended to fire them both and asked Gordhan to resign to minimise the consequences for the country, both politically and economically. But Gordhan, who is known to be a fighter, insisted he had no plans to resign and would continue serving the national interest.
“My position [to Mantashe] was that the ... president could fire me if he wanted to get rid of me,” Gordhan said of that meeting in an affidavit later.
ANC leaders spoke of a manic urgency that possessed Zuma to fire Gordhan and Jonas at any cost. By the time Zuma discussed the matter with the
ANC’s alliance partners, the SACP and Cosatu, he was described as a “suicide bomber” who was dead set against any kind of rational argument. He was resolved to carry out the deed.
When Zuma called the ANC’s top six to his official home that Thursday evening, he put on a stoic face and his tone was measured. He had a list of names in his hand of whom he would appoint when he reshuffled his executive but it was not open for discussion as party leaders had undermined him by leaking what had happened in their meetings with him to the media. Ramaphosa shrugged. So be it, was his attitude.
“It was just a process of informing us of his decision. It was not a consultation because he came with a ready-made list,” Ramaphosa said days later. Mantashe was visibly angered by Zuma’s decision. “We were given a list that was complete, and my own view as the secretary-general, I felt like this list has been developed somewhere else and it’s given to us to legitimise it,” Mantashe said at the time. He, Ramaphosa and Mkhize then huddled together and decided they would publicly distance themselves from the cabinet reshuffle.
In the early hours of the morning, Zuma announced in a statement his new cabinet, which involved 20 changes to the executive, including the dismissal of Gordhan as finance minister and of his deputy, Jonas. Malusi Gigaba replaced Gordhan while Sfiso Buthelezi, the former Passenger Rail Agency chairperson, replaced Jonas. The changes made no sense to anyone.
“My own view is that I’m very uncomfortable because areas where ministers do not perform have not been touched. Ministers have been moved and the majority of them were good, performing ministers.
I’m very much uncomfortable with it,” Mantashe said.
Party leaders have commented that the March reshuffle as well as the drama that led up to it was indicative of two certainties: that Zuma had perverted the intelligence agencies of the state to serve his interest and that the state was being run from outside the ANC and from outside the Union Buildings.
As civil society increasingly mobilised against Zuma and Ramaphosa stepped up his campaign, the use of the intelligence agencies by Zuma and his allies against their opponents only intensified.
Intelligence insiders said that Zuma’s intelligence army, the Special Ops unit, was used to play an active role in regional and provincial gatherings of the ANC in the run-up to Nasrec “to ensure certain outcomes”.
A report by former minister Sydney Mufamadi, who was appointed by Ramaphosa months after he became president to investigate the State Security Agency, revealed that the SSA had become “extensively embroiled in the politics and factionalism of the ruling party” and there was “naked politicisation of intelligence in recent years”.
Agents loyal to Zuma also infiltrated and penetrated groupings they believed were anti-Zuma and spent state funds on political activities for his benefit. Money from the agency was used as a political slush fund. Indeed, insiders at the agency believed that the looting of state funds by the intelligence agency was far worse than state capture by the likes of the Gupta family.