Ramaphosa has laid bare what is wrong with the ANC
Idisagree with the pundits who have argued that President Cyril Ramaphosa’s testimony at the Zondo commission this week was either boring (why should it be entertaining?) or lacking in any specifics. In fact, I found it utterly compelling and profoundly revealing about the extent to which the ANC’s internal institutional arrangements are at odds with some of the most basic tenets of constitutional democracy — so much so that they often obstruct the efforts of the best in the party’s ranks to deliver excellence in government and to reform both the organisation and its approach to governance in SA.
Ramaphosa’s testimony was emblematic of the existential problem at the centre of South African politics under the current system and the current governing party: it is impossible both to lead a party crippled by systemic corruption and to disassociate oneself from that party’s worst elements. In other words, one cannot simultaneously be a powerful ANC president and an effective South African president because the two roles are fundamentally at odds with one another.
This is likely why Ramaphosa decided to keep separate his testimony as ANC president from that as president of the republic. The attendance of a phalanx of the party’s top leadership was also a smart rhetorical flourish which emphasised the implied difference between Ramaphosa as head of the ANC and Ramaphosa as head of the state.
The biggest upshot of Ramaphosa’s submission, along with that of ANC national chair Gwede Mantashe two weeks ago, was that it also laid bare some of the party’s internal policies and conventions — almost certainly conceived in good faith decades ago — which have facilitated state corruption on a grand scale and ultimately led to “nine wasted years” under the leadership of Jacob Zuma.
The first of these is the convention that dictates one cannot aspire to the presidency of the party without first serving as deputy to a sitting ANC president. In fact, every president of the ANC and of democratic SA first served as ANC deputy president.
This is a curious custom that creates a “circular firing squad” among the party’s top leadership, in which one can neither openly criticise a previous administration nor seek to better its dismal record without also being fingered as complicit in its poor governance. In addition, any deputy president who hopes to survive long enough to become head of the party and of the state is compelled to sit on their hands for five years and hope to be able to undo the rot when they finally secure the post.
The second is cadre deployment — a slippery eel of a policy whose philosophical underpinnings are littered throughout ANC conference resolutions and policy briefs going back as far as 1984. Zondo commission evidence leader Paul Pretorius SC’s enumeration of the ANC’s written submission on cadre deployment is likely as close as we’ll get to a comprehensive outline of the policy and its intentions — yet another reason the commission’s work is so critically important.
Although Ramaphosa tried to argue that the written policy is more honoured in the breach than the observance, the list of institutions targeted by cadre deployment is nevertheless chilling, particularly in its references to “the entire civil service, parastatals, educational institutions, independent statutory commissions, agencies, boards, and institutions, and international organisations and institutions”.
The truth is that the policy is far more pernicious than Ramaphosa attempted to paint it in his testimony, most especially as it was the vehicle used to deploy “captured” individuals to the boards and leadership of state-owned entities, thus creating opportunities for organisations linked to the Guptas to loot these institutions at their leisure.
Lastly, the national executive council (NEC) practice of making decisions by consensus instead of by majority vote has become an instrument for delaying decisive leadership; one which also enables the corrupt and malfeasant within the ANC to act as spoilers of any reform efforts in the party.
The delayed implementation of the “step-aside” resolution with respect to Ace Magashule is emblematic of this problem. Despite the urgent need for Ramaphosa to make good on his commitment to root out corruption in the party and the state, and despite enjoying a decisive majority of support in the NEC, he cannot risk alienating other members of the structure by asserting this power. This would be seen to run contrary to the “tradition” of making decisions in an inclusive manner. But leadership by committee has never been an effective method of running an organisation, or a country.
While it may be tempting to lay the blame for these deficiencies squarely at the door of the ANC, we have a duty to ask ourselves whether we have adequately future-proofed our political system against similar excesses by subsequent governing parties. I agree with deputy chief justice Raymond Zondo’s suggestion that it is also our political and electoral systems which are the problem.
Ultimately, and contrary to his own testimony, Ramaphosa would be far more successful, and better able to execute his vision for the South African presidency, if he were unfettered by the constant need to keep the party he also leads united in its support for his administration. And with an approval rating that is higher than his party’s, he could also secure a more decisive mandate in a direct presidential election — which would free him to focus on his most important role: the leadership of the country.