Is DRC sliding into heart of darkness?
THE organisation of the third democratic elections that will see President Joseph Kabila cede power could plunge the Democratic Republic of Congo into chaos with unprecedented consequences for the region.
Kabila was given power on a silver platter in 2001 after the assassination of his father, Laurent. Neither the most senior nor the most competent in a ruling clique, he surprised observers when he agreed to negotiate a political transition with rebel movements created and supported by neighbouring countries.
The Sun City, North West Province negotiations led to a transitional government in 2003 which he led. In 2006 he took the country to its first democratic election in 40 years.
As expected, Kabila beat his fearless rival, Jean Pierre Bemba, in the second round. In 2011, Kabila again organised and won the elections, beating Union Pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social, the party of the old opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi.
Before the elections, however, fearing he could be challenged in the second round by a coalition of political parties, he amended the constitution to limit the election to one round. The results for the 2006 and 2011 elections were contested.
Kabila is in his second and last term in office according to the constitution. A presidential election must take place in November.
Kabila seems to be in no hurry to organise elections that will see him leave. Observers and opposition parties fear he does not want to go after 15 years in power and accuse him of delaying tactics.
Five months before the elections, his government has not started preparing for a poll. It has argued there is not enough time to organise considering the challenges of voter registration and a lack of funds.
The exercise is expected to cost at least $1 billion.
Kabila has instead proposed national dialogue to find a consensus on how to deal with the challenges. Opposition parties have rejected this as a ruse to legitimise his stay.
Kabila has asked the constitutional court to interpret Article 70 of the constitution which stipulates that the outgoing president stay in power until a new one is inaugurated.
The opposition sees article 70 as applicable to a normal situation where elections have taken place. For Kabila’s corner, it means a stay in power with or without elections.
The court interpretation allows Kabila to stay in power indefinitely until elections.
The opposition has called the ruling a coup.
Meanwhile, intimidation of opposition leaders, activists and the media has increased.
In the firing line is the popular former Katanga governor Moise Katumbi, who is accused of recruiting mercenaries to destabilise the country.
An arrest warrant has been issued for him.
He was in South Africa for medical treatment after tear gas was thrown at him by state security as he was going for his third court appearance on mercenary charges.
How and why have we come to this situation when everything pointed to a new beginning for the DRC, when everyone was expecting Kabila to graciously give power to a successor elected through democratic elections?
First, under Kabila, despite noticeable progress on the macro-economic level, the country has not transformed. It remains a dysfunctional state, giving credence to those who have argued that elections are not democracy.
The expectation that elections would provide an opportunity for nation-building has proved difficult to realise in the DRC.
The central government under Kabila has shown no willingness or capacity to proceed with democratic consolidation and state reform.
Second, after 15 years of democratic rule, the government is not in control of the entire territory, violence persists in the east. The army is a shadow of what it was, corruption is on the rise and no effort has been made to reform the public administration.
Third, despite positive macro-economic indicators, the state is not able to provide basic services to even a third of the people.
Kabila has kept a comprador bourgeoisie that is consuming much without producing anything. The country remains in a primitive accumulation mode.
The state remains a ficti- tious one, a fiction that puts the country at risk of reversal into anarchy if the elections are not organised.
The only significant change from 2006 is that the country had its first legitimate government since the assassination of Patrice Lumumba in 1961.
Congolese appreciate that legitimacy, which is why in spite of deficiencies in previous elections, they were willing to accept the results and move on.
But that legitimacy might be interrupted if the 2016 presidential elections are not organised.
Whatever solution is found to avoid organising the next elections, Kabila’s legitimacy will diminish if he remains in power.
The restoration of the legitimacy of government is a starting point for nation-building for a post-conflict country, but the state can emerge only when its authority is restored.
Despite two consecutive elections, electoral democracy has not found domicile in Congolese institutions and mind.
A lack of political will to restore the key determinants of state power – the army, the public administration, the independence of Chapter 9 institutions (the electoral commission) and the justice system – has been the main barrier to the consolidation of democracy.
These determinants are necessary for a juridical and empirical statehood to emerge; but they are captured by the political elite to serve its own interests.
The collapse of the Congolese state was profound when Kabila took power and it is unrealistic to expect overnight change. But state restoration requires new paradigm shifts which he failed to introduce.
Also lacking is a leadership that can provide hope for a different tomorrow. It is difficult to define the nature of the leadership and how it articulates the question of state transformation. The current leadership, in government and outside, is unable to produce a consistent programme of state reform with clear ideas of the ultimate aim, a correct understanding of the path leading to that aim, and an accurate conception of the true state of affairs.
The opposition is united only in the bid to push Kabila out but lacks clear transformative programmes.
For the ruling class, the fear of losing power and the consequences of that, forces it to spend all its time designing strategies to maintain power, even if that means plunging the country back into the heart of darkness.
This is why the ruling party is predisposed to act outside the rule of law or revert to undemocratic acts.
The Congolese lack the will to seek a new beginning.
There is a clear evidence of unwillingness by those who control political power to make democracy work.
This weakness is a manifestation of what economist Gunnar Myrdall calls “soft states”. These are states that continue to exist amid corruption and disorder.
But something has changed in the country. The people’s assertiveness has grown. This is comforting.
Congolese people are coming out of their usual lethargy in the face of a serious abuse of power and corruption by the political elite.
They are no longer as polite and subservient as they have been for decades. They are not prepared to be docile in the presence of the abuse of power.
The Congolese people will determine their own future. Unfortunately, it might take place on the streets.
• Kabemba is director of Southern Africa Resource Watch.