Trump’s Korean gamble
WITH US President Donald Trump’s tough talk on North Korea, it is worth asking if this strategy might backfire disastrously, given the American penchant for bullying and big talk, famously exemplified by Trump himself.
This is a distinct possibility in a Far Eastern communitarian context, such as the volatile North Korean situation, the dynamics of which Trump understands very little.
What if North Korea is begging for war?
Trump seems to have shifted the entire burden for diplomacy onto China, but scholars are in agreement that a stable North Korean government is a priority for Beijing and the Chinese influence is limited.
Trump’s key miscalculation might be his neglect or ignorance of the idea of “face” (ganhua in Chinese Mandarin), so vital in communitarian societies such as China and Korea.
Australian criminologist John Braithwaite has explained communitarian societies as cultures where the members enjoy dependent, highly intermeshed relationships.
This is very different from Trump’s own individualistic, dog-eats-dog society. In communitarian societies, “face” (the measure of your estimation by your peers) ranks very highly.
This is the driving force behind Japanese warriors of old falling on their swords and committing suicide in the face of public disgrace and humiliation.
China’s Xi Jinping understands this, as does the new South Korean leader, Moon Jae-in (himself the son of North Korean refugees).
Moon has called for restraint and further talks with the North.
Trump does not understand this, which is why he, resembling the proverbial bull in a china shop, taunts the North with ill-advised utter- ances.
But it is not only North Korea’s face that is at stake here, but also that of China in its pursuit of regional leadership. China cannot be seen to kowtow to American demands.
Beijing is caught up in the middle of a matrix of three considerations.
These considerations are that North Korea is a whimsical regime prone to destabilise regional security, there is a widely held perception that Beijing could rein in its neighbour by applying its considerable economic leverage, and there is a Chinese imperative against economic devastation and regime change in the North.
Of these, a Chinese imperative against economic devastation and regime change is by far the most important to the Chinese.
China has definite geopolitical aspirations to oust the US as the regional leader in the Far East and the Western Pacific.
North Korea strutting its nuclear toys has increased tensions in the region and driven the US’s traditional allies (Japan, South Korea and Taiwan) away from Beijing’s embrace into the arms of the American colossus.
China resents this as it has territorial claims on Taiwan and had moved closer to a rapport with South Korea.
Since 1992, China has had diplomatic relations with South Korea and buys more goods from that country than any other.
These moves and China’s well-known “soft offensive” (whereby Chinese language courses, culture, notably films, and food are exported globally) have been jeopardised by North Korea’s provocative missile exercises.
The general belief that China is eminently able to make the North toe the line – a perception rejected by Chinese leaders – is based on three assumptions.
These are that such a move would have the desired effect of scaring off Kim, that the Chinese have the necessary leverage for such a move and that the Chinese are willing to use such power.
The Chinese are concerned that cutting off energy supplies to the North would erode all influence they may have.
The relationship between North Korea and Beijing is complicated.
It shares a common disdain for American imperialism and aggression. More than 400 000 Chinese soldiers died defending North Korean integrity during the 1950-1951 war of American aggression.
Few in the West are aware of the joyous celebration that swept China after the news of 9/11 broke.
China also helped Pakistan to acquire nuclear capacity during the 1980s as a wedge against India (another US ally that has emerged from the woodwork) and subsequently facilitated Pakistan’s transfer of nuclear capability to the North (although the Chinese have denied this allegation).
Finally, China is most reluctant to allow North Korea to devolve into economic meltdown.
Not only will this result in tens of millions of North Korean economic refugees streaming across the Chinese border, but a destabilisation of the regime could result in a Korean peninsula unified under an American umbrella against China.
Such a scenario will not only endanger China’s regional leadership prospects, but seriously unbalance the power dynamics in the region.
A unified Korea enticed to join the US’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defence missile system on the Korean peninsula will be a momentous setback for the Chinese dream of regional overlordship.
The same applies to the prospect of Japan and South Korea generating nuclear weapons to offset the threat from Pyongyang.
China’s economic ties with North Korea are, without doubt, considerable.
These ties are the regime in the North’s lifeline with exports of coal, iron ore, gold, rare earth minerals (the stuff that goes into your cellphone) and seafood.
At least 90% of its trade is with China. Its most notable import is oil with crude between 750 000 and 850 000 tons expected to pass through the pipeline under the Yalu River this year.
This is the Friendship pipeline close to the Chinese border city of Dangdong famous for its Korean seafood barbecue.
Despite the US’s stance that time for talking is passed and massive military retaliation is probable, what Trump seems to miss in his arrogant assessment of the North Korean problem is the importance of “face” (ganhua) in Far Eastern communitarian cultures such as the Chinese, Vietnamese, Japanese and Koreans.
If North Korea is pushed into a corner, the concept of “face” might explain why it could relinquish all control, and attack Guam and Japan or South Korea.
It might also explain China’s reluctance to rein in Pyongyang.
In his wisdom in dealing with the crisis, Trump would be well-advised to tone down his rhetoric and frame his response to North Korean provocation within the discourse of communitarian “face-saving”.
Failing this, Trump’s bombastic arrogance might be his own undoing in the crisis.