Some uncomfortable historical lessons
NO ONE can credibly take issue with President Cyril Ramaphosa’s opening statement before the State Capture hearings that corruption is not a new phenomenon in South Africa and that the apartheid system was “morally and systemically corrupt”.
And that there was also “a prevailing culture of corruption within the apartheid state, stateowned enterprises, private business establishment and Bantustan administrations”. Nor, we can all agree with Ramaphosa, is corruption unique to the ANC.
But then Ramaphosa launches into what is likely to be the leitmotif of his testimony. The crux of his defence of the ANC – for this week he appeared before the commission as party leader, not the nation’s president – is that it was a momentary aberration.
The party recognises, Ramaphosa reassures us, some in the ANC were “advertently and inadvertently complicit in corrupt actions”. But this did not mean “the ANC is itself corrupt or uniquely affected by corruption”. What rubbish.
If the testimony to the Zondo Commission shows anything, so far, it is that the ANC is corrupt to its very core. Almost every facet of its organisation, from the deployment of cadres to the studious indifference to best managerial practice, is structured to enable looting.
While it is true that the National
Party placed its cadres, Broederbond drones, in the top positions of most SOEs, it differed from the ANC in its goals. The Nats’ primary objective was not to loot but to have SOEs that delivered substantial developmental advantages to South Africa. In this, they succeeded.
Much of Ramaphosa’s testimony was the relentless exoneration of himself, his ministers and his party. Yes, sometimes bad things happened, but no one’s to blame.
As Ramaphosa earnestly explained, cadre deployment was an admirable tool of government that conceivably, when carelessly applied, might cause a nick or two in the user. On occasion, “ill-qualified persons were put into positions”.
When quizzed by Zondo on facilities management company Bosasa funding ANC election activities, Ramaphosa glossed over the problem as just “one of those anomalous events”. Yes, someone somehow dropped the ball. But it was an isolated incident and not any particular person’s fault.
Zondo asked Ramaphosa why so many SOEs were in such a poor state. Ramaphosa initially laid vague blame on “massive system failure”, to which the evidence leader responded by asking whether Ramaphosa should not take responsibility for this. “That is a fair proposition,” Ramaphosa conceded magnanimously. “Some of the [failure] may have been inadvertent, and some may have been purposeful … We acknowledge that some of these things did happen. Yes, things went horribly wrong, but we are here to correct that. We do that with humility and our heads bowed.”
Zondo was not to be fobbed off. “I think it is quite important to acknowledge this but I would like you to identify the actual areas as a party where you did something you shouldn’t have.”
Ramaphosa undertook to do so, but not immediately. He said he would do so at the end of his evidence – in other words not while testifying in his capacity as head of the party, but when he would be giving evidence as head of state.
The exchange encapsulates neatly one of the most dangerous aspects of ANC governance. Ramaphosa is saying, in essence, that he has two answers to any question: the party leader’s answer and the leader of the nation’s answer.
Interestingly, in 1979, at the apogee of apartheid arrogance, a commission of inquiry concluded the then newly inaugurated state president, John Vorster, had, while serving as prime minister, known all about the corruption involved in the so-called Muldergate Scandal and tolerated it. Although this was smallscale malfeasance compared with today’s ANC shenanigans, Vorster resigned in disgrace.
There are some uncomfortable historical lessons here. The Nat cadres deployed to SOEs appear to have been less venal, and more disciplined and capable, than their latter-day ANC counterparts. Also, the Nat party leadership, when it came to public revelations of corruption, were more readily shamed than that of the ANC.
There is a critical difference that will save Ramaphosa from a similar fate to that of Vorster. Any ANC successor one cares to contemplate would be a thousandfold worse than him. For now, as a result of the Jacob Zuma inoculation, Ramaphosa has immunity.