Chronic crime calls for specialist policing
SINCE 2012 there has been a surge in serious, violent and organised crime in South Africa. Combined with corruption, sexual violence, drugs and cyber attacks, the proliferation of these crimes threatens South Africa’s stability and economic prosperity.
Yet despite having more than 152 000 trained officers and a budget of R82.6 billion this year, the police have not been able to get on top of the situation.
SAPS’s crime intelligence finally collapsed in 2011 under the leadership of the disgraced Richard Mdluli, but much of the police’s professional investigative ability was lost between 2000 and 2009.
This was when many specialised investigative units were closed down or dispersed to police stations, destroying the morale of thousands of committed and experienced detectives. It was an ill-considered and counter-productive strategy that ought to be reversed.
Crime is a complex business, ranging from assault to commercial crime by sophisticated syndicates. New felonies such as cybercrime and copper cable theft are costing the country billions.
Many criminals possess expertise that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the average police station detective to successfully investigate them.
It is for this reason that police agencies across the world form specialised teams of detectives and provide them with training and kit to investigate serious categories of crime.
Specialised units are able to focus their combined talent on a specific problem, and they attract talented investigators.
They are particularly necessary for technical crimes such as computer-related fraud, violations of company law and stock exchange regulations; or crimes run by international networks such as child pornography or drug production and dealing.
Specialist units do, of course, need proper management to ensure they don’t develop counter-productive group loyalties and degenerate into corrupt fiefdoms.
In the US, police in narcotics or gang units have on occasion acted like the criminal organisations they were established to eradicate. The Los Angeles Police corruption scandal in the late 1990s had specialised units operating like gangs.
Their widespread corruption and brutality caused 106 criminal convictions to be overturned, and more than 140 civil settlements costing the city $125 million.
Even where specialised units are effective, they may result in empire building, increased friction within police departments, and the mutual withholding of information. There are often arguments for such units to be held to higher levels of accountability, or in extreme situations closed down.
But the benefits outweigh the disadvantages, and studies show that specialisation overall leads to operational effectiveness.
South Africa’s international obligations call for specialist police units. We are signatories to the Palermo Convention and the UN Convention against Transnational Crime, which call for a “dedicated capacity to combat a particular crime”.
The National Development Plan 2030 recommends the re-establishment of specialised units staffed by highly trained and professional police officers to respond to changing crime trends such as nar- cotics, cybercrime, human trafficking and international crime syndicates.
The need for specialist units is also reiterated in the SAPS’s Strategic Plan 2010-14. So why were they shut down, and when will we get them back?
George Fivaz, a career policeman, became the first national commissioner of the new SAPS with his appointment by president Nelson Mandela in January 1995.
Fivaz was a trained detective who had to create a single police service from 11 different forces, each of which had specialised units. He established national and provincial units to investigate police corruption, and specialised teams for crimes including hijacking, taxi violence, gang crime, illegal weapons, political massacres and drugs.
Then came Jackie Selebi, who challenged the justification for many of the investigative units when he succeeded Fivaz in January 2000.
Selebi had no policing experience, and certainly no appreciation for the value of specialised units.
When he took over, there were 537 of these units spread over nine provinces, and he rapidly set about shutting them down, supposedly to boost crime investigation at stations.
By 2002, some of the more prominent police units such as the drug squad, the anti-corruption unit, the murder and robbery unit and the diamond and gold branch had disappeared.
By early 2006, 355 special investigative units had been closed down. Only 286 remained. A second phase of restructuring from 2006 most affected the units responsible for serious and violent crimes; and the cluster of family violence, child protection and sexual offences. The Family, Child and Sexual Offences (FCS) Units were initially closed down, but have sensibly since been restored.
The SAPS justified the restructuring on the basis of the need to empower police stations with the skills of the specialised units, cost-effective use of resources and reducing fragmentation.
However, the idea that moving officers from specialised units to undefined functions at a police station would strengthen local policing was fundamentally unsound, and the hoped-for impact did not materialise. Destroying what works to fix another organisational problem is never a sound solution.
The policy completely ignored what specialised units were about. Once these units were decentralised they stopped functioning as a specialised entity.
The morale and effectiveness of detectives plummeted, and the police lost a vast reservoir of investigative expertise.
It contributed to nearly 10 years of institutional turmoil.
All police forces need a reliable capacity to investigate and combat corruption in their own ranks. This too was destroyed by Selebi. Given that Selebi himself was convicted of corruption, it now seems plausible that his decision had an ulterior motive.
There is no dedicated capacity in the SAPS to investigate police corruption, apart from a limited capability within the Hawks. As a result, police corruption continues to be a major problem and is recognised by the public as being pervasive.
All South Africans should now welcome signs of a reversal in policy, and suggestions at the highest level of government that investigative units may once again become a cornerstone of effective policing. It is urgently needed.
More recently, on March 29, Police Minister Nkosinathi Nhleko announced a decision to consider the reintroduction of specialised crime fighting units.
Disappointingly, however, we might be witnessing a change of heart. On September 8, in a written Parliamentary reply, Minister Nhleko said there was no intention in the police’s 2015-16 performance plan to reintroduce specialised units.
With crime endemic and growing, the
Skilled units are
necessary to tackle sophisticated
crime syndicates
minister’s response is simply not good enough.
It disregards the threat facing South Africans and their economy, and the sensible recommendation in the National Development Plan for the re-establishment of specialised units.
Even without the minister’s change of heart, it will be difficult to establish specialist units of professional police officers without the SAPS and its leadership being professionalised too. Dr Johan Burger is a senior researcher in the Governance, Crime and Justice division at the
Institute for Security Studies