MAHATTAYA’S PFLT:ANOTHER MISSED GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY FORTAMILS

One of the three political parties that have been cancelled by the Commissioner of Elections Mahinda Deshapriya is the People’s Front of liberation Tigers (PFLT), the party that was founded by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 1989. The party which never contested at elections when the LTTE was active was removed from the list of political parties by the Elections Commissioner along with two more ethnicity-based parties, for failing to furnish relevant documents for the renewal of the registration for a long time.

Taking into account the events that followed the forming of the PFLT, one can only inferably attribute this initiative by the “world’s most ruthless terrorist outfit” as many analysts claim, to its need to deceive the government of President Premadasa into believing that it was serious with the peace process that had been fresh and moving at the time. However, it would have been a golden opportunity for the Tamil leaders to win over broader autonomy, had the LTTE exploited the situation and entered into the mainstream democratic politics through this party.

By the time the PFLT was formed the LTTE was the only Tamil armed group to be reckoned with out of dozens of such groups committed for a separate Tamil State within the Sri Lankan territory a few years ago. Many groups by then had given up the armed struggle for the Tamil Eelam and some had entered the democratic mainstream with the signing of the Indo-lanka Accord of 1987 which introduced the Provincial Council system through the 13th Amendment to the Constitution, a piece of legislature that has become the main topic in the political circles nowadays.

The LTTE accepted the Indo-lanka Accord under pressure by India and in a way its leader V. Prabhakaran was humiliated by the then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in that process. However, it reneged on its commitment to the Accord in few weeks and had resumed hostilities from September, 1987 inviting even Indian troops under the Accord.

President Ranasinghe Premadasa, who was voted into power in late 1988 amidst brutal violence by the LTTE in the North and the JVP under cover of the Deshavimukthi Janatha Vyaparaya (DJV) in the south, invited both groups for talks soon after his ascendancy to the mantle. The northern rebels, who had then been cornered into the Mullaitivu jungles by what was then officially called the “Indian Peace Keeping Force” (IPKF), that had been brought in under the “Accord” promptly and positively responded and talks between the outfit and the government began in late 1989.

This was the first time that the LTTE had come forward for talks with the Sri Lankan government on its own thus creating great enthusiasm and hope among the countrymen for peace. It was against this backdrop the rebels formed their political party and registered it with the Elec- tions Commissioner, vindicating that enthusiasm and hope. Ironically, the title of their party did not bear the term “Tamil Eelam” or “Eelam” in it, in spite of some other parties such as Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) managing to be registered without a title change.

Goapalaswamy Mahendrarajah, better known as Mahattaya, the then deputy leader of the LTTE who was then leading the outfit’s Wanni cadres had been assigned to lead the peace talks with the government. He was also appointed the President or the leader of the newly founded political party, the PFLT and Yogaratnam Yogi, a charismatic young LTTE leader was the general Secretary of it.

The talks were highly successful from the LTTE’S point of view, as President Premadasa seemed to be prepared to accommodate any demand except for a separate State put forward across the negotiating table. The rebels blocked the entrance of the Jaffna Fort then occupied by the troops with a huge bunker and planted onion on it. Some people attrib- uted the government’s move during the talks to remove the Sinhala letter “Sri” from the number plates of new vehicles to the very talks.

Interestingly, the Sinhala letter “Sri” on number plates was the focal point during the 1958 communal riots, as vandalizing of those newly introduced number plates in the north had been one of the triggers of those riots.

Finally, despite the profound mutual distrust between the negotiating parties, President Premadasa took steps to dispatch lorry loads of weapons, cement and other war materials to the LTTE, even without the knowledge of his Cabinet. When the LTTE wanted to oust the Indian troops from the shores of the country, President Premadasa obliged even to that with a pronouncement at a temple function, severely damaging the relationship with the giant neighbour. Ultimately, once the LTTE got what it wanted done it resumed the hostilities on June 10, 1990, using a trivial incident, an arrest by the Kalmunai police of a Muslim tailor who was stitching LTTE uniforms, over an alleged illicit love affair.

Even then Premadasa was so amenable that he seemed to have ordered the police personnel in the Eastern Province to surrender to the LTTE without making counter attacks. This resulted in the now famous brutal killing of more than 600 policemen by the eastern Tigers then led by Karuna.

These events point to President Premadasa’s zealous craving for the success of the peace process that he had initiated. And this also indicates as to what the President’s response would have been had the LTTE genuinely attempted to achieve autonomy broader than what the Indo-lanka Accord had specified and mobilized the PFLT to take control of the Tamil dominated Northern and Eastern Provinces. Definitely it was a golden opportunity for the Tamil leaders who had been demanding greater autonomy, despite the question whether devolution would solve the problems of the Tamil people or not.